


Volume 1. Issue 2
December 2021

ISSN: 2789-2298

African Journal of
**GOVERNANCE AND
PUBLIC LEADERSHIP
(AJoGPL)**

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Editorial

Public Governance and leadership in times of Uncertainty. Intimacy of Politics and Science in Pandemic Management?

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Introduction

Societies of all times have withered the storms caused by social, political and economic disruptions. Throughout the journey of mankind, problems have often presented themselves and solutions have always been found. Men and women who have always been in charge of the public arena have always attempted to get answers. Politicians and scientists have always intimately worked together. The current situation the world finds itself in orchestrated by the monstrous Covid-19 is not different. The question in the minds of the public is what has so far influenced the containment measures of covid-19-politics or science?

As the world quickly came to terms with the social, economic, political and technological effects of covid-19, the politicians looked to scientists as the only hope. Of course, scientists equally looked to politicians for political guidance and facilitation. In many countries of the global, at the height of the second wave, political institutions failed and others crumbled but withstood the pressure. Public administrations demonstrated that they lagged 30 years behind the technological frontier.

Since the early onset, decision making in the pandemic has relied on the reported data on cases and deaths (Karlinsky, and Kobak, 2021). Politicians are given the statistics by now their intimate friend scientists to make the communication to the public. At the earliest stages of the pandemic, many governments shied away from evidence-based policies and instead preferred to listen to experts whom they carefully selected (Barberia, Plümper, Whitten, 2021). The initial response of politicians was that this was a simple matter that would wither. The case of President Trump and President Magufuli at the time demonstrated how far politicians were willing to ignore science and move it alone.

As the ramifications of Covid intensified and it created a paralysis of most public administration systems and tested the capacity of leaders in offering solutions to problems; the role of scientists against increased. The pandemic has thus now created more working connections between politicians and scientists. Benner (2021) in his commentary 'Pitfalls Between Science, Politics and Public Debate: Lessons From the COVID-19 Pandemic', and as related by the global public policy institute, gives more insights about the relationships. The author suggests that Scientists, policymakers and the media can and should learn lessons on how policymakers and the public can best draw on scientific expertise. They observe that when politicians suggest the uniformity of scientific opinion to legitimize uncomfortable decisions, the credibility of both science and politics suffer.

In times of crisis, scientific evidence ought to provide an important impetus for political debates about the ‘right’ course forward.

Politics and science have worked together on the various containment measures. While Covid-19 has been the toughest stress test for political institutions, public policies, and public administrations across countries, it has created a synergy between the two fields that are core to the running of government. Beyond its social and economic impacts, the pandemic has redefining the relationships between science, public policy, and society (Callaway, Ledford, Mallapaty, 2020). Although the worldwide plea to “follow the scientists’ advice” immediately resonated in media spaces and public debate less than one week after the first Covid-19 case was diagnosed, it is difficult to overlook the uncertainties that have accompanied scientific advising to governmental decision-making.

A variety of policies have been implemented around the world in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Riley, Xie & Khurshid, 2021). It is understandable there has been variation in the content, implementation and enforcement of policies but across countries, the measures have either been pharmaceutical or non-pharmaceutical based. The non-pharmaceutical strategies have relied on social distancing and surveillance efforts with testing to identify active cases. The first available non-pharmaceutical response has been the isolation of the infected individuals (Hellewell et al.2020). The second strategy has been isolating the geographic regions the virus has reached from regions to which the virus has not yet spread (Chinazzi et al.2020). The strategy has been isolating the people that have a high probability of dying from an infection-the old and vulnerable (Marais and Sorrell, 2020). The fourth strategy relies on policies that aim at drastically reducing social interactions into what is popularly referred to as a “lockdown” approach (Plümper, Neumayer, and Pfaff 2021). Obviously, these strategies are not mutually exclusive but rather tend to reinforce each other. The strategies have been guided by the close working relationship between science and politics.

The COVID-19 pandemic is not only a public health crisis but also a major policy crisis (Riley, Bo Xie & Khurshid, 2021). While the world has since moved on, the capacity of the state in responding to crises of a big magnitude has been sharply questioned. The health care systems of most countries have been left depleted. The world of public administration has suffered serious setbacks. Education systems have been majorly fractured and to recover will take some time in a number of countries. Elections have been held under new lockdown measures (Capano, 2020). Online platforms have sharply taken over the systems of service delivery. The role of the military and security forces which had always been invincible in public service delivery has become more visible. The private sector systems have been brought to their knees.

The issue

This is the second issue of the African journal of governance and public leadership which comes at a time the aforementioned pandemic has caused unimaginable sufferings with its social, economic and political ramifications. This second issue presents six papers. From Tanzania and using *Lipsey’s street level bureaucracy (SLB) analogy*, Denis Kamugisha explains how public service delivery in Tanzania has been affected and what strategies need to be deployed to make improvements. He bases his argument on the glaring gaps in public service delivery at the different levels of government. The author informs us that through a street-level bureaucracy perspective there is a notion that SLBs always develop strategies to

address some challenges they face in doing their businesses. Nevertheless, there is also a view that such strategies may contradict public policy intentions or limit the effectiveness of the 'legal rule' or 'order'. Coping strategies at the local level dance to the tune of operating forces in the social fields. The study findings confirm that in certain scenarios SLBs' coping strategies and interventions either comply with public policy intent or not. Such strategies became social rules, norms and values. Compliance with legal order was reflected in the interface between SLBs and citizens through school committees where it was acceptable to ask parents to contribute money to purchase more desks, chalk, chairs, tables and textbooks.

In the times of the pandemic, the role of the health workers gender has received global recognition. The medical doctors in particular have proved vital partners with government. That is why, a paper on '*A Micro-Analysis of Motivation of Doctors at Parirenyatwa Referral Hospital in Zimbabwe*' by Sharon Hofisi and Obey Chingoiro. The authors analyse the importance of motivating doctors using a case study of Parirenyatwa Group of Hospital (PGOH) but with implications to a wider health system. The paper concludes that the ways that could motivate doctors at PGOH include non-monetary benefits, improvement in medical supplies and equipment, and prioritising economic hardship salary adjustments or cushioning their salaries through hardship allowances. The study found that non-monetary benefits which include vehicle, support for the relocation of workers' spouses and suitable accommodation, and low-interest student loans offered to workers interested in furthering their professional development are critical aspects which need consideration by the stakeholders.

The third article by Sharon Hofisi and Tafdzun C. Chisambiro dives into the debates of *a nexus between ministerial intervention and the performance of metropolitan Councils in Zimbabwe*. The study reports findings obtained from explorative and evaluative research methods to analyze and examine the implications of ministerial interventions in the performance of the council. The authors relied on the use of desk-top research the study was reliant on secondary sources that are books, council reports, journals, e-journals and available literature on the matter were being explored as well as information from key informant interviews. The authors report how the minister's intervention represents the dangers of allowing executive excesses in the administration of Metropolitan Councils and how most of the dismissals has created the impression that good governance is sacrificed at the altar of political expedience.

Governance and leadership tend to be complex and no single discipline makes it perfectly well to explain these subjects. A multidisciplinary lens is required. In this regard, the article by Leonardo da Silva Guimarães Martins da Costa on '*Transdisciplinary of physics, philosophy, economics, law, psychology and politics applied to public administration*' is helpful. The author writes from a heavily practical experience of the Brazilian public administration system. He explains transdisciplinarity as concerned with the dialogue of opposite poles, as the interaction and the integration of opposites (dualities), considering dialectics between specialists and generalists, between the analytical and synthetic method. The main objective of his study was to evidence transdisciplinary as a tool for problem solving, as applied knowledge and understanding of reality, more than the mere intellectual view. He suggests this this approach to public management needs to be based on the principles of 1) duality – interaction and integration of opposites, specially the analytical and synthetic methods and 2) four elements - rationality, feasibility, reasonableness and meaning.

Elections are a key feature of a functioning democracy. Elections determine the leaders selected by citizens to manage the affairs of government on their behalf for a constitutionally prescribed duration. In article 5, Gift in an article entitled '*The Timing and legitimacy in the announcement of presidential results in the 2018 general elections in Zimbabwe*', qualitatively describes the experience of Zimbabwe in Presidential election decisions of 2018. The authors suggest that the timing in the announcement of presidential results by the Zimbabwean Electoral Commission (ZEC) must have more innovative ways of managing the process in light of a variety of outcomes. This is in recognition of the long-drawn struggle for democracy, economic recovery, and the well-being of citizens in Zimbabwe which has been on the agenda of many people. The paper observes that the important role of ZEC has been neglected on its treatment of results due to past experiences of rigging and delayed announcements of presidential results. The study suggests important lessons for other democracies in the timing of the announcement of presidential results.

Finally, we turn back to Tanzania with an article by Wilfred U Lameck on the *determinants of employee retention in Tanzania's local government context*. The author was motivated by the growing trend of employee turnover which has forced many organizations to devise strategies of ensuring that the best and the most talented people are retained within the organization. The findings reported were obtained from a sample of 150 respondents obtained from Ikungi District Council. The author concluded that to understand the factors influencing employees' retention particularly in local government authorities, both managerial or leadership factors together with personal factors should be taken into consideration. The paper reports for example how leadership style of district local government authorities affected leaders and subordinate relationship.

Conclusion

Public management and leadership remain critical for society functioning. Within the current health global pandemic, many countries have tested the importance of sound systems of public management. Those countries with strong systems of public management including health systems have been able to withstand the damages by the pandemic. While there are vigorous debates about what governments should do and not do including the effectiveness of lockdowns and to what extent privacy should be protected, and how to balance the trade-off between health and the economy; what has been uncontested is the importance of a connected system of response. Beyond the questions of effectiveness any approaches, the societies which function better endeavor to build strong systems of managing public affairs. The relationship between politics and science needs to be balanced against the broader public good.

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
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Coping with service delivery deterrents in Tanzania: An eye on Lipsky's cutting-edge work

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AJoGPL

ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 2.

pp. 8-28, Dec 2021

<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

There is consensus in public administration literature that a robust service delivery is the result of numerous actors' interplay including policymakers, citizens, and street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). While this supposition has not been refuted hitherto, the Tanzanian experience shows that service delivery, particularly primary education, is still in a snail's pace. This challenge is associated with a lack of mutual interface between aforesaid actors because the central government dominates decisions regarding service delivery. This deterrent has opened up a new window for street-level bureaucrats to execute own de-facto policies. This notion is well featured in street-level bureaucracy theory, which assumes that at the end of policy chain SLBs can develop a pattern of practices to deal with difficult encounters. Since how SLBs respond to diverse context when faced with some difficulties in the due course of rendering public services is not clearly articulated in Tanzanian literature, this study sought to fill up this gap. The study employed street-level bureaucracy theory and a qualitative paradigm to explain how SLBs operate in difficult encounters to deliver primary education in the Tanzanian context. The findings reveal that in difficult moments SLBs can adopt a number of strategies to deal with service delivery deterrents by rationing resources as well as routinizing, modifying, and simplifying work or opting for exit strategies. Furthermore, coping strategies may either comply with public policy intentions or not. To ensure a robust service delivery, the central government is inclined to formulating feasible policies for enhancing mutual interaction among key stakeholders.

Key words: Street-level bureaucrats, policymakers, service delivery

Introduction

Numerous scholars in public administration have divergent views on the subject of service delivery. Despite not having a universal definition, service delivery is viewed as the interplay between policy makers (council officials and councilors), citizens (beneficiaries) and street-level bureaucrats (providers) (Ringold and colleagues 2012; Bold and colleagues 2010; Ahmed and colleagues 2005). The aforesaid actors can enhance a robust service delivery by performing various public administration functions with a high level of commitment and integrity. This is imperative because a robust service delivery requires joint efforts in solicitation and allocation of resources. For example, council officials and councilors from Mvomero District and Moshi Municipal Councils can make feasible policies and execute them to address citizens' concerns, like access to primary education.

If the quality of education is in shambles, citizens may demonstrate voice or exit strategies. Moreover, citizens' concerns cannot be resolved if they do not constitute part and parcel of the decision making process. Taking part in decision making platform empowers citizens to demand accountability, which is their constitutionally right. For citizens to demand accountability they need access to relevant information. Policy makers and frontline policy implementers (street-level bureaucrats) have the responsibility of enhancing citizens' access to right information. SLBs constitute part of policy executors who work in difficult environment that is associated with limited resources. Street-level bureaucrats referred to in this context are teachers, particularly from Mongwe, Dakawa (Mvomero), Mnazi and Njoro (Moshi) primary schools, who can interact with government officials, councilors, citizens, parents and pupils in the due course of rendering public services.

Since it has not been refuted that the interaction between government and non-government actors enhances a robust service delivery, studies conducted across the world, Tanzania inclusive, do not confirm that aforesaid interface always culminates in a robust service delivery as a result of existing restraints. Despite the fact that Tanzanian policies embrace joint action regarding service delivery, the experience reveals that service delivery, particularly primary education, is at a snail's pace due to lack of mutual interface among key actors. This is because the central government has always continued to extend its tentacles over local government affairs (Kamugisha 2019; Chaligha 2014; Faguet 2012). The interface between the central government and other actors does not always accord discretionary power to LGAs over finances, staff and infrastructures (Kessy and McCourt 2010). This raises the question of how this situation can be improved because schools seem to operate poorly. Surprisingly, in spite of the aforesaid deterrents, there are hardly any cases of closing the schools. This situation has opened up an avenue for cross examining how the theory (street-level bureaucracy) in use works in the context of Tanzanian.

The theory assumes that when frontline workers are caught up in a difficult state to address certain beneficiaries' concerns such as client inability to access education, SLBs always develop a pattern of practices to keep things moving in semi-autonomous social fields (Lipsky, 1980). However, Moore (1973) contended that a pattern of practices may limit government's control over semi-autonomous social fields. This posed three questions. First, what are the deterrents of service delivery of schools from selected LGAs in Tanzania? Second, how do street-level bureaucrats cope with the deterrents of service delivery? Third, how do street-level bureaucrats' operations comply with public policy intentions in semi-autonomous social fields? This paper starts by defining concepts 'service delivery' and 'street-level bureaucracy'. It then presents the study's conceptual framework, followed by a description of service delivery deterrents and what causes them. It further explains how SLBs devise ways of dealing with service delivery deterrents, and how these strategies limit government's control over semi-autonomous social fields or how they affect execution of public policies. Finally the paper draws some concluding remarks.


Conceptual Framework

Concepts usually display diverse meanings to suit certain purposes. This part defines the key concepts '*service delivery*' and '*street-level bureaucracy*.' It further presents street-level bureaucracy theory by Lipsky (1980).

Service delivery

Service delivery as pointed out before is the interplay amidst state (government) and non-state actors (Ringold and colleagues 2012; Bold and colleagues 2010; Ahmed and colleagues 2005). A state actor covers a person who acts on behalf of a governmental body with some limitations in exercising his/her discretionary power. The good examples are policy makers (bureaucrats or council officials and councilors), citizens and frontline policy implementers. Non-state actors are organizations and individuals not affiliated with, directed by, or funded through the government. Several categories of them come from academic institutions, NGOs, CBOs, philanthropic foundations, private sector entities, to mention but a few. The joint interaction among actors facilitates a robust service delivery because there is no single actor that has all the necessary resources to address complicated issues. For instance, the delivery of services such as education needs a combination of several inputs, like qualified teachers (street-level bureaucrats in this context), direct or indirect citizens' participation in school matters, relevant text books, classrooms, student or pupils' dormitories, staff quarters, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In a nutshell, service delivery, particularly primary education, can be illustrated by Figure 1, which defines the roles of actors (government officials, councilors, citizens and service providers) as they jointly interact to deliver services.

Figure 1: Stakeholders' Interface Regarding Service Delivery



Source: Modified from Kamugisha (2019), Ringold et al., 2012

Figure 1 accords roles of key stakeholders as they interact to render services. First, policy makers (i.e. local government officials and councilors) have the role of promoting development by planning well and allocating scarce resources wisely through mutual decision making. This is anticipated by reformers to culminate in local government having substantial discretionary power or autonomy over human, physical and financial resources decisions. Despite the milestone realized hitherto, the study by Warioba (2008) revealed the mushrooming of conflicts between governmental and non-governmental actors over socio-economic and political affairs at the local level, implying a lack of mutual interface between them. Second, citizens could hold SLBs accountable through '*client power*' because they are '*part and parcel*' of decision making in school committees meetings. Citizens can also indirectly hold policy makers accountable for their actions or inaction, especially when the services they render are either of poor quality or are unreliable. The strategies citizens can use are '*voice*' and '*exit*' or removing the government in power through the ballot. The biggest problem citizens encounter when they want to make informed decisions is information asymmetry. Third, through a '*compact*', bureaucrats and councilors can come up

with flexible policies, laws, and procedures that enhance effective service delivery. However, to bring this about, policy makers would need to ensure that frontline workers are sufficiently motivated through the 'carrot' or 'stick' approach (Shafritz et al., 2011). This means that excellent performers would be positively rewarded (carrot) to maintain their outstanding performance, and negative reinforcement (stick) would be used to change bad behaviors over non performers, although this is not always practical. The purpose of motivation is to empower service providers (street-level bureaucrats) to provide essential services that meet or go beyond citizens' expectations.

Street-level bureaucracy

This concept was coined in 1960s and it became popular in 1980s after the publication of Michael Lipsky's seminal work. Since then much attention has focused to street-level bureaucrats' behavior, principally the discretionary (administrative) notion, which denotes the feasible or stretchy exercise of judgment and the power of making decisions by bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). Generally, the term 'street-level bureaucracy' entails both 'granted' and 'used' discretionary autonomy or power by street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). The latter embraces 'judgmental discretion', which means 'frontline policy implementers with a high level of discretion operating in the bureaucratic structure of lower-level governments with a high level of contact with citizens' (Kamugisha, 2019: 1). As pointed out earlier, SLBs in this context stand for primary school teachers, whose level of interaction with citizens or parents or pupils is very high, as well as with lower-level government leaders, who execute policies in a given social context with certain autonomy. Although the body of knowledge on the SLBs concept has shifted from behaviorism to institutionalism, across the globe, the former has not been thoroughly studied in the Tanzanian context. However, the following SLBs characteristics provided in the literature are a help:

The experience has shown that primary school teachers, SLBs, repeatedly interact with parents and learners with considerable discretion in the course of doing their job (Hupe, 2013). In this process they experience insecurity caused by a number of factors including an unmanageable workload as a result of poor quality staff, infrastructure, financial and non-financial incentives. Despite this obstacle, SLBs have to remain committed to delivering essential services beyond expectations. Although under normal circumstances they cannot fulfill their mission, they are compelled to develop certain strategies to cope with these difficulties, regardless of whether or not their endeavors are congruent with public policy. SLBs have a certain level of freedom to undertake their obligations, which may include implementing public policy or making certain decisions (Lipsky, 2010). According to Doh (2013) and Dada (2013), SLBs discretionary power regarding service delivery increases along the continuum from de-concentration to devolution because government control over LGAs becomes less in both theory and practice. The legal framework accords substantial power to lower tiers of government to define their own destiny without central government interference although it has been difficult to implement. The mere presence of such a clause implies that SLBs and primary school teachers have some discretionary power to develop and execute their own curriculum.

SLBs have the potential to demonstrate a high level of commitment to serve citizens with whom they interact in a given context to ensure the delivery of essential service (Lameck 2017; Lipsky 2010). However, SLBs face shortage of personnel to deal with individual cases or clients. For instance, teachers as SLBs fail to spend time with individuals or pupils because they teach big classes (Kamugisha, 2019).

It should be remembered that SLBs do not choose their pupils despite the fact that they come from the populations they serve. Nevertheless, their teaching behavior may have a positive effect on the pupils, their parents and the entire population.

Performance of SLBs depends on the nature of the resources available (Lipsky, 1980). However, to carry out their duties, SLBs and teachers may need more resources than are available. For instance, increased enrolment has led to a greater demand for teachers, infrastructure, textbooks, pit latrines drop holes, desks, classrooms, libraries and staff quarters. To cope with this situation, SLBs may develop certain strategies to limit demand, utilize the available resources to the maximum, and modify their work to meet their objectives. Weatherley and Lipsky (2002: 172) suggest that SLBs can operate freely by developing routine procedures and rationing the prevailing resources, modifying goals, and controlling the number of service recipients. This means that SLBs have the opportunity to implement policy to fulfil their responsibilities at work. These characteristics relate with Lipsky's (1980) contention by airing out that public policies are not only those formulated by members of parliament or top administrators, but in reality they come from crowded work place offices shaped by regular interactions. Anchored on the public administration field, SLB is thoroughly embedded in the notion of administrative discretion. This implies a high level of implementation of certain public policies and programmes by SLBs, especially when they are under pressure to produce results, as supported by Lipsky (2010), Tummers et al., (2014). It also describes the characteristics of SLBs focusing on their personal views, beliefs, norms and demographic characteristics. Concerning administrative discretion, Walker and Niner (2015), Hupe (2013), and Brodtkin (2012) maintain that SLBs' behavior and policy outcomes can partly be a result of public trust, and of the administrative culture or system in different contexts. Based on Lameck's (2017:2) view, SLBs are frontline workers with a degree of discretion, who are faced with a heavy workload and conflicting demands from within and outside the organization. While discretion in Lameck's view covers only individual judgments, in reality, it captures both granted and individual verdicts. Therefore, SLBs may exercise granted and judgmental discretion to make decisions regarding service delivery.

Street-level bureaucrats' discretion

Discretion used by SLBs is more meaningful in a devolved system than in a centralized one (Doh 2013; Dada 2013; Hupe 2013; Ringold et al., 2012). The scholars contend that the exercise of discretionary power leads to the gradual devolution of autonomy by central government, embracing both granted discretion (autonomy) and judgmental discretion that can be used by individuals or SLBs. The problem with judgmental discretion is that it contains an element of leniency regarding the decisions public servants make because according to Burns (2004), people's behavior follows the perception of reality and not reality itself. Discretion in this context focuses on SLBs' actual behavior in relation to the contextual mandate (Hupe, 2013), which involves 'discretionary choices' (Brodtkin, 2011), 'discretionary users' (Oberfield, 2010), and 'discretionary behavior' (Walker and Niner, 2005). This implies that SLBs (teachers) can exercise their freedom to make an informed choice in developing or implementing the curriculum in relation to their objectives. Tummers (2011) views that SLBs act differently. This freedom can be exercised in a specific context (Evans, 2010). Consequently, execution of discretionary power may be deterred by a situation or context (environment).

The foundation of judgmental discretion is laid down by Locke and Davis. Whereas Locke (1948) argues that at the end of policy chain cruelty commences, Davis (1969) refutes Locke's view by asserting that at the end of the law not only does tyranny start, but also discretion commences. Davis conceptualizes discretion as either beneficence, justice, reasonableness, or tyranny, injustice, arbitrariness. Although Locke looks at this concept from a pessimistic viewpoint, Davis remains realistic considering both pessimistic and optimistic versions. For Locke, the use of judgmental discretion to deliver primary education always contradicts policy intentions. This implies that SLBs' strategies address only frontline workers' intentions rather than people or pupils' interests. For Davis, street-level bureaucrats and primary school teachers focus either on their own or people's interests depending on circumstances. This is substantiated by Anisman (1975) who asserts that under certain circumstances public officials bestowed with authority may choose to act or not; rely on one path, or opt for the other; hire a professional, or a friend, or a foreigner, or an indigenous. In so doing, the government official may be influenced by own goals or interests more than people's interests. Although Anisman agrees with Davis, he is more inclined to Locke. Based on this controversy, the exercise of discretion may result in both public and personal gain. When a person gains more than the public gains, it may be interpreted as the misuse (abuse) of power.

However, an understanding of discretionary power is not complete without shedding some light on 'granted discretion', which embraces a degree of freedom accorded by policies, legislation, statutes and other mandates (Hupe, 2013). In this regard, Robert (1975) mentions three types of discretion. The first is 'explicit discretion', expounded by Keith (2005) as discretionary powers conferred on administrators through statutes. Where there is a statutory or legislative vacuum, judgmental discretion is manifested. The second type of discretion is 'Prosecutorial discretion' whereby decisions on law enforcement may differ according to context. A good example is of a prosecutor and defendant or offender. Prosecutorial discretion accords power to a prosecutor to choose whether or not to charge a wrongdoer (person) for wrongdoing (crime) and files the charge. In this context, a primary school teacher may decide to warn a pupil being suspected of burglary or charge him/her with burglary. This goes to show that decisions and outcomes regarding service delivery may vary across contexts and the nature of the service being offered (Robinson 2007, Alsop *et. al.*, 2006). The third type of discretion focuses on 'appraisal of evidence' where decisions conform to situational (value) judgment. It is about taking gathered information and analyzing their significance (relevance), reliability and validity and applying them to the specific context, education in this regard.

Bryner (1987) points out two types of discretion: 'rule making' (legislative) and 'application of rule'. The latter covers all three types of discretion highlighted by Robert (1975). Although teachers' main role is to implement a policy, in a certain context they may formulate and execute their own policies. There is no doubt that teachers as SLBs in a given framework of a certain policy (Burns 2004) may use discretion differently; they can either follow the rules or be rebellious, which means that all types of discretion have both beneficial and detrimental repercussions.

Merits of discretion

Discretionary power can enhance the making of sound choices, depending on the prevailing circumstances. In principle, discretionary choice carries justice and righteousness with it. For instance, primary school teachers exercise their duties as per legislations, policies, circulars, and guidelines under MoESTVT.

Burke (1996) substantiates this by asserting that discretionary choice helps to keep street-level bureaucrats on track in terms of 'right and justice'. This means that in undertaking their duties and taking discretionary decisions teachers are accountable for their actions. Based on Dillman's (2002) view point, wisely exercised discretion ensures that the decisions made by frontline policy implementers, meaning that teachers in this case are both right and effective. Decision makers ensure 'sufficient flexibility' ...and use information in a prudent and humane manner' (Michael and Don Gottfredson 1988: 263). Consequently, in conveying knowledge to learners for example, the exercise of discretion is inclined more to promoting the justice, equity, fairness and equality of beneficiaries than something else. Aristotle asserts that 'treating unequals in the same manner is an abuse of discretion or it is injustice to treat equals in an unequal manner' (ibid.).

Challenges of discretion


Abuse of discretion in the delivery of services, particularly education, has become a common phenomenon today. For instance, it is not an issue to find teachers evading classes; parents not making follow ups on school development of their pupils; school committee not holding teachers accountable for their wrong doings; and government officials not allocating funds for schools development including monitoring and evaluation. The exercise of discretion in this regard manifests itself as malfeasance due to enforcement gaps, injustice, prejudice, favoritism, segregation, stigmatization, diverse interests, and biases in the execution of public policy (Ball et. al., 1985). These problems arise as a result of a breakdown in the interaction between policy makers, citizens and public primary school teachers, where one actor may undermine others due to the imbalance of power. Generally, policy makers seem to be more powerful than other actors, a situation which may hamper their relationship with other actors (Boven and Zouridis 2002). Thus, decisions regarding service delivery may be frustrating if they do not focus on citizens' interests, particularly in the absence of formal rules or at the end of policy chain. If schools have no strong monitoring mechanisms to teachers, there is a likeliness that teachers may not prepare lesson notes, attend classes, teach, compose examinations, mark examination papers, monitor pupils' discipline.. To sum up, the positive and negative sides of discretion are that at one point teachers' interaction with service recipients may or may not enhance compliance with public policy intentions.

Street-level bureaucracy theory

The SLB theory applies to where there is a high demand for services, coupled with inadequate resources, abundant physical and/or psychological threats, and ambiguous job performance expectations (Lipsky, 2010, 1980, 1969). This reflects the ongoing situation in Tanzania. There is an increasing demand for primary education with limited finances, staff and infrastructure or equipment in many parts of the country. Although many efforts have been made by the government to address these predicaments, it seems that school teachers in liaison with people have tried their best to develop strategies for coping with the status quo. This confirms the exercise of internal arrangements at the grassroots to address stubborn predicaments. Doing the internal arrangement at the local level without government's knowledge reveals limited effectiveness of the government in controlling and managing selected schools thoroughly. This leaves SLBs with the discretion to jointly work with people or citizens in their premises to define their fate. This is what Moore (1973:721) observes that at the local level there are certain forces (customs, norms, rules) that shape people's behavior to comply or abide by customary laws. This entails that interaction at the grassroots exhibits distinct operational boundaries in social fields expressed through moral obligations not enforceable by legislation. Frontline workers as they interact with people under certain circumstances

observe existing cultures. This means that social obligation is an established loyalty that is not easy to break as there is the fear of one being excluded from society. Wilhelm (2011) observes that the internal environment provides strong pressure for an individual to comply with the existing system unless one wants to alienate or disentangle oneself from this social field's relationship. Figure 2 demonstrates how this works. It shows how coping strategies are practiced and how they limit government's control over a semi-autonomous social field in selected LGAs in Tanzania.

Figure 2: Slim Efficacy in Dispensaries and Schools



Source: Adapted from Wilhelm (2011) and Kamugisha (2019).

The kind of arrangement in Figure 2 is what compels people while interacting with frontline workers to adhere to informally created rules concerning compliance or non-compliance with public policy intentions; and efforts to change this will not succeed a great deal (Wilhelm, 2011). Moreover, the execution of a legal order may produce results which are different from those anticipated due to the influence of semi-autonomous social fields (Moore, 1973). This means that coping with and limiting a legal order is reflected in the delivery of primary education in several ways in Tanzania. Lipsky (1980) showed what can hamper the robust delivery of primary education in the context of Tanzania, namely, too few textbooks, desks, toilets, staff, staff quarters and classrooms. Others are the lack of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for staff and the funds needed to run the schools, implying that schools will have to close down if these problems are not resolved. The fact that LGAs have not been given substantial autonomy to run primary schools but they are still operating them confirms that SLBs are exercising their discretionary powers as an imperative to deal with the status quo.

Discretion and service delivery trends in Tanzania

Understanding the trends regarding the delivery of essentials services particularly primary education in LGAs since independence in Tanzania (Tanganyika by then) is the notion that discretion had been given through modes of governance in the name of decentralization to enhance a robust service delivery. Autonomy of LGAs is accorded by the United Republic of Tanzania Constitution (1977) articles 145 (1) and 146 (1) which establish their existence and accord some roles respectively. Decentralization was anticipated to increase the quality of governance and service delivery (REPOA 2010). Quality of governance would be understood by local government councils expressing freedom to make policies

and operational decisions without being encroached by central government institutions (URT, 1998). Decentralization, as defined by Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), carries both 'forms' and 'dimensions'. While the former covers de-concentration, delegation, devolution, privatization and partnership, the latter encompasses administrative, political, financial, and economic (market) dimensions. The exercise of discretion and service delivery can be understood under unicentric, multicentric and pluralistic systems varying in 'forms' and 'dimensions' of decentralization as elaborated by Doh (2013).

In the Unicentric era where the governance system embraced de-concentration form of decentralization, decisions regarding collective service delivery were only under the custody of central government. It was at zenith from 1972 to 1982 when local government's autonomy was disbanded (Liviga 2011; Max 1991). It was reflected in various legislations, particularly education, where Act No. 25 of 1978 of Education restricted its provision only to government, implying that non-governmental actors had no opportunity to contribute in the delivery of primary education. Furthermore, centralization hindered primary school teachers from exercising their discretionary power regarding the delivery of primary education. Although these challenges hampered effective delivery of primary education, little has been written about how primary school teachers muddled through. The failure of the unicentric mode of governance to enhance a robust service delivery in local governments fueled a shift from collectivist to individualistic, market-oriented (multicentric) system.

The multicentric system dominated decisions regarding service delivery from the year 1985 to the early 1990s in the form of privatization focusing more on the 'market' than the 'state' (Masue 2014; Sorensen and Torfing 2004), promising to bring a significant improvement on the state's financial capacity as was propagated by IMF and WB. It was anticipated that the state would set sound budgets for the delivery of essential services, like education. However, these neo-liberal policies did not lead to economic recovery as was promised, but instead they increased external debt and frustrated socio-economic and political spheres, which were aggravated by the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the retrenchment of staff (Kamugisha 2019, Masue 2014). Subsequently, the delivery of essential services, including primary education, deteriorated greatly because the government was unable to finance them. In line with that, Mushi (2009) pointed out that public schools were nearly collapsing characterized by obsolete school infrastructures, lack of authorized teaching materials, qualified teachers and inability of the government to motivate teaching staff. This state of art affected service delivery including education. The literature does not explain how street-level bureaucrats and public primary school teachers were able to proceed with the provision of education.

The challenges of multicentric and unicentric systems were to be addressed by pluralistic system in the 1990s, which focused much on increasing a venue for interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors or public private mix regarding service delivery, particularly education. The National Education Policy of 1995 uplifted the restrictions posed by Act No. 25 of 1978 restricting the delivery of primary education to the government only. In this era the government of Tanzania adopted decentralization by devolution to transfer human resources, financial resources, physical resources, autonomy, and responsibilities and improve governance or making of decisions at LGAs, including communities (Kamugisha 2019; Kessy and McCourt 2010). It was thought that the interface between key policy makers (local government officials, councilors), citizens and street-level bureaucrats would culminate in a robust service delivery. Despite the interface between the aforesaid actors, the practice

reveals that service delivery is still ineffective; implying that not always such interaction is mutual and that it always culminates in a robust service delivery. This means that the operations of the aforesaid actors to enhance service delivery may be deterred by a lack of mutual interface between them. Government's interference with local government affairs, information asymmetry among service beneficiaries, conflicts between government officials and councilors, and misappropriation of resources, express some of such deterrents. This provides avenues for application of street-level bureaucracy theory (Lipsky 2010; 1980; 1969).

Methods

This study adopted a qualitative research approach to study how SLBs in Mvomero District and Moshi Municipal Councils develop certain strategies to cope with the deterrents of primary education delivery in Tanzania. The two councils were selected because they constitute the earliest councils formed in phase one and two of the Tanzania local government reform. Similarly, the two councils varied in terms of location, income, population size, performance, and socio-economic activities (CAG Report, 2019). For instance, Moshi council normally got unqualified report while Mvomero council got qualified reports from CAG. Regarding income, most inhabitants of Moshi are Chaga with a relatively higher level of income than their counterparts- Lugulu.

The study was carried out using numerous methods of collection of data. The first method (primary) focused on in-depth interviews covering 32 primary school teachers and six (6) government officials. Observation covered some school sites to ascertain the state of resources, namely human, infrastructural, and financial. Secondly, documentary review facilitated collection of secondary data by reviewing national documents such as policies, guidelines, legislation, research reports and educational programmes.

Results

This section presents the deterrents of service delivery with a bias on primary education (through documentary review, interviews, and observation observation), coping with service delivery (education) deterrents (through interviews, observation and documentary review), and how coping strategies shape (education) public policy.

Primary education deterrents

Since independence, the Tanzanian government has been making deliberate efforts to ensure a robust service delivery. Despite the milestones reached as a result of its initiatives, the reviewed documents reveal that service delivery at LGAs' is still at a snail's pace, implying that a lot more effort is needed, particularly in relation to indicators of primary education (Awinia, 2019). Statistics on enrollment clearly articulated that while pupils' enrolled in public schools increased by 18.6 % (from 7,083,063 pupils in 2004 to 8,639,202 in 2016), the number of teachers enrolling in colleges dropped by 39.2 % in 2008 (from 30,892 to 18,754), implying that when pupils' numbers were growing, teachers' numbers graduating from colleges were going down (Awinia 2019; BEST 2016; URT 2012) and a significant number of school aged children were still out of school (URT-MEST, 2018).

Statistics on the pass rate indicated that there had been a decline in the number of pupils passing the primary school leaving examination based on the set threshold (Mkumbo, 2010). For instance, the percentage went down from 70.5 (2006) to 49.4 (2009) (ibid). Mvomero District and Moshi Municipal Councils indicated that very few children scored an 'A.' "Score trends in 'A' in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 were 0.3, 1, 1.7, 3.4; in 'B' 42.4, 58, 37.9, 44.9; in 'C' 48, 37, 47.5, 44.5; and in D+E 9.3, 4, 12.9, 7.2" (Kamugisha, 2019). The same trend was reflected in the number of pit latrines, drop holes, staff, textbooks, classrooms and desks against the set threshold, as summarized in Table 1. Focusing on the teacher-pupil ratio (TPR), the national level statistics disclosed that while the TPR should be one to forty-five (1:45), practically it was 46 (2000), 54 (2009), 51 (2010), 48 (2011), 70 (2012) and 42 (2016) (Awinia 2019; BEST 2016; Kamugisha and Mateng'e 2014). The TPR in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa, and Mongwe primary schools was 1:39, 1:30, 1:38, and 1:70 respectively (Table 1, No.3). While the first three schools met the required threshold, Mongwe primary school did not due to its remoteness.

Statistics on the classroom-pupil ratio (CPR) reflected the same trend. While one classroom was supposed to accommodate not more than 45 pupils (1:45), national statistics revealed that a normal classroom in the country catered for 92 (2006), 109 (2009), 72 (2010), 66 (2011), 70 (2012), and 77(2016) (BEST 2016; URT 2012). The CPR in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa and Mongwe primary schools was 1:79, 1:49, 1:121 and 1:58, respectively (Table 1, No.5). The status of pit latrines drop holes (PLDH) indicated that the acceptable PLDH-pupil ratio was one to twenty five (1:25) for boys and one to twenty for girls (1:20). Nationally, the trend was 12.5 (2005), 89 (2009), 56 (2010), 53 (2011), 56 (2012) and 56 (2016) (Awinia 2019; BEST 2016; URT 2012). Statistics for the PLDH-boys ratio in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa, and Mongwe was 1:25, 1: 33, 1:47, and 1:29 (Table 1, No.1) and for girls it was 1:20, 1:35, 1:43, 1:25, and 1:29 (Table 1, No.2). Although these statistics are better than the national statistics, they still do not comply with the established threshold. The same applies to textbooks, that is, the book-pupil ratio (BPR). For instance, while each pupil should have his/her own textbook, national statistics showed that 2 shared a textbook in 2001, 3 in 2009, 5 in 2010, 5 in 2011 and 5 in 2012. The BPR in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa, and Mongwe was 1:2, 1: 2, 1:24, and 1: 31 (Table 1, No.4) as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of Characteristics of Selected Schools

N/s	School Features	N.S	Mnazi (MO)	Njoro (MO)	Dakawa (MV)	Mongwe (MV)
	Standard indicators	N.S	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual
1	Boys PLH Pupils Ratio	1:25	1:33	1:47	1:49	1:29
2	Girls PLH Pupils Ratio	1:20	1:35	1:43	1:25	1:29
3	Teacher-Pupil Ratio (TPR)	1:45	1:39	1:30	1:38	1:70
4	Book-Pupil Ratio (BPR)	1:1	1:2	1:2	1:24	1:31
5	Classroom-Pupil Ratio (1:45)	1:45	1:76	1:49	1:121	1:58
6	Desk-Pupil Ratio (DPR 1:2)	1:2	1:3	1:2	1:3	1:3

Source: Kamugisha (2019:119)

Generally, the statistics in Table 1 reveal that Mvomero and Moshi Councils lack autonomy as regards having authority over resources (finances, staff, and equipment) and access to social services, focusing on primary education as explained below.

Authority

The information from Mvomero and Moshi Councils revealed that policy makers had narrow discretionary authority to make decisions at the local level before the reform era of the 1990s. Councilors opined that after the reforms they had discretionary power to sack any council official, including the directors, for violating rules or for squandering resources. They could also make their own by-laws, solicit resources, and allocate them to address jurisdictional matters. Heads of departments were accountable to LGAs executives whereas previously they were only accountable to the respective ministry, (MoESTVT) in this context. Although that seemed to be the case, the notion of autonomy appears to be contradictory because Act Nos. 7 and 8 of 1982 of LGAs give autonomy to the minister responsible for LGAs to create, abolish, and re-establish LGAs even without their consent. In line with that, the government officials and councilors interviewed indicated that executive directors had limited autonomy to solicit funds as a source of revenue and use them as they saw fit, which opposes Ayee's (2008) contention that money is the life blood of decentralization, without which nothing imperative can be done.

Financial resources

This statement by Aye (2008) implies that for decentralization to work, money is crucial. Although the interviewed government officials and councilors from the selected LGAs indicated that they had some financial autonomy, practice revealed that a decision regarding the allocation of financial resources was always overseen by central government as the acting Municipal Executive Director (MED) commented:

Local governments' power to levy and allocate taxes is granted, although in some cases autonomy is limited. The council's own sources of revenue, like property tax and hotel levy have been shifted to the TRA. From the meagre revenue, the directives still require the council to allocate 60 % of own source revenue to development, transfer 20 % to lower level governments, allocate 5 percent to women's groups, 5 percent to youth groups, and render 5 percent as co-funding to donor-funded projects, excluding other unplanned activities. In line with this, LGAs still get conditional and unconditional grants (Kamugisha 2019: 113).

Theoretically, LGAs have substantial autonomy, but in practice the above quotation reveals that LGAs' problems are mainly associated with financial incapacity, which contradicts certain legislations and policies pointed out earlier which accord mandate to LGAs to solicit, plan and use own source revenue sagely on numerous issues, including school development. In addition to that, the capitation grant disbursed to primary schools did not go as budgeted. The following trend tells it all: 75 % of 32 billion (2016) was not disbursed; 67 % of 54 billion (2015); 47 % of 81 billion (2014); 27 % of 133 billion (2013) (Awinia 2019; MoFP 2017).

Human resources

Adequate and qualified human resource can enhance a robust service delivery. The adopted legislations at the lower level of government mandate LGAs to recruit their own personnel with relevant characteristics (URT1998, 1982). But staff recruitment function, particularly of primary school teachers, is overseen by central government through different ministries covering those related with education, finance, local governments, and management of public services. Local government officials and councilors have autonomy to only distribute and transfer staff within their jurisdiction.

However, this is not always the case because staff transfer and distribution is partly influenced by government officials, friends, business men and women, and prominent people through ‘memos’ and ‘networks’ (Kamugisha, 2019). Actually, the recruitment is done by the center through Public Service Recruitment Secretariat (PSRS) under Section No. 29 (1) as amended by Act, No. 18 of 2007. The PSRS functions contradict local government policies and legislations which mandate local government councils’ power of exerting own freedom in making policies to address jurisdictional matters without government encroachment (URT, 1998: 3). Furthermore, resourcing procedures are governed by various Public service decrees including Act No.18 of 2007.

Infrastructure

Autonomy can be assessed based on how officials at LGAs have autonomy to acquire necessary resources and equipment, especially for schools in this context. Table 1 above shows what schools lack enough classrooms, desks, toilets and extra-curricular facilities. The Municipal Executive Director, Municipal Education Officer, and Ward Executive Officer indicated that although LGAs could exercise their discretion on jurisdictional matters, they had limited autonomy (financial resources or capitation grants, physical resources, human resource, including teachers) to address service delivery problems.

Accountability

Accountability can be presented in different ways. This section looks at citizens’ ability to demand accountability, especially when they encounter delays and experience theft by SLBs in trying to get access to essential services. Although Sujarwoto (2012) commented that citizens could either voice or exit when service quality declined, it was imperative to find out what citizens did when they experienced ‘delays’ and ‘theft’. Insights from the two councils given in Table 2 show that 19 % of citizens did not know what to do about delays and 16 % did not know what to do about suspected theft. This was more of a problem in Mvomero than Moshi. While 16 % lodged complaints through the proper channels in the case of delays, 38 % did the same when they suspected theft. Similarly, 41 % did nothing when they encountered delays because they believed that nothing could be done and 41 % did the same when suspecting someone of theft (see Table 2).

Table 2: Extent of Citizens’ Demand for Accountability

Levels	What can you do when encountering delays while seeking public services?			What can you do when suspecting an education officer of stealing?		
	Mvomero	Moshi	Total (%)	Mvomero	Moshi	Total (%)
Do not know what to do	15	4	19	13	3	16
Lodge complaints through proper channels	4	12	16	8	30	38
Use connections with influential people	2	12	14	1	1	2
Offer tips or bribe	8	2	10	2	1	3
Do nothing because nothing can be done	21	20	41	26	15	41
Total (n=50)	50	50	100	50	50	100

Source: Kamugisha (2019)

Table 2 shows that Moshi (urban) citizens were able to demand accountability more than their counterparts, Mvomero-rural, which shows that the difference between rural and urban areas matters when it comes to demanding accountability due to information asymmetry and lack of confidence and connections.

The state of service delivery discussed above concerning school characteristics, authority, finances, decision making, staffing, infrastructure, accountability and access confirm what Lipsky (2010, 1980, 1969) states that when there is a high demand for crucial services, there are conditions that are likely to hinder effective service delivery. Some of them are inadequate resources, physical and/or psychological threats, and ambiguous job performance expectations (ibid.), which is also a case in Tanzania (Kamugisha, 2019). This signifies a lack of symbiotic interface between key service delivery actors and governmental and non-governmental actors. This is because the centre has enormous power over LGAs and so is unwilling to cascade substantial autonomy to LGAs for fear of surrendering its office (Gupta 2009). This culminates in a lack of mutual relationship, and thus, as Wild and colleagues (2015) point out, creating a mismatch between policy making in theory and its execution in practice, thereby restraining resources, authority and power transfer to LGAs. This situation denies citizens an opportunity to participate in development process by giving their opinion, labor and finance, for example, in school construction. Other factors that may hinder accountability include: corruption, lack of infrastructure, information asymmetry, unethical culture, low capacity and technocracy (Muro and Namusonge 2015). Regarding these deterrents, Lipsky (2010, 1980, and 1969) suggests that SLBs would devise mechanisms to cope with the status quo while Moore (1973) observes that coping strategies may tend to limit government's control over semi-autonomous social fields.

Coping with service delivery deterrents

The findings from selected cases show that SLBs can cope with service delivery deterrents discussed in previous sections using various strategies. This section covers a few of them in the context of Tanzania, like resource rationing, making routine procedures, and modification.

Rationing

The findings revealed that where there was high demand for services with limited resources, rationing was introduced to safeguard the distribution of resources and allocation of services without any waste. Rationing was in two ways. First, primary school teachers carried out their tasks by fixing the distribution of services. For example, time was rescheduled or minimized to facilitate teaching when facing staff shortage. Second, they provided services at a certain level to different classes; they prioritized national examination classes at the expense of non-examination classes.

Furthermore, teachers as street-level bureaucrats attempted to reorganize their work to meet their obligations, like saving time for their own benefit. Despite such challenges, rationing meant devising ways to ensure fairness, orderliness, regularity and answerability, and defending workers from beneficiaries' demands for a response. It was a way of legitimizing the reason for not dealing with recipients' concerns at a certain point. On the other hand, SLBs used their discretion to ration services by ceasing to perform certain tasks they were responsible for. Certain schools dealt with inadequacy in terms of both the number and qualification. For instance, although Njoro and Mnazi primary schools had the required teacher pupil ratio (TPR) of one teacher to 45 pupils, teachers of standards one and two were unqualified.

To deal with this scenario, the school administrators requested the Municipal Education Officer to enhance training of teachers without qualification to instill the 3Rs into pupils. Coping with staff shortage, Mongwe primary school arranged for private teaching in return for a small token by getting pupils to

review previous national examination questions, selecting the subjects to teach, and giving priority to examination classes, like standards four and seven. Because Mongwe primary school had a ratio of one teacher serving 70 pupils (1:70), the only way it could cut costs was to engage pupils to teach easy subjects focusing on classes preparing for the final examinations. It also rationed teaching time by reducing the number of days, contrary to education policy intentions because teachers stayed far from Mongwe village for fear of witchcraft practices reported there. Because traveling to and from the school and prepare for class, they arrived at a consensus to teach from Monday to Wednesday, leaving the remaining days for personal business, self-reliance, entrepreneurial and extra-curricular activities. Another way by which teachers dealt with the scarcity of manpower and resources was to bear some expenses. For instance, in the absence of funds allocated for examination or test papers, teachers used their initiative to print pupils' exercise papers in advance and distributed them later, thereby resolving service delivery deterrents.

Simplification and routinization

According to Lipsky (1980) treatise, SLBs face tough conditions in executing their tasks and so they may think of some strategies for dealing with service delivery deterrents in semi-autonomous social fields, simplification and routinization being some of them. The routine activities developed by primary schools are viewed as local rule or formal order taking place in selected schools, regarded by Lipsky as 'social fields' as a result of existing norms enriched by routine and simplification. Generally, SLBs and semi-autonomous social fields' used here to elucidate primary school teachers' operations in selected LGAs. The findings indicated that primary school teachers tended to behave like SLBs, since they had established routines and made life simpler to cope with service delivery deterrents, including inadequate resources, like finances, primary school teachers, teachers' quarters, pit latrines, drop holes and other school infrastructures. As regards the mechanisms used to deal with the shortage of pit latrines and drop holes, with the resulting overcrowding and pupils relieving themselves in nearby bushes, Njoro and Mongwe teachers simplified this problem by encouraging children to take a break every half an hour to reduce queues to the pit latrines. At Mnazi primary school class teachers were routinely involved in managing the queues although it took up a lot of their time, for which they were not given any incentive. It was also noted that a lack of adequate intrinsic and extrinsic incentives compelled teachers to do businesses such as ladies' and gentlemen's salons, motorbike taxi service, and farming, livestock keeping during teaching hours although the Standing orders for the public service 2009 and other Public Service Acts do not entertain the practice. As regards to 'overcrowding', which was difficult to control because the number of pupils' enrolled kept on growing, schools such as Mongwe primary school divided big classes and examination classes into streams, which could be attended to by more than one teacher at different intervals. These findings indicate that implementation of the decentralization policy and its promises by reformers have not led to an improvement in essential services at LGAs, but instead frontline workers have always had to work to bridge the gaps by developing coping strategies to ensure continuity in the delivery of services.

Modification

As already mentioned, Lipsky (2010, 1980, and 1969) indicates that in doing their work SLBs, primary school teachers in this context; face the difficulty of limited resources. Therefore, SLBs try to make best use of them through modification of their work, while relinquishing some organizational and personal objectives that cannot be attained. The findings revealed that teachers had a lot of influence on the lives of

citizens because they could determine how their children could benefit from their service through their decisions, and the manner they dealt with service delivery predicaments and emerged work pressure. The ways or internal engagements, they used to curb such quandaries is what translated into local accepted policies or living norms in the social fields. In this regard, teachers chose to teach by reviewing the questions set in previous examinations due to the lack of human and material resources, rather than following the syllabus, or they trained older pupils to write notes and mark the work of lower classes and get pupils in higher classes to mark each other's multiple choice questions. These actions clearly indicate how at the end of the policy chain primary school teachers from selected areas formulated their own policies and executed them as a way of mitigating the problematic situation.

How coping strategies shape public policy intentions

Through a street-level bureaucracy perspective there is a notion that SLBs always develop strategies to address some challenges they face in doing their businesses. Nevertheless, there is another school of thought that such strategies may contradict public policy intentions or limit the effectiveness of the 'legal rule' or 'order'. Coping strategies at the local level dance to the tune of operating forces in the social fields. These study findings confirm that in certain scenarios SLBs' coping strategies and interventions either comply with public policy intent or not. Such strategies became social rules, norms and values. Compliance with legal order was reflected in the interface between SLBs and citizens through school committees where it was acceptable to ask parents to contribute money to purchase more desks, chalk, chairs, tables and textbooks. Although government circulars No. 5 of May, 2016 prohibits parental contributions practiced from 2002 through voluntary and compulsory contributions, in some situations parental contributions were still practiced at a great deal. Another example was the parents and teachers getting together to raise the national examinations' performance by contributing some food and money so that their children could be tutored after school hours. This practice indicate how socially constructed rules facilitate the delivery of education by enabling citizens to voluntarily participate in the activity.

The inability of social rules, norms and values to comply with laws, statutes, creeds and public policies in social fields means that government's interventions do not always achieve their goals. The findings indicate that some issues in the internal structure respond more to customary arrangements, some of which are governed by the lineage system involving the rights, trust and obligations of kin as well as neighbors. For instance, the fact that behavior such as absenteeism and dropping out affected the delivery of primary education without government officials taking legal actions, explicates how social norms or rules may limit the effectiveness of government in execution of formal rules. Although the inability to take action against absenteeism and dropping out contradict public policy and the public service legal framework of Tanzania, they are viewed as normal by citizens. For instance, it was observed that some parents and guardians in the selected cases encouraged girls to drop out and get married so that the parents could dowry. The parents also encouraged boys to drop out mainly to help with running their parents' businesses, which is prohibited by the 2002 Education Act. Moreover, lower level leaders, who should ensure that this law is implemented, were reluctant to take action because the majority of the community members behaved the same way. They probably feared being victimized by the large community if the government were to punish those reported for doing wrong. Secondly, teachers do not always abide by the law contrary to its requirement. Such kind of behavior contradicts the execution of Education and Training Policy (URT, 2014, 1995) and the Public Service Regulations (2003). For instance, as already mentioned, the modifications they made to overcome shortage of resources were a misuse of judgmental

discretion in favor of leniency, as noted by Locke (1948: 99) and Davis (1969: 3) that “where law ends, tyranny begins” and Davis’ (1969) critique to Locke’s argument that discretion begins at the end of policy chain which also covers tyranny.

Discussion

This article addresses the state of service delivery (primary education), coping strategies with deterrents of serviced delivery, and how coping mechanisms affect public policy implementation. The service delivery in selected LGAs is at the state of flux despite the milestone reached as the result of decentralization reforms. This is because the discretionary autonomy articulated by decentralization reforms (URT, 1998) has not been honored. The central government continues to extend its tentacles over LGAs’ affairs. For instance, LGAs are used as a learning curve for the central government because when they discover new vibrant source of own revenues, the central government seizes it.

The central government directs LGAs how to use their own revenues over a number of things including serving the disadvantaged groups like the aged, womankind, youth and undermined. Therefore, anticipated LGAs authority declines or becomes like a rubber stamp because many of the activities done at this level is a response to higher authority’s directives. Furthermore, in the delivery of primary education, staff recruitment is done by the centre through ministries of education, finance, public service, local government, and recruitment secretariat. Nevertheless, there are no any efforts seen so far rising to question the overriding powers from the central government suggesting that the central government interference over LGAs’ discretionary power will not be reduced. As for now, it is the central government that decides what LGAs should do and not do. Consequently, the mutual interface anticipated by reformers to come true amidst the centre and LGAs has become a nightmare or illusive as highlighted by aforesaid factors. In this situation Lipsky (1980) explicates what policy implementers should do to rescue the possibility of closure. With limited resources, uncondusive service delivery environment, and any threat that may be encountered in the due course of rendering services, frontline policy implementers (in this context primary school teachers), should develop mechanisms to deal with such difficulties. Due to the service delivery deterrents encountered in the selected LGAs, it was evidenced that street level bureaucracy largely applied. Primary school experts or teachers in study schools conducted themselves as SLBs. For example, where teachers were not enough, pupils in higher level classes were required by the schools to teach the young ones under the guidance of the respective subject teachers. Secondary, under limited motivation, teachers could decide to complement the existing fissure by engaging in ‘entrepreneurial activities’ like opening ladies and gentlemen hair cutting/dressing saloons, bodaboda transport, and retail kiosks. With these coping strategies, one may not find a problem but it is imperative to note that they increased absenteeism, which led to compromising of education quality. Despite the challenges from the coping strategies, some other strategies increased quality as in many selected schools teachers cooperated with parents to increase teaching hours apart from the formal schedule set by the government. This was specially done to national examination classes for the purpose of covering syllabus and reviewing previous exams whereby parents supported schools by contributing either in cash or in kind or both. The limitation of SLB’ theory in relation with study areas is that, it is not always the case that whenever SLBs encounter difficulties they will find the way to deal with the situation. There are avenues for total exit, especially in difficult and complex environments.

Generally, coping strategies may lead to detrimental or negative repercussions depending on the nature of the policy in operation and the context. For instance, the National Education Policy (1995) encourages much private public mix in the delivery of primary education. Accordingly, engagement of citizens or parents' contributions was very much at zenith. Therefore, any contribution in cash or kind would mean compliance with it. However, the National Education Policy of 2014 was silent regarding parents' contributions to education delivery. The Government circular No. 5 of May, 2016 prohibits both voluntary and compulsory parent's contributions. However, although parents' contributions to compensate teachers' for their time informally scheduled for examination classes is good, it contradicts the government circular or the policy. Therefore, commenting on a policy as good or bad is contextual in certain situations. Furthermore, coping strategies may affect policy in several ways. Entertaining absenteeism in the name of engagement in entrepreneurial activities contradicts the standing orders for the Public Service of 2009 and other public service acts. This means that at the end of a policy chain, coping strategies may pose detrimental effects to the quality of education. As pointed out earlier, not always should coping mechanisms be entertained by street-level bureaucrats. The government has the responsibility to improve the working conditions in difficult environments. Otherwise collective services may not be accorded as required, and the spillover effect of not taking respective measures may be more injurious.

Conclusion

Based on what the selected cases reveal, SLBs as primary school teachers have the ability to develop a pattern of practices to cope with deterrents of service delivery, including primary education in this context, which tend to limit the central government's control over the respective semi-autonomous social field. This can be seen in how they translate discretion down to earth by putting public policy into action in a difficult environment for the sake of service beneficiaries. This is manifested in how SLBs manage heavy workloads, modify their work or ration material resources to meet this objective. SLBs also use their discretion as to whether or not to conform to public policy intentions. They may choose to ration teaching so that they can engage in entrepreneurial activities during class sessions, which is contrary to certain legislations, standing orders, employment guidelines, establishment circulars, teachers' ethics guidelines and other regulations governing operations of the public sector. They may also opt to abide by established guidelines, directives and legislations, and liaise with the citizens to amicably address educational problems. Because SLBs' behavior in a semi-autonomous social field is influenced more by wanting to deliver a service than meeting personal interests, the government should take this into account and find ways of raising their morale. Although SLBs are constrained by the lack of finances, staff and equipment, they can still render service and fulfill their duties when they put their mind to it altruistically. However, this depends on how they were raised religiously and socially and how teachers colleges' curriculum was designed to embrace teachers training and mentorship to shape teachers' behavior ethically in any situation. Since they are frontline policy implementers, they may have detrimental results as they interact with pupils they are not well trained.

Policy Implication

This paper aimed at explaining SLBs roles in developing strategies to deal with service delivery deterrents in selected councils in Tanzania. The strategies SLBs developed may either comply with public policy

intentions or not. To start with service delivery deterrents, it was noted that the interface between key stakeholders in the delivery of education did not culminate in mutual interaction because the center exhibited overriding powers over other stakeholders ending up deterring service delivery. The exercise of powers by the center was reflected in devolving capitation grants, teachers' recruitment, and distribution of school infrastructures. These problems can be addressed, firstly the central government deliberately deciding to cascade substantial autonomy to local governments so that they can address their jurisdictional matters using available resources. Secondly, the central government building people's capacity by availing them with relevant information as the basis for making informed decisions so that they can hold the government accountable indirectly through 'the ballot' or directly through 'voice' or 'exit' when services quality declines due to unproductive decisions.

Based on Lipsky theory, there is a big room for the government not considering the aforesaid viewpoints. In this situation, frontline policy implementers, teachers in this context, may precede rendering services in a very difficult environment or decide to quit the work environment if its turbulence becomes high. For those who remain in semi-autonomous social fields can develop strategies to cope with the status quo (Lipsky, 1980). Some strategies affect policy, stipulated legislations, guidelines, procedures and standing orders pointed out in the previous sections. In the selected cases it was noted that some teachers engaged in small businesses, such as ladies and gentlemen saloons, motorcycle taxis or bodaboda and engaging in agricultural activities as a compliment to meagre salaries accorded to them. Therefore, it is imperative to accord teachers with extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, especially to those who are in difficult environments. Likewise, the government should enhance ethical education to ensure that teachers undertake responsibilities or civic duties thoroughly.

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
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A micro-analysis of motivation of doctors at Parirenyatwa Referral Hospital in Zimbabwe

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AJoGPL
ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 2.
pp. 29-43, Dec 2021
<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

This article analyses the importance of motivating doctors at Parirenyatwa Group of Hospital (PGOH). Lack of motivation causes doctors to maintain a low threshold of quality to their medical work; struggle to maintain work-life balance and commitment to quality medical care; struggle to focus on high-end medical services; or concentrate on building positive mindset for career goals. Motivation of doctors helps in ensuring that collaborative team environments are embossed in size and purpose, thus making a substantial contribution to the professional success, prestige, network, cooperation and interaction of doctors. The article brings to the fore how the Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) can play a huge role in motivating junior and senior doctors. It uses the case study of Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals to streamline the research. Documentary search and conversational interview with an official at the Health Services Board were used to get an institutional glimpse of the concerns of the doctors from the perspective of the Health Services Board. The targeted doctors who had promised to give their views did not respond to the questions after they had initially indicated that they would do so after their medical theatre routines. Be that as it may, the tenor of empiricism was maintained in this study since the researchers could analyse the administrative positions from selected key informants; officials from the Health Services Board, as well as representatives of doctors on the group needs and individual concerns of the doctors. In the wake of rigorous social media communication in Zimbabwe, the information processing in research work needs to move away from individual concerns made through in-depth interviews to analysis of official or group communication from the affected groups. This leads to focus on the quality of grievances than their quantity and avoidance of overreliance on silos within institutions. Effectively, there is representative-based analysis, consideration of common challenges, and egalitarian work group concerns. The study focuses on PGOH because it is the biggest referral hospital in Zimbabwe. The article draws from disparate literature on motivation and principles of good governance that are espoused in the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013. The major conclusion in the study is that the practical motivation of doctors is ignored and this has led to frequent industrial actions, poor performance, patient neglect and low retention of senior doctors at Parirenyatwa.

Key words: Motivation, Health Professionals, Job Satisfaction, Parirenyatwa Referral Hospital

Introduction

The preferred approach to motivation in this article is one which considers motivation as an enjoyable or positive emotional state resulting from the assessment of one's job experience (Locke 1976).

There are studies which show that motivation is key to effective decision-making (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2010); is system specific (Davis & Singh 2011). Health worker retention is critical for health systems performance and a key problem is how best to motivate and retain health workers (Willis-Shattuck, Bidwell & Ditlopo 2008). This study sought to bring out the significance of motivating doctors in public hospitals particularly those at Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals (PGOH) since motivation in some cases is overshadowed by the problems between the government as the employer and the doctors as the employees. The challenges or problems have resulted in regular strikes, brain drain, and low retention of junior and senior doctors in the public sector. As a result, those challenges have several implications for the government that includes increased patient woes. Chipunza (2017) reported that in 2017, hospitals discharged patients who were seriously ill because junior doctors were on strike.

The concerns normally raised by the junior doctors in public hospitals include low salaries, limited medical supplies, and shortage of medical equipment (Chingono 2018). Those concerns result in low motivation of junior doctors. This is also important considering views from scholars like Pinder's (1998) that "*work motivation is a set of internal and external forces that start off work-related behaviour, determine its form, direction, intensity, and duration.*" These aspects are critical in setting this research.

Statement of the Problem

Ideally, doctors at referral hospitals must be adequately remunerated considering the great work they do in helping outpatients and in-patients to recuperate and deal with various types of ailments. Regrettably, the poor motivation of doctors in public hospitals such as PGOH has resulted in doctors going on strikes more often notably in 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. The bipartite discussions between the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) and the representatives of doctors have not stopped doctors from engaging in industrial strikes to demand improvement of their conditions of service. These strikes are terrible in some cases and have resulted in the loss of human life because sick patients in some of the cases are turned away without being attended. Doctors at PGOH have been embarking on strikes demanding better working conditions and improved salaries. These conflicts greatly affect the nation since PGOH is one of the biggest referral hospitals in Zimbabwe. The emergence of pandemics like Covid_19 has also exacerbated the need for doctors and other health workers to demand protective clothing and mass support from the government. There is need for an institutional policy that secures job security and restores the doctor as a vital human capital asset. As such, this research sought to find out motivational solutions to curb doctor's strikes, brain drain, and low retention caused by poor motivation strategies. In turn, the motivation of doctors was found to play a huge role in bridging the doctor to patient relationship.

Literature Review

According, to Stipek (1996), early approaches to the study of motivation were rooted in the literature on extrinsic reinforcement. Gage and Berliner (1992: 231) viewed "*motivation as the engine and steering wheel of a car, and therefore they believed that motivation generates the energy and controls the behaviour of any person.*" In line with the above view, motivation for doctors at PGOH in this study was viewed as the driving force for improved performance of doctors since according to Gage and Berliner (ibid); it controls behaviour of any person.

This study considered that doctors at PGOH lacked that kind of motivation and that was one of the reasons they normally engage in numerous strikes. The reasons for the strikes were captured by Kamhungira (2019) who noted that one of the most recent strikes of junior doctors lasted over 40 days from the beginning of December 2018 to January 2019 and the junior doctors were demanding better working conditions and salary increments, all of which are related to poor motivation from the employer.

The literature review on motivation of doctors at country-specific levels specifically focuses on reviewing worker dissatisfaction. No wonder, Rabby (2001) states that the ingredients of motivation lie within all and the internalised drive toward the dominant thought of the moment. To support the view on the dissatisfaction of workers, this study employed the view by World Health Organization (WHO) (2004) that, "Countries such as Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand have identified low salaries as the major reason for job dissatisfaction and migration among the health workers." While the issue of salaries was also found in this study to have contributed to low motivation for doctors at PGOH, a knowledge gap is in existence on the motivation of doctors at PGOH in that junior doctors have largely been showing the inclination to strike than all doctors in general.

According to Kontodimopoulos *et al.* (2009), a study on 13 hospitals in Greece showed that the most important factors that motivated doctors in those hospitals were personal achievements and adequate remuneration. This current research established that those factors raised as motivators for the Greek hospitals are also important factors that have been raised by doctor's representatives of PGOH in many cases.

Globally, physician shortage at public institutions has been felt in countries such as Brazil in Latin America where it was found that doctors could stay at a public hospital because of reasons such as academic environment, relationship with colleagues or the high prestige in which society holds the institution (Filho *et al* 2016: 1); Poland in Europe (Chmielewska *et al* 2020); and rural Pakistan in Asia (Shah *et al* 2016). At a regional level, most doctors intended to migrate from Africa because of low salaries, poor working conditions, and lack of resources (Hongoro and Normand 2006). They would accept a job if the benefits of doing so outweigh the opportunity cost (*ibid*). The view above links with that Dagne, Beyene and Berhanu (2015) low staff motivation (absence of incentives) in less-developed countries result in shortage of human resources for health and cripple health systems and health care, since doctors can be absent during work hours or can just 'sit around' while patients are waiting.

This also links to the view by Chikanda (2005) that doctors in Zimbabwe also leave employment in their high numbers due to the lack of resources and facilities (42.9%), heavy workloads (39.4%) and insufficient opportunities for promotion and self-improvement (32.2%). This also links with the view by Lambrou *et al* (2010) who had a "research on two African countries, Benin and Kenya, where they stressed the importance of non-financial incentives for the motivation of doctors." From these studies from the African states, it was observed in this study that the motivation of doctors could be non-financial or financial. The studies also showed that the motivation of doctors is indeed important because failure to do so could lead to a brain drain of the doctors. This study thus filled the gap concerning how non-financial and financial benefits can be used to motivate junior and senior doctors at PGOH in Zimbabwe.

Administratively, at a national level, the Zimbabwe Health Service Board (ZHSB) advocates for the motivation of doctors in two types of packages, which are financial and non-financial incentives. The non-financial benefits that were advocated by ZHSB on the motivation of doctors include, supporting the relocation of workers' spouses and suitable accommodation, educational allowances, and low-interest student loans were offered to workers interested in furthering their professional development (Chimbari, et al 2008).

This research noted that the ZHSB as the motherboard of doctors also considers the motivation of doctors in two ways that are non-financial incentives and financials. However, junior doctors demanded better working conditions, salary increments, and adequate resources beyond what the ZHSB (Mbanje 2019). Essentially, the literature above showed that there is no agreed framework on how the government can end strikes at PGOH.

Research Methodology

Methodology refers to the strategy, the plan, and action, the process or design lying behind the choice and use of a particular method (Crotty, 1998). Kumekpor (2002) states that a judicious choice of methodology and how the methods used can simplify and facilitate the collection and analysis of data. While PGOH is close to the University of Zimbabwe where the researchers are based, the selected doctors were given in-depth interview questions and promised to revert. The researchers were affected by statutory instrument 200/2020 which related to the containment, prevention and treatment of Covid-19. While the efficacy of the motivation of doctors required that the researchers interview the doctors, the reliance on official communication from doctors' organizations filled this gap. As such this research used the qualitative approach. The qualitative approach was defined by Shank (2002: 5) "*as a form of systematic empirical inquiry into meaning.*" Researchers try to understand how others make sense of their experiences (Ospina 2004). To also examine the administrative perspectives, officials from the Health Services Board were also interviewed. Key Informants were also selected to provide their independent opinion on the official statements from doctors at various hospitals around Zimbabwe.

Research design

The research study made use of the case study research design. According, to Eisenhardt (1989), a case study focuses on understanding the dynamics of the present with a single setting. The research made use of a case study research design of PGOH because it has been experiencing many strikes by both junior and senior doctors.

Data collection methods

The research relied on data from interviews with key informants and officials of the Health Services Board as well as scrutinizing official responses by representatives of doctors on the factors that affected the motivation of doctors at Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals, a large referral hospital in Zimbabwe. According, to Punch (2004) both historical and contemporary secondary sources are a rich source of data for social research therefore that is one of the issues that led the researcher to use the secondary sources for the research study. Data was collected using desk research, which looked at government reports, media articles, websites, and diaries. Essentially, this research noted that representational bodies of the doctors

erred out the grievances through official statements that were published in the print media. This made it easier for the research to dispense with the need for many interviews from doctors and officials from the Health Services Board as the official documents still retained the tenor of empiricism. Further, this research proceeded from the trite position that organizational management in the healthcare sector can be understood from the perfect coordination between various groups of professionals (Chmielewska et al 2020: 2). Examples of other documentary sources that were used in the analysis include Herald, Newsday, and the World Health Organization (WHO) Report. Predictably, desk research was preferred here as it allows for logical analysis especially where it is used to establish the significant ways of motivating doctors at Parirenyatwa General Hospital since the data collection method was not limited in terms of information from the government reports, media articles, websites, and diaries as compared to other data collection methods. Desk research applied to the qualitative approach because desk research is part of secondary data collection methods.

Data analysis

Analysis of data is a process of inspecting, cleansing, transforming, and modelling data to highlight useful information, suggesting conclusions, and supporting decision-making (Bihani and Patil 2014). The secondary data that were collected by the researcher for the study were analysed through content analysis. Content analysis is a research technique for analysing and understanding the collection of texts (Harris 2001). Content analysis was more applicable to this research type because it was used for analysing and understanding the texts used in the study. The content, which was analysed, includes government reports, media articles, websites, and diaries for example Newsday article called Doctors to lament 'dead' hospital services.

Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations are values and principles, which address the question of what is good and bad in human affairs (Australian Law Reform Commission and Australian Health Ethics Committee 2001). The ethical considerations in this study included the need to avoid plagiarism by acknowledging the data sources. The other principle, which was considered, was research authorisation. This involved obtaining permission from the University of Zimbabwe, Governance and Public Management Department, to carry out a study within a particular area and in this case, it is Parirenyatwa Group of Hospitals. Interviewees from PGOH and Health Services Board (HSB) were selected based on representational reasons. For instance, those from HSB were selected based on affiliation to human resources and to experience in engagements between representatives of doctors and GoZ in bipartite meetings. The doctors from PGOH were selected based on availability.

Findings

This section focused on the research themes that emerged from the data that was collected from the research methods that were used for the study. The findings reflect the central research focus of this study: ways to motivate doctors at Parirenyatwa Referral Hospital. The contextual approach for examining the thrust of this research was to examine the views of doctors, officials from the Health Services Board (HSB) and key informants involved in public administration and commerce. The collected information showed that the contestations between doctors and Government of Zimbabwe revolved primarily around

the meagre salaries, lack of protective equipment; threats of dismissal of doctors if they fail to report for work and incidents of corruption by some government officials. It was found that individual doctors chose to communicate through their representative organizations for fear of victimization. While the efficacy of the motivation of doctors would require their active participation, it is high time researchers also adopt research stances that accept realities that obtain in specific environments. These themes included the findings on the significance of motivating doctors at PGOH, the nexus between the significance of motivation of doctors and their performance, poor motivation and strikes of doctors, poor motivation, and retention of doctors at PGOH and the GoZ's response to challenges facing doctors at PGOH.

The cross-cutting significance of motivating doctors at PGOH

An important theme that emerged from this research was that of the perception of PGOH as a referral hospital which shapes the performance of medical centres across Zimbabwe. The information revealed that PGOH and Sally Mugabe Hospital (Harare Hospital) are the biggest referral hospitals in Zimbabwe which have the capacity to achieve a commanding level of influence over government ministries, development partners and other key stakeholders in the medical fraternity. This perception was also matched by historical development of motivation theories. The studies by which motivation of employees was publicised such as Maslow (1943) have a psychological impact on employees since motivation encourages workers to stay long and happy at their workplace. A key informant from the Faculty of Commerce at the University of Zimbabwe indicated that Maslow's model on motivation has gained traction in each discipline that mankind studies, including the medical fraternity. It has gained a level of 'acceptability' beyond the field of psychology. He said that many doctors are struggling to understand the hierarchy of needs espoused by Maslow as they feel they are part of some 'wasted generation' that is not remunerated in line with the poverty datum line and regional developments (interview recording, 2021). A key informant from Department of Social Work weighed in from the perspective of the helping professions. She argued that the helping professionals such as nurses, doctors, clinical social workers, clinical psychologists, among others struggle to deal with the '*big issue*' on how to negotiate with government in good faith (interview 2021). This '*big issue*' permeates through all sectors of the economy and was also echoed by all interviews. Even when it was not expressly mentioned by officials from the HSB, it was clearly implied when reference was made to the need to tread cautiously on the negotiation table when dealing with government. Further, fears are also implied from the conduct of a senior doctor who agreed to be interviewed indicated to the researchers that he was going into theatre together with his colleagues. He asked the researchers to send questions on WhatsApp which he would address after his theatre procedures. He did not respond to the questions and also did not answer to the calls. As such, the meeting with this doctor and his colleagues never saw the light of its day.

The social worker also raised an important point on the inability of doctors to achieve work-life balance in an environment where they put more effort but get poor rewards. She argued that many helping professionals including doctors at PGOH feel the work environment heavily affects their family life. They are forced to subsidize the employer through side jobs. This tallied with the findings from the participant from the Faculty of Commerce who argued that the motivation of doctors at PGOH as analysed by Maslow, is linked to of the idea of self-actualisation through getting meaningful incentives and capabilities that are obtained at a workplace. This is also buttressed by documentary findings from Juneja (2001) who notes that stability of employees is always important and therefore could be achieved through motivation from the employer to the employee. Generally, the motivation of doctors and other

health workers has been extant in health systems in Zimbabwe since the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Chikanda (2005) noted that as of 1997, out of 1,634 registered doctors in Zimbabwe, only 551 (33.7%) were employed in the public sector and those low numbers showed a lack of motivation for doctors to work in the public hospitals such as PGOH.

A participant from the Governance and Public Management Department at the University of Zimbabwe described a significance of motivation with a historical touch:

I remember PGOH was named after a liberation hero. It is supposed to be a symbol of free and decent work that corrects the historical imbalances where black employees were poorly remunerated. The political economy of motivation implores Goz to faithfully deal with doctors at this big referral hospital. We have had countless reportage in the media where doctors are not paid but patients are the ultimate sufferers. All those who are disingenuous should self-introspect and we get to a situation where we do not send out our doctors to greener pastures. We want to hear statements like, 'we have paid doctors and consultants in the medical fraternity.' We must find constructive dialogue between individual doctors and government in a way that shows that government is committed to invest in the personal and professional development of doctors. If that is done, we can make sure that it is also sustainable.

The above concerns are buttressed by historical concerns from studies by Chimbari et al (2008) which showed that motivation increased the doctor's commitment to their work. Scholars like Heryati (n.d) also argued that when employees are motivated to work, they generally put their best effort into the tasks that are assigned to them. This research noted from Kamhungira (2019) that doctors at PGOH have not been doing their work such as attending to patients in time because of staff shortage that have been occasioned by periodic strikes. Essentially, the doctors at PGOH lacked that kind of motivation that addresses their grievances on poor salaries and lack of social amenities that speak to work-life balance. Looking at the health workers' strike which lasted for 40 days from the beginning of December 2018 to January 2019, doctors and their representative organizations felt that their genuine grievances had not been properly addressed (ibid). With that in mind, motivation plays a very significant part in encouraging doctors in Zimbabwe in general, and at PGOH in particular, to commit to their work and work stations, put their best efforts in saving lives, and reduce incidences of strikes that usually affect outpatients and those needing critical care.

Motivation is needed to help doctors to perform their work effectively

While the concern that the impasse between doctors and government was drastically affecting outpatients and specific-need patients was reportated on many occasions on social and print media, it was also described by the HSB. One interview subject from the HSB noted the following:

I see it this way: everyone sees the '*slippery slope*' we are trying to navigate. HSB may have an influence on government or doctors and give the impression that representatives of doctors and government are following our recommendations. And for some strange reasons both the doctors and government can shift goal posts rapidly. The hopes of each camp evaporate quickly. It is complicated for administrative bodies to sound optimistic but we are managers and have to live with the fact that we manage people. It is one thing to deal with issues disingenuously and another to commit to negotiations faithfully. So some performances, they will go down. I think under the prevailing economic situation we may want to improve the welfare and work-life balance of all health professionals so that they perform well and please all patients.

The nexus between the motivation of doctors and their performance augurs well with the view by Gage and Berliner (1992: 231) who consider motivation as “*the engine and the steering wheel of a car*”. Gage and Berliner (ibid) also believed that “*motivation generates the energy and controls the behaviour of any person.*” In essence, this research found that the performance of doctors at PGOH has not been patient-oriented especially during strikes (Gonye 2019). Chipunza (2019) noted that after failed negotiations between GoZ and doctors’ representatives, casualty departments and A1 where emergencies are usually attended to, a few nurses were seen turning patients away or referring them to private institutions. This observation from the Herald was also confirmed by a patient who was interviewed and indicated that he had visited PGOH for many days without receiving medication (ibid). The major reason while doctors could not physically attend to patients was the failure by Government to increase the doctors’ salaries from US\$281 to US\$ 1200 (ibid).

The doctors at PGOH have not been performing in areas such as attending to the patients in time, which was contributed by the strikes resulting in their shortages of the doctors (Gonye 2019). Regrettably, many children were dying, women giving still births and sick patients could not be attended to (Chipunza 2019). Community Working Group Health executive director who was interviewed by the Herald proposed that the salary increments had to be backed by opportunities for professional development, meaningful career paths, training loans as well as improved working, living and social conditions (ibid). Predictably, the GoZ should innovatively motivate the doctors through both monetary and non-monetary responses such as prioritising improved working conditions, and faithfully considering better methods of conflict resolution by Government. Specifically, salary adjustments or cushioning of doctors’ salaries through giving them hardship allowances and engaging funding partners to procure adequate medical supplies and medical equipment can greatly improve the performance of doctors at PGOH.

Poor motivation results in strikes of doctors and other ways of paralysing medical services

Finding access to medical services and maintaining this access easily is difficult for patients because they deal with helpers that are disgruntled. What constitute poor motivation was also determined by what patients and other key informants observed from the negotiations between government and doctors. An academic from the Governance and Public Management Department referred to the need to ensure the right to healthcare that is enshrined in section 76 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is fully realised by patients. He states thus:

One of the important issues that become evident from the logjam between doctors and government is that the access to medical services is proving to be difficult. And for the individual patient of course, the tussle between the professional service provider and the policy maker creates a problem that in many cases may lead to unfortunate deaths. The patients and other hospitals would have done everything, send the patient using their single ambulance, but still reach a dead end at the referral hospital. These are the tragedies of the common people. It definitely creates a sense of injustice that violates the right to healthcare that is protected in the Constitution. Of course the right is supposed to be enjoyed considering the availability of resources but denying that right through strikes or non-remuneration of doctors is unfair (interview recorded 2021).

Another participant, a nurse who once worked at a private hospital expressed her fears in dealing with the challenges of health professionals in general.

She registered her frustrations in this way:

I think that doctors are emotionally suffering and have used their emotional suffering as a biggest tool to come to work in difficult times. Please do not quote me wrongly. I see patients who come through referrals from referral hospitals. The government doctors are accepting peanuts from private doctors to earn a living. But the individual patient feels the pain of paying the extra amount we consider peanut at private rooms. You can see how referral hospitals have become referral hospitals (interview recorded 2021).

Another participant from a civil society organization that deals with rights noted that:

It is difficult for doctors and other stakeholders to show resistance during Covid-19 situation. And with the Covid-19 situation forcing us into new waves and new variants, it is completely difficult to raise voices on the performance of doctors. The loss of a loved one brings deep discussions on the status of the health system in Zimbabwe. The Lazarus moment can be ended by multi-sectorial approaches to engaging government. We have to admit in earnest, that citizens are pushing the cause of doctors well before the government. We are not putting a lot of pressure to save lives through effective work from motivated medical teams (interview recorded 2021).

Another analyst from the Governance and Public Management Department noted that:

And then you obviously have a parallel medical practice of doctors who somehow are struggling to survive and are also struggling to remain ethical. It becomes difficult to determine the way to push for agenda-setting. And I think doctors and the government are very sensitive to what is coming from their negotiations. I mean, if you read the press statements you can see that they are toned down. There is no feeling that any real pressure can come from what the media reports (interview recorded 2021).

The above concerns are also supported by findings from secondary sources of data such as online news sites such as Herald that poor motivation of doctors resulted in industrial actions by Zimbabwean doctors. The findings from the secondary data were that doctors engaged in industrial actions and registered their grievances with the GoZ. While the interview with an official from HSB emphasized that bipartite meetings between GoZ and representatives of doctors in Zimbabwe, concerns from doctors' representatives such as Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors Association (ZHDA) President Dr Fortune Nyamande showed that both junior and senior doctors:

'Cannot continue to cover up for a health system that has failed. We are very disappointed that nothing is coming out of the negotiations between Government and the junior doctors...' (interview between Paidamoyo Chipunza of the Herald and Dr Fortune Nyamande).

As a result of the above concern, most non-emergency cases that had been booked for theatre were cancelled indefinitely while the Paediatric emergency department at PGOH was closed (ibid). The industrial actions or job actions according to a report by Mbanje (2019) had resulted in patients being turned away at hospitals such as PGOH and in some cases there were widespread reports of deaths in circumstances, which could have been prevented, had patients received adequate care. For PGOH, the strikes affected patients since some were turned away due to the shortage of doctors (Gonye 2019). Even when Covid_19 occurred, doctors at PGOH complained that they could strike because they wanted protective equipment (Chingono 2020).

Poor motivation leads to poor retention of doctors at PGOH

Remaining at work and ability to resist job offers is also steeped in the way professionals are motivated at their current workplaces. While doctors have largely used strikes and other platforms of action such as dialogue with government, they have not benefited from informed and unbiased media coverage, campaign awareness or problem-solvers. A doctor who chose to comment in passing remarked that:

We are not politicians or a political institution but as professionals, we sometimes use political means to try and be heard. We have a sort of, weapon where we spend most our time trying to deal with depression because we are both the meal and the menu of the powers that be. Those who decide for us love to do so sadly. But I think it is supposed to be a compromise. We always want to remain at our work stations. We are growing up. We have families and loved ones. We still have the extended family, the burden of black tax. Others who do not want to improve our welfare are seeing our loss of energy in ten years. So why not use the next ten years to improve our life elsewhere where we do not feel depressed (interview recorded 2021).

The findings above on low retention of doctors have been historically documented. For instance, from the findings from Feltoe (2009),

“As of December 2008, the overall vacancy rate in the public health sector stood at 32 percent, while that for general medical practitioners, medical equipment engineers, environmental health officers, and health-care programmers stood at 60 percent, 48 percent, 79 percent, and 79 percent respectively.”

The major cause of low retention was the poor motivation of the health personnel. This research established that poor working conditions, low salaries, and shortages of basic medicines and equipment are the major factors that poorly motivate doctors in most Zimbabwean hospitals (Mbanje 2019).

Mbanje (ibid) reviewed that poor working conditions at (PGOH) was one of the causes of the poor motivation of doctors. These poor working conditions include long working hours (Chingono 2018). According to Mananavire (2019), the doctors were complaining that they were working a shift, which was 12 hours long per day, which was longer, than other ordinary workers who worked 8 hours per day. The other cause of poor motivation for doctors according to the findings was the issue of poor salaries. According to Mbanje (2019), some of the doctors even argued that the current salaries were not enough to the extent of not being adequate to cover all monthly expenses; the report even argued that the salaries were so low that they would not even reach the next pay date according to the doctor's representatives. The other issue reviewed by Mbanje (ibid) was that the doctors argued that even their counterparts in other neighbouring countries like South Africa were being well remunerated.

The GoZ's disingenuous response to challenges facing doctors at PGOH demands a realistic theory of change

An evaluation of the interview data revealed that government has the perception that doctors can be dismissed if they register their concerns with the establishment. One participant described the challenges with getting an effective response to the doctors' challenges at PGOH in the following manner:

I do not think that we can afford to be disingenuous with matters that bear on the welfare of doctors and life and death of patients. It is definitely all the citizens who can call the government to order. Government has to compete with all kinds of professional concerns and messages. That is why government must change

their methods of engaging with citizens. Command ideology of threatening doctors with replacements is not health for the development of the nation. You can never run a profession without some business or cost-benefit analysis. There is no one who can reason with policy makers and implementers well. We are used to statements like, 'we will do our best to improve the welfare of doctors and nurses.' The following day the tone is hard-hitting or vindictive. I have the impression that the complaints and concerns that are raised by government against doctors are a result of stubborn facts that anger the giants. Government does not take up the concerns from doctors and health professionals across the country like 98 % of the time. The result is that never a government-driven commitment to improving the welfare of doctors.

The GoZ and doctors held several engagements on the issues of reviewing their allowances and improving their working conditions however, these negotiations were fruitless since nothing tangible was resolved (Mananavire 2019). The engagements were largely fruitless leading to a sour and constrained relationship usually explained by the commitment of doctors to embark on industrial action. The GoZ during the industrial action of September 2019 proposed a salary increment of over 70% but the doctors rejected it citing that it was not adequate with the cost of living since inflation was on the rise (Mananavire *ibid*). Before the September 2019 industrial action, the government had first offered a 30% salary increment but it had also been rejected by the doctors (Mananavire *ibid*).

In some instances, the doctors refused to negotiate with the GoZ whilst back at work and negotiate while working (*ibid*). Another event that occurred was the dismissal of about 448 doctors for failure to return to work after a court order which held that their industrial action was illegal (Mugabe 2019). All these events above from the finding showed that the GoZ and doctors did not have a working relationship rather a constrained relationship. During the Covid_19 crisis, GoZ engaged PGOH by providing senior doctors with protective equipment to enable them to look after coronavirus patients after they had gone on a strike after the government had failed to provide protective equipment for them (Sithole 2020).

The role of government in motivating doctors is to be understood from the work of the Special Rapporteur for who has in detail showed that right to health also includes a health workforce and medical education. To ensure a health workforce is motivated, governments should be held accountable when they make the right inaccessible (Williams & Amon 2020). They should also keep their promises to make the right progressively realized as contemplated by international law. This will go a long way in helping countries to also deal decisively with instances of corruption in the medical centres, especially in the wake of Covid-19. The Ministry of Health has not been spared by the scourge of corruption following the arrest and dismissal of former Minister of Health Obadiah Moyo who was accused of abusing Covid-19 funds. Such allegations paint a bad picture on Zimbabwe's commitment to fulfil the demands of visions such as Agenda 2030, Vision 2030 where Zimbabwe strives to attain a middle income status, the national development strategy (NDS) 1 which focuses on strong institutions. Added to this is the Constitution of Zimbabwe that also provides for good governance through the pillars such as transparency, justice, responsiveness and accountability.

Conclusion

From the foregoing, the study concluded that the ways that could motivate doctors at PGOH include non-monetary benefits, improvement in medical supplies and equipment, and prioritising economic hardship salary adjustments or cushioning their salaries through hardship allowances. While interviews with doctors were preferred, the respondents that had promised to participate did not do so as they indicated that they were busy. The researchers however managed to get some information from the Health Service Board although the targeted respondent was said to be on leave, it is hoped that this article will however be further developed to take into considerations the actual input from the doctors and members of the health services board. Essentially, we found that non-monetary benefits include vehicle, support for the relocation of workers' spouses and suitable accommodation, and low-interest student loans offered to workers interested in furthering their professional development.

The research also concluded that the GoZ and doctors at PGOH needed to resolve their differences and fix their constrained relationship for the benefit of patients who seek the services at PGOH. The study also concluded that the causes of the poor motivation of doctors at PGOH included low salaries, shortage of medical supplies, and medical equipment. The study also concluded that it was indeed significant to motivate doctors at PGOH.

Recommendations

- GoZ and the doctors at PGOH should amicably resolve their constrained relationship possibly through mediated dialogue by an independent mediator.
- The GoZ should engage doctors in good faith and should improve medical supplies and equipment and prioritise economic hardship salary adjustments.
- The Ministry of Health and Child Care (MoHCC) if constrained in monetary funds should at least resolve the non-monetary motivation ways that include supporting the relocation of workers' spouses and suitable accommodation, educational allowances, and low-interest student loans were offered to workers interested in furthering their professional development.
- The MoHCC should engage with donor partners to aid them with medical equipment and medical supplies.
- The MoHCC should create a committee, which reviews the salaries and working conditions of doctors and the committee should give a monthly report of doctor's performance as well as recommendations on how their performance could be improved.
- Incidents of corruption must be shunned at all costs and cronyism should be effectively punished.

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
The nexus between Ministerial Interventionism and the performance of Metropolitan Councils in Zimbabwe

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AJoGPL
ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 2.
pp. 44-52, Dec 2021
<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

This article adopts a heuristic approach to analysing the mixed governance system in Metropolitan Councils in Zimbabwe. While section 5 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013, espouses a tier system of governance that has central government, metropolitan councils and local authorities, it also allows the Minister to intervene in the affairs of a Metropolitan Council. In this milieu, interventionism and interference bear significantly on how Metropolitan Councils such as Harare and Bulawayo run their affairs. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that interventionism-interference dichotomy is in most case explained by the fact that the responsible minister belongs to a political party in government, whose party may have few councilors in the Metropolitan Council. Through a qualitative methodology, this study argues that the heuristic model permits for logical analysis of the policy interventions that emanate from the mixed government system of administering Metropolitan Councils. The paper finds that ministerial interventions or central-local government relations hugely affect the performance of Metropolitan Councils. The article recommends that the normative framework entrenched in the Constitution be embossed and that proper reviews of dismissals of Council employees be made lest aspersions be cast on how the mixed government system is weaponised against party rivals.

Key words: Local council performance, Legislative performance, Public administration

Introduction

After independence in 1980, the government of Zimbabwe established a multi-tier government. It emphasized on the formation of the national, provincial and local levels of government in a bid to provide the “grassroots” levels of society with political, social and economic development. The approach was following the African Charter on Decentralization which emphasized on the need for African states to decentralize powers to lower tiers of government. Local authorities were an important aspect of government as they necessitated local debates and paved way for local development. Local authorities were run by elected councilors who the citizens voted to represent their needs as a locality (Machingauta 2010). Historically, the relations between the central government and its local authorities were unproblematic under the dominance of a single dominant political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).

ZANU PF was later challenged by the opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) which emerged in the late 1990s and ushered in the colour of multiparty democracy in Zimbabwe. The united MDC won the elections in most urban councils in the year 2000. The governance structure in cities such as Harare City Council has largely been politically altered since 2000, mostly with the MDC dominating council. Hostile relations were evident between the years 2000 to date in terms of the way the central government supervision was administered. Mayor Mudzuri of the MDC party was fired and replaced by Mayor Makwavarara who was a sympathiser of the ZANU-PF party. Central government interventions through ministerial directives were seen through the firing of legally elected councilors by the Minister of Local Government, National Housing and Urban Development (Mukaro 2006). Mukaro (ibid) notes that the MDC national executive resolved to withdraw MDC councilors when Minister Chombo rendered the council ineffective by firing Harare's first elected executive mayor Mudzuri. Similarly, Minister Kasukuwere's cancelation of urban water debts was seen as politically advantageous but had a crippling effect to the council's finances (ibid). The lack of constitutional limitations to curtail the powers of the ministers' power under the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979 and under the 2013 Constitution to this day motivated this research. Against this background Harare Metropolitan should be allowed to appoint an executive mayor who can oversee its mandates efficiently without seemingly patronized ministerial interference.

Statement of the Problem

Ideally, the separation between central government and other tiers of government should lead to effective decision-making in the lower tiers of government. The form of government that is established by the Constitution should also stimulate local development since the Constitution establishes the normative framework that promotes horizontal accountability between or among state institutions. In reality however, the need for ministerial interventions on Council is a matter of great debate and controversy especially where the Minister comes from the ruling party and the local authority or Metropolitan Council is run by opposition councilors. Specifically, the minister may largely be seen to be intervening to interfere with local council autonomy. For the effective performance of the Harare City Council the powers of the minister should be properly curtailed in the existing legislation including the Constitution. This is because the stellar performance of the council and its autonomy can only be achievable with central governments impartial influence.

Literature Review

Various scholars and researchers have written on the implications of ministerial interventions in both urban and rural local authorities. Ministerial interventions were described as central government tools for meddling in local issues (Gumbo 2008). This mechanism was blamed by Jonga (2009) as having traded good governance for political advantages thereby thwarting local freedom, commitment and initiative within councilors, and ultimately disturbing local level performance as seen in 2006, the Zimbabwe National Water Authority (ZINWA) overtook the providence and sewer services as directed by the minister (ibid). Zimbabwean central government-local council relations have been deemed as centralization veiled in decentralization (Nyikadzino and Nhema 2015).

Chigwata (2014) notes that in the old Lancaster constitution, was difficult to establish when it was “*necessary*” or “*desirable*” to suspend a councilor by the president or minister. The Constitution advocates for the establishment of an independent tribunal to handle the firing of the mayors so as to curb unlawful hiring and firing of legally elected officials (ibid). This was seen in the Machetu case the minister suspended Machetu and other councilors on the basis of misconduct, and when the high court exonerated these councilors from the charges and ordered their reinstatement however, the minister still went on to dismiss the said councilors.

Literature shows that ministerial interventions affect the freedom of local discretion on the part of local authorities. Machingauta (2010) notes that the supervisory powers of the minister present a good example of an imbalanced relationship which exists between supervision and local government discretion in Zimbabwe’s multilevel system of government. This leads to the provision of poor goods and services to citizens as was the situation in Chitungwiza in 2005 after the commission set by Minister Chombo was taking money out of the already financially suffering council than solving the problem of incompetent councilors (ibid).

The study also found from literature that ministerial interventions had positive implications as they held councilors accountable for malpractices. Acting mayor Makwarara was labelled in the Gazette (2006) as the ‘most spoilt woman in Zimbabwe’ after misusing council funds for personal use such as DSTV payments according to Pindula (2006).

From a heuristic perspective, Sharma (1995) notes that the Minister of Local, Lands and Housing has the authority to nominate some members in the local authorities which are district councils, town councils as well as in the city councils. Sharma (ibid) further argues that statutory responsibilities of Council in Botswana like those in the Harare City council include primary education, primary health care, roads and rural water supply. Furthermore, the councilors were responsible for social and community development, municipal abattoirs, markets, parks and licensing and it was alluded to as the focal point in central government planning (ibid).

Abidoye (2015) notes that local government relations are usually characterized by reluctant cooperation and competition between levels and arms of government. While Abidoye’s arguments were made with reference to federal and state governments and how they affected revenue allocation and jurisdictional powers between federal and the state government, the same arguments bear significantly to the tier system of governance in Zimbabwe that was alluded to above. Abidoye (ibid) shows that the illegal removal of local government officials elected by the citizens is not unique to the micro environment of Harare Metropolitan Council but is rather a country-specific problem. In Nigeria, about 10 local government chairmen were suspended from the office in Nigeria which in turn led to the suing of 36 governors and their state assemblies (ibid).

Chigwata (2014) notes that ministerial interventions have a stifling effect in terms of local autonomy as far as law-making powers are concerned. He argues that the central government in its supervisory mandate should not encroach into the role of law-making nature which allows councilors to exercise their functions through enabling Acts of Parliament. The same position is aptly captured by the European Committee

on Relationships between the Central and Local authorities (2007), which found that European nations give autonomy to their local authorities. The report reviewed that the dismissal of councilors was only taken into consideration of extreme circumstances (ibid). In the case of Spain for instance, the senate has to approve the dismissal of individuals, thus the decision unlike in the case of Zimbabwe does not lie in the hands of a single person (ibid). In the Netherlands, dismissal of councilors is considered after clear investigations as well as second chances were not strange to offenders (ibid). From the above scholarly work, it was evident that there was no study that focused directly on the minister's play in the HCC.

Methodology

The study used the qualitative research approach to get the data needed to understand the study. Qualitative research according to Pope and Mays (1995) method is development of concepts which helps understand social phenomena in natural (rather than experimental) setting, giving due emphasis to the meaning, experimental and views of the participation.

Research Design

The study used the case study research design where it collected and analyzed data from the Harare city council to try and observe its performance and the interference of ministers over a period of time such that a conclusion could be reached.

Research Instruments

The study deployed explorative and evaluative research instruments to analyze and examine the implications of ministerial interventions in the performance of the council. It relied mostly on the use of desk-top research the study was reliant on secondary sources that are books, council reports, journals, e-journals and available literature on the matter were being explored. The study also focused on key informant interviews in the form of semi-structured interviews. According to USAID (1996), key informant interviews are qualitative in-depth interviews with people who are well informed on a particular topic. As a result, key informants on the subject that is the implications of ministerial interventions in the HCC and their known effects. Such informants could be council workers or even residents in Harare.

Data Analysis

The data collected through documentary research, interviews was analyzed and presented through the data analysis stage. Data analysis according to Leedy (1980) was the range of processes and procedures whereby the researcher moves the data collected into some form of explanation, understandable or interpretation of the people and situations which were being investigated.

Target Population

In this study, the target population constituted of councilors, the citizens affected with the performance of the councilors and the minister and all informants were from the Harare metropolitan.

Sampling procedures

The researcher employed non-probability sampling techniques of snowballing and purposive sampling. Purposive sampling was used because the researcher based it on the characteristic of councilors. The study focused on the heterogeneous purposive sampling that selected a range of cases reported on the handling

of council affairs. This was helpful in providing insight into the study. Snowballing sampling was also used to get information on this study that is an interviewee led the researcher to another source of information to broaden the study.

Findings and Analysis

Major Findings

The major themes that rose were the roles of ministerial directives, dwindling citizen participation, shortcomings of available statutes, ministerial interventions and centre-local relations. The main issues raised by these findings is that the overbearing and over brooding nature of the minister's presence in local affairs has lost its true meaning because of lack of restraint on the minister's power.

Ministerial directives and their impact on the Harare city council.

The research found that ministerial interventions came in the form of administrative and financial forms that eventually had the same effect that is to cripple local authorities in their endeavors to carry out their duties. The amount of time the Minister of local government (MLG) spends meddling in local affairs could be termed as suffocating instead of rearing growth to local affairs. Nyikadzino and Nhema (2015:1) argue that the minister who was supposed to play a strategic role in policy formulation and implementation is involved in the day to day running of municipality leaving little room for councilors and residents to determine their own destiny. Through laws such as the SI (229) of 2018, the president gave the Minister of Local Government unfettered power to determine how various local government affairs are administered. According to an informant interviewed by Nyikadzino and Nhema (2015:7), the major problems of directives were that they were not followed by funding to see them through. An example given was Operation Murambatsvina of 2005 that was followed by operation Garikai, where the funds to demolish and relocate the people were not well accounted for (Chigwata 2014:370). In 2013 then Minister Chombo fired councilor Xavier Vengesai on the basis of misconduct and ordered the council to foot the ten thousand dollar bill incurred by the investigators despite the fact that Council could not afford to do so (Ncube 2013).

Ministerial interventions and their impact to the performance of Harare City council.

An intervention by definition according to Machingauta (2010:144) is supposed to be the next step taken when other supervision mechanisms have failed to fulfill statutory obligations or have failed to bring about the desired outcome. On the surface, the Minister represents the central government when it involves himself with the running of local affairs through the minister in charge of local affairs. While ministerial interventions have sometimes produced positive results such as the exposure of corrupt councilors in Gweru who were fired over dishonesty scandals, Chadenge (2017) notes that such suspensions have been considered to be acts of patronage in the absence of evidence to connect key officials such as mayors. The suspension of Gweru councilors for instance included the mayor of Gweru and in an interview MDC-T spokesperson Munyaradzi Mutandavari described this move by Kasukuwere as a political move by Zanu-PF against the MDC as most suspended councilors belonged to the opposition party.


Thus the question that arises is whether ministerial intervention is in fact ministerial interference in Metropolitan Council affairs. As described by the Macmillan dictionary (2007), interference is the act of only getting involved or involving oneself, causing a disturbance.

Such is the criticism given to the minister’s office as being superimposed over the affairs of the local council. The Minister of Local Government’s role is seen to be more of interfering as such stipulations made by the office only stifled local autonomy. Madzivanyika (2011:35) notes that the Urban Councils Act stipulates that urban local authorities can not raise taxes, surcharges or borrow without the guidance of the minister in charge of local government. Recently minister July Moyo was sued by Harare residents for interfering in council affairs for issuing directives that did not benefit the council (Zimeye 2020). It is of great importance to note that the council is embedded with technocrats who are employed for the purpose of the day to day running of the council but, however, they have to await the permission of a politician who could be making judgments based on politics and not for the benefit of the people.

Table 2 Showing how council affairs are disturbed by interference.

The table illustrates the high levels of external influence the council in Harare faces with a percentage of 70% of the respondents agreeing that the levels of outside influence are higher than internal. Also the autonomy of council in category 2 is low with a 20% rate, the levels of citizen participation also staggering low at 20% and lastly in category 4 is the encouragement of initiative that respondents was discouraged by a 90% rate. Thus from the given information, it is clear that the respondents and the researcher agree that the intervention of the minister (central) government was negatively affecting council performance as shown above.

Table 2



Keys:

1. Levels of external influence
2. Autonomy of councilors in conducting their business
3. Local participation in the conduct of council affairs
4. Encouragement of initiative

Blue-Low Orange-High

The table illustrated the respondents and their take on the affairs of council in the Harare city council. Similarly, in Chitungwiza, which was once Harare’s dormitory town, the minister’s interference was seen in the way the minister could at any time ask for council minutes and documents as well as give directions on policy matters, as provided by the UCA Section (313) and (315). The problem extends to rural councils and Chigwata (2014) notes that in rural local authorities, the minister had the power to determine the circumstances which a resolution of the council could be altered single handedly thus this overpowers the mandate of council and as a result interferes autonomy at great length.

Center-local relations and how they affect the Harare city council.

Centre-local relations were found in the study to be a catalyst to the performance of the council. Poor center-local relations affected the councils performance. Olowu (2003) argues that the major challenge facing decentralization in Africa is that national leaders fear that the transfer of power to local levels represents a zero-sum game in which local leaders (who might be politicians in a different party) gain power and resources at their expense. This augurs well with the view that, instead of local authorities being a 'tier' of government, they are merely forced to become extensions of the center (Diphoko and Gumede (2013:1). Diphoko and Gumede (ibid) argue that in Botswana, local authorities were under torturous control of the Central government which in turn compromised service delivery. In this milieu, Fjeldstat's (2001) argues that the central government often creates more problems rather than solutions. This research found without a doubt that the strained relations of the central government especially through the Minister emasculate the performance of the council. Mayor Manyenyeni was suspended by the Minister but the Minister failed to constitute a tribunal as contemplated by the Constitution. When the mayor was re-suspended on the same allegations, he successfully challenged the Minister's decision. The suspension of Mayors such as Gomba on allegations of corruption however created responses where opposition political parties appointed a replacement, Jacob Mafume. Similarly, while Council appointed James Mushore as town clerk, he got to be paid by Council although he was not allowed to perform his clerical duties. As such, central government should allow Metropolitan Councils to oil their operations by appointing candidates on merit as was done to Mushore.

Dwindling Citizen Participation and how it affects the performance of council.

This study found from documentary review that because of the unexplained firing of elected officials and the appointment of Central government favoured individuals most citizens felt as if the main mandate of the council to realize the affairs of their communities had been snatched from them. Nyikadzino and Nhema (2015) note that high ministerial intervention was stifling residents' participation in council affairs which they said disturbed consultation and creativity as council affairs were meant to benefit the councilors as well as the citizens. Most citizens generally were of the view that it was pointless if grass root concerns were ignored especially in cases where council affairs were being mishandled as was the case in the Chitungwiza council (Ndawana 2018). Further a series of problems arose from ministerial interventions which in the end seem like cat and mice games between council members for example Councilor Tendai Saimoni of the MDC-T in Chitungwiza was suspended by Minister Kasukuwere only to be exonerated of charges (Masaka 2016).

Shortcomings of Statutory framework guiding decentralisation and the role it plays in the performance of council.

The study discovered that the biggest shortfall in terms of a performing council stemmed from half-baked statutory Acts that governed affairs of local government autonomy. All available statutes do not have effective measures to promote decentralization. Decentralization in the form of delegation, de-concentration and devolution which is now constitutionally enshrined in chapter 14 of the Constitution has not been implemented and may remain a white elephant in this era of polarised politics.

Conclusion

From the foregoing analysis, this study notes that the minister's intervention represents the dangers of allowing executive excesses in the administration of Metropolitan Councils. The Harare Metropolitan Council has its executive mayors suspended in a manner that electrocuted the administration of council. Most of the dismissals created the impression that good governance was sacrificed at the altar of political expedience if regard is made to the political appointments or decisions such as holistic debt forgiveness that stifled council finances. The study also found that it is essential to adopt a continental cleansing approach to dealing with mixed governance problems as African countries discussed show how political interests are at the forefront of enfeebling the performance of lower tier council instead of embossing multi-level governance.

Recommendations

Alignment of statutes to the constitution

Laws such as the Urban Councils Act and Rural District Council Act which give the minister power to suspend councilors and mayors must be aligned with the Constitution which requires the setting up of tribunal to do so. It has been seen in the Minister's failure to prosecute suspended mayors such as former Harare Mayor Gabriel Manyenyeni that suspensions may be abused and alignment may go a long way in curbing the politicisation of suspensions.

Further alignment should also decisively deal with the granting of unfettered power to the Minister who is at large to ask for records and minutes of council and this takes away the autonomy and the free performance of the council.

Fiscal autonomy

The study recommends that Metropolitan Councils would be given the full autonomy to draft and propose their budget to the Minister of finance and be allowed to collect and set charges and surcharges of those services legally under their jurisdiction. This will alleviate bureaucratic challenges that short-circuit Metropolitan administration without the intervention of the minister.

- Council should be allowed to appoint key officials on merit as it had done in the James Mushore case.
- Council's executive mayors must also be dismissed or suspended after due process has been followed, including the gathering of enough evidence to sustain charges. Had this been followed in the Manyenyeni case, the Minister would not have resorted to after-the-fact decisions when he re-suspended Manyenyeni after failing to prosecute his case when he was initially suspended.

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
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Transdisciplinarity of Physics, Philosophy, Economics, Law, Psychology and Politics applied to Public Administration

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AJoGPL
ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 2.
pp. 53-66, Dec 2021
<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

Transdisciplinarity can be understood basically as the dialogue of opposite poles, as the interaction and the integration of opposites (dualities), considering dialectics between specialists and generalists, between the analytical and synthetic method. The main objective of this study is to evidence transdisciplinary as a tool for problem solving, as applied knowledge and understanding of reality, more than the mere intellectual view. The methodology adopted was based on Jungian psychology and in the MBTI System. Two schematic models were elaborated: 1) Duality and four elements as troubleshooting requirements and 2) difference between knowing (rational aspects) and understanding (a broader concept involving rationality, reasonableness, feasibility and meaning). As for Model 1, the idea is the integration and interaction of opposites in a dialectics approach, considering also the four archetypical elements translated into four requirements for troubleshooting managerial problems. Those are connected to Jungian functions: sensation, feeling, thinking and intuition, which were translated by this author into management requirements of feasibility, reasonableness, rationality and meaning, respectively. This approach considers not only psychology, but also Plato's philosophy, physics and the alchemical tradition. This emerging paradigm that considers all the transdisciplinary epistemic forms: technoscience, philosophy, tradition and art. The core is the dialogue of opposites, between specialists and generalists, between the analytical and synthetic method, to create a unit of applied knowledge, the understanding of the reality to solve problems effectively, not only in an intellectual and mechanistic view. Also this paper shows examples of applied transdisciplinarity in public management starting from the point of view of following disciplines: i) Physics with Philosophy; ii) Economics; iii) Psychology; iv) Law; v) Politics; and vi) Public Administration. The findings and the conclusion of this paper involve promoting cultural and behavioral transformation of public servers, so that they can develop soft skills, connected to reasonableness and meaning, to emotional and intuitive intelligences, not only hard skills (technical, scientific and bureaucratic training). The recommendations are in the sense of promoting managerial and educational training for public servants in this connection. Hopefully these transdisciplinary concepts and applications may be useful for many countries.

Key words: Public Administration

Introduction

Transdisciplinarity can be understood basically as the dialogue of opposite poles, as the interaction and the integration of opposites (dualities), considering dialectics between specialists and generalists, between the analytical and synthetic method.


¹This paper is the sole responsibility of its author, not necessarily reflecting the view of any public institution, such as the Brazilian National Treasury".

The main objective of this study is to evidence transdisciplinary as a tool for problem solving, as applied knowledge and understanding of reality, more than the mere intellectual view. The main transdisciplinary vision comes from modern physics: duality. In physics, at the beginning of the 20th century, particle-wave duality was discovered. Everything has a particle character (something concentrated) and wave character (something expanded). Even the light, which in the mechanistic classical paradigm would be only a wave, but light is diverted by gravitational fields due to its particle character (its mass). One character predominates over the other. In light the wave character is dominant. This means that in non-mechanical phenomena and not predictable by Newtonian physics {classical physics), the Cartesian paradigm or the Aristotelian logic. That is, in human phenomena, this dual character is intrinsic, already observed in modern physics regarding non-mechanical phenomena. In this context, subject and object are interacted, cannot be separated, which means the observer interferes in the experiment.

In praxis, the scientific “*exemption*” does not exist, and belongs to rationalists, reductionists and scientificists. It has been an anachronistic paradigm since the beginning of the twentieth century, with the advent of modern physics and Jungian psychology. The holistic view of reality, including holology (the study of the whole) and holopraxis (the praxis of the whole) is basic for transdisciplinarity. In this connection, anthropologist and psychologist Roberto Crema, rector of UNIPAZ in Brazil, teaches that Jungian functions of feeling and intuition make up the synthetic method, while those of sensation and thinking underlie the analytical method. The scholar considers that we can summarize the synthetic method as a necessary and creative response to the fragmentation crisis based, paradigmatically, in a science detached from consciousness, which led the subject to degenerate into an object. This method is the basis of the generalist. It is a qualitative pathway that is opposed to the quantitative and merely objective approach of the specialist. So, the author sees transdisciplinarity as the dialogue between the synthetic and the analytical methods, considering the Jungian theory of four psychological functions (CREMA, 2017:166-168).

Based on the four Jungian functions (intuition, feeling, sensation and thinking), this author Model 1 considers respectively the four types of intelligence, as an easier way to understand Jungian functions: intuitive, emotional, empirical (meaning “sensitive” in Jungian terms) and rational. To illustrate the need for dialogue between the analytical and synthetic methods, the Model 1 scheme was constructed for reflection on how to deal with solutions to managerial problems, when they involve human phenomena, in terms of dualities or polarities and four elements: sense, reasonableness, feasibility and rationality. Model 1 is a result of our conception and developed based on i) Jung’s psychological typology explained by Franz (1971) and ii) the Myers–Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) system of self-leadership and management – MBTI, which improved the Jungian classification.

The four requirements can be correlated to the psychological functions developed by Jung in his psychological types, which is the basis of the MBTI system: dominance of intuition, feeling, sensation or thinking (DOM CABRAL, 2017).

Model 1. Duality and four elements as troubleshooting requirements

Source: adapted from author's own research (COSTA, 2021:99).

Besides, Model 1 shows our vision of transdisciplinarity, which can be as simple as the A) dialogue of opposites, interaction of dualities or dialectics and B) the integration and balance of the four archetypical elements or principles, respectively:

B1) In **ancient traditions** – earth, water, air, and fire (the alchemical four elements).

B2) In **physics** – solid, liquid, gas and plasma (the states of matter).

B3) In **psychology** – sensation, feeling, thinking and intuition (the conscience functions).

This idea of four elements in three approaches (B1, B2 and B3) can be corroborated by Jungian psychology (Franz and Jung himself), considering the correlation of psyche and matter or psychosomatics.

According to Franz (1980), the alchemist Zosimos stated in the 3rd century that the four elements should not be understood in a concrete way; on the contrary, they would be mysterious "*centers*" or principles present in the matter. Later, they were interpreted as aggregations: all solid matter was considered as "*earth*", all liquids as "*water*", all gases as "*air*" and everything that burned, corroded or burned as "fire".

As far as psychosomatics is concerned, one can also think of the physical and the psychological as a duality and as a whole. In an interview with psychologist Dr. Richard Evans, Jung (1957) made a parallel between the matter of our physical body with the psyche, the latter as a quality of matter, another aspect of matter. Considering that psychology was separated from philosophy as a discipline only in the end of 19th century; even in Plato's philosophy these four elements are present, and can be shown in the same sequence of BI to B3 approaches in the divided line A, B, C and D (University of Florida, 1999), a content of Plato's *The Republic* (2013):

A- *Eikasia* – sensible appearances (perceiving).

B- *Pistis* – common sense (belief).

C- *Dianoia* – thinking (like in math).

D- *Noesis* – intelligence or intuition (dialectics).

² Archetypes are universal images or patterns, culture-independent models or scripts. The initial concept comes from Plato, but Jung explored the idea in his theory of the collective unconscious.

The connection with Jungian functions sounds clear:

A- sensation, B- feeling, C thinking and D- intuition.

So, those four elements tend to be shown in archetypical form, that is how came the idea of requirements of feasibility, reasonableness, rationality and meaning, as an insight, it is a conjunction of physics, psychology, philosophy and management.

Finally, this paper aims at showing concepts and examples of applied transdisciplinarity, starting from different disciplines and various papers, together with more contents in the comments and in examples for each item:

Item	Discipline	Author	Main Country
1.	Physics and Philosophy	Nicolescu	Romania
2.	Economy	Max-Neef	Chile
3.	Psychology	Crema	Brazil
4.	Law	Wiviurka	Brazil
5.	Politics:	Viparelli	Italy
6A	Public Administration	Uwizeyimana	South Africa
6B	Public Administration	Nita	Romania.

Source: Table created by the author

1. Physics and Philosophy

Romania: **Basarab Nicolescu**³, co-founder of CIRET⁴

Nicolescu (2010) makes a history of the origin of the term transdisciplinarity and its future perspectives, multidisciplinary is related to the study of several disciplines at the same time, but without interaction between them; interdisciplinarity transfers methods from one discipline to another, with the possibility of creating new disciplines; finally, transdisciplinarity goes beyond all discipline: its objective is understanding, for which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge. There is no opposition between disciplinarity – including multidisciplinary and interdisciplinarity – and transdisciplinarity, but a fertile complementarity. There’s no such thing as one without the other. Mechanical phenomena do not have the contradictions of human phenomena, which have the same nature as those unveiled by modern physics.

Comments: this is a direct application of the principle of particle-wave duality of modern physics, in which it is not possible to apply classical physics – mechanical phenomena. Also worth mentioning Nicolescu’s theoretical basis coming from modern physics, understood, in our point of view, as follows.

³PhD in physics (Pierre and Marie Curie University of Paris). Honorary theoretical physicist of the National Center for Scientific Research, of the Laboratory of Nuclear Physics and High Energy of the same University. Founding president of the Centre International de Recherches et Études Transdisciplinaires (CIRET) in 1987, together with Ubiratan D’ Ambrosio (Brazilian mathematician) and Edgar Morin (French anthropologist). Since then, Nicolescu is the great mentor of the international transdisciplinary movement, which postulates a new alliance of science with consciousness.

The International Center for Transdisciplinary Research (CIRET) is a non-profit organization, located in Paris and founded in 1987. The aim of the organization is to develop research in a new scientific and cultural approach - the transdisciplinarity - whose intention is to lay bare the nature and characteristics of the flow of information circulating between the various branches of knowledge. The CIRET is a privileged meeting-place for specialists from the different sciences and for those from other domains of activity, especially educators. Site access (in English): <https://inters.org/websites/CIRET>.

- A. **Classical physics:** since Newton in the 17th century. XVII, Two key principles: i) **separability**, ii) **action and reaction**. Newtonian philosophy is still dominant in economics and human sciences. Some exceptions: Max-Neef (Economics) and Jung (Analytical Psychology).
- A. **Modern physics:** quantum (Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, De Broglie and others) and relativistic (Einstein). The main transdisciplinary idea comes from modern physics: **duality and complementarity**.

Few realize that physics is the mother of all natural sciences and humanities. As a rule, the paradigms developed in physics take time to be applied in other disciplines. One of the rare exceptions is Jungian psychology, contemporary of modern physics at the beginning of the 20th century, because Jung discovered principles analogous to particle-wave duality, subject-object and conscious-unconscious, considering ancient philosophies and traditions, which Freud did not study, hence the division between Jungian “*analytical psychology*” and Freudian “*psychoanalysis*”. However, Jung was a scientist – a psychiatrist and a hospital director, who also maintained understanding with modern physicists.

In our opinion images can sometimes represent synthetically more than many extensive texts. A single image can provoke revealing insights that synthesize years of study, complementary to the analytical technoscience paradigm. Transdisciplinarity promotes a dialogue between the analytical or diabolical method (separation) and the synthetic or symbolic method (joining). Diabolos in Greek means “to launch separately” and symbolo “to launch together”, in a synthesis of concepts, which brings together rationality and significance or meaning.

Example: for Costa (2021) in public management there is a tendency for the subject to be degenerated in object, that means excess of diabolos, of analysis. Analysis and technoscience are connected to rationality and feasibility, but must have dialogue with symbolo or synthesis, connected to meaning, sense and reasonableness, otherwise the human phenomena is disregarded, there will be less effectiveness if solutions consider the mechanical part of the phenomena only. In Brazil, managers tend to be focused only on controls and accountability, because the mechanistic paradigm does not consider the human factor, such as incentives for proactivity. Instead, the focus is on processes and not on results. This has negative effects on the quality of public expenditure.

2. Economics

Chile: **Manfred Max-Neef**⁵,

Max-Neef (2014) recalls his academic career, considering he spent a lot of time diagnosing and analyzing (an analytical hypertrophy), but was not used to understanding. In addition, The scholar also recalls his 1996 meeting with the American physics doctor Philip Smith, resulting in the same book *La economía desenmascarada*, in which he criticizes the dominant scientificism in economics:

[...] I began my academic career at age 27, as a professor at Berkeley during the early 1960s. [...] My entire discourse as a mainstream economic scholar was completely

⁵Former professor at the University of California – Berkeley, winner of an alternative Nobel Prize in economics, former rector of the Southern University of Chile, candidate for president of Chile in 1993 with 6% of the vote, died in 2019.

inadequate for me to say anything meaningful. I was used to diagnosing and analyzing, but not used to understanding.

[...]

It was simply a matter of Jungian synchronicity that the paths of the physicist and the economist eventually converged. [...] the idea that we could write a book together appeared, with the intention of demonstrating what economics was like behind its mask of supposed exact science, mathematical and free of value judgments.

Free translation from Spanish to English. (MAX-NEEF, 2014:13-14).

In the paper Foundations of transdisciplinarity, Max-Neef (2005) asserts that if asked to define our times, he would say that we have reached the point in our evolution as human beings where we know a lot, but we understand very little. While in the field of knowledge it makes sense that I (subject) represent a problem and look for its solution (object), in the domain of understanding there are no problems, but only transformations that integrate subject and object. It can be concluded, therefore, that knowing and understanding belong to different levels of reality.

Comments: after all, in our opinion understanding involves something broader than knowing, that means the integration between analytical and synthetic methods, between rational-sensitive and emotional-intuitive intelligences, hard skills and soft skills. Max-Neef points out the analytical excess that creates problems in economic theories. In this connection, economists tend to be confused between efficiency and effectiveness. Similarly, some lawyers in the public sector cannot perceive, in practice, the difference between rationality and reasonableness, given the same analytical hypertrophy. In a 2021 lecture, the Brazilian Minister of Economy (ME) said: since 2019, when he took over, he had never seen so many competent servants, doing in a very precise way the wrong thing. The central thesis of this paper involves the same distortion in public management. The ME is supposed to be a liberal orthodox, and Max-Neef can receive labels of being an outsider, an environmentalist, because he once was professor at Berkeley, UCLA, known for his heterodox ideas. After all, labels and ideologies lose their meaning when it comes to broader and essential transdisciplinary tools. In its manifestation, the ME referred, perhaps even unconsciously, to one of the concepts of the private sector in Brazil of efficiency (doing right) and effectiveness (doing the right thing). In the traditional Cartesian economic view, the tendency is to put everything as "efficiency", without distinction. In the public sector efficiency involves conformity of a process and economics. On the other hand, efficacy is connected to concrete results. After all, management involves something more than technicalities. A good manager needs to be a generalist who is always open to discussion and to listen, so as not to get lost in technobureaucracy. It is necessary to learn how to dialogue with all the actors involved in each process.


In psychological terms, according to Crema (2010) there is a hypertrophy of information and knowledge, of broad, unrestricted and immediate access, but also an atrophy of the process of discernment and understanding.

Those economical and psychological visions are mapped in Model 2, based on Model 1, Model 2 was developed to show, in terms of duality and four elements connected to transdisciplinarity, the difference between knowledge and understanding.

Also, in Model 2 the idea of causality is shown in connection to knowing, in the sense that cause and effect are typical of the rational point of view, which Jung (1973) considered the Western way, while synchronicity would be the Oriental way of seeing reality.

One could consider transdisciplinarity as an integration of causality, where linear logic reigns, and synchronicity, where the meaning comes first. In Model 2 “*meaning*” is shown connected to intuition.

Model 2. Knowing and understanding – dualities and four elements



Source: adapted from author's book (COSTA, 2020:212).

Example: public policy models may be rational, but not reasonable, or even feasible, in the sense that they could bring an intolerable burden to society, for instance. Moreover, there must be a dialogue between reductionist quantitative econometric models (objectivity) and the psychology of agent expectations (subjectivity). That is what knowledge and understanding is about. As a simple corporate management example, which entrepreneurs know very well. In decision making processes involving investments, even if there is a technical eco-fin feasibility study showing excellent internal rate of return, if the entrepreneur feels an intangible risk, difficult to be measured, or even if he sees lack of sense or meaning in the solution, he will not invest. This is a typical case where there are 1) soft skills: meaning and reasonableness at **Model 2** (intangible sense of risk) in dialogue with 2) hard skills: rationality and exequibility or feasibility (technical study).

3. Psychology

Brazil: **Roberto Crema**⁶, rector of UNIPAZ and co-founder of this institution.

For Crema (2010), there is a hypertrophy of information and knowledge of broad, unrestricted and immediate access, while simultaneously there is an atrophy of the process of discernment and understanding. As Heidegger well denounces, we have never been more alienated from the human issue. We need, therefore, to reflect on what prevents us from updating our references and what can open us to the possible universe of an intrapersonal and interpersonal understanding, subjective and intersubjective,

within the framework of a Trinitarian ecology: individual, social and planetary. Among the obstacles outside intellectual understanding, Edgar Morin points to the existence of "noise", the lack of understanding caused by the polysemy of concepts, ignorance of the rites, habits, values and ethical imperatives of others, the incompatibility of worldview and the inequality of mental structures. As for internal difficulties, Morin indicates egocentrism, ethnocentrism and sociocentrism. Perhaps we can broaden these lucid considerations by affirming the existence of a mega-factor that impedes understanding, which consists of what Pierre Weil, Jean-Yves Leloup and Roberto Crema called normosis, a pathology of normality.

Comments: understanding is closely related to the psychological concept of consciousness. For Jung (1989), consciousness begins its evolution from an animal state that seems unconscious to us, and the same process of differentiation is repeated in each child, as happens physically in the anatomical evolution of species, so it is also in the psychic system. In this complex process, the ego arises. He also teaches us that we are aware only of a small part of the world. Our vision reaches only a certain distance, our memory is insufficient, our sensory perceptions, important to our orientation, too. A lot of things happen that we're too blind to see.

Example: as far as Crema and Jung are concerned, we can consider dualities of knowledge-understanding, subject-object and conscious-unconscious. In practice, there is no supposed "impartiality", nor a single objective truth, when it comes to human phenomena, especially in public management. Considering the idea of normosis, there is a tendency to see things from the "knowledge" perspective only, not from the "understanding" one. That is a cultural problem to be addressed. Understanding means seeing things not only by rationalism and feasibility, but also by reasonableness and sense, something essential in the point of view of problems solving in public management.

4. Law

Brazil: Eduardo Seino Wiviurka⁸.

Wiviurka (2010) analyzes the possibility of applying the epistemological practice of transdisciplinarity to the science of law. For this purpose, at first he presents some characteristics of transdisciplinary thinking, highlighting the complexity and form of development of transdisciplinary research (in comparison with disciplinary, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary research), which can be approached more easily from the law. Thomas Kuhn's thinking about the evolution of science is presented, emphasizing scientific revolutions, a process by which one paradigm succeeds another model in which the idea of "transdisciplinarization" of law is inspired by the author. He also analyzes Brazilian CNE/CES Resolution and identifies legal positivism as a paradigm for the science of Law. Also the author presents some of its limitations in the face of transdisciplinarity and the evolution of social phenomena (characterizing its crisis), a context in which the challenge of "transdisciplinarizing" the Law is proposed.

⁸Anthropologist and psychologist, master in human and social sciences from the University of Paris, creator of the Fifth Force in Therapy (Transactional Synthesis), former coordinator of the International College of Therapists (CIT) in Brazil.

⁷The Governor of the Federal District in Brazil, José Aparecido, in 1987 assigned the public property Granja do Ipê for this purpose, an area very close to the Brazilian capital Brasília. UNIPAZ It is a non-governmental, non-profit organization, declared a Federal Public Utility agency. It was created to develop specific and inter-related projects related to the holistic view and the transdisciplinary approach. Site access (in Portuguese): <https://unipaz.org.br/>.

Comments: in this connection, there is the question of media culture, the rationalist bureaucratic paradigm in which the means become an end, in a self-reference such as in some public institutions in Brazil. The transdisciplinaryization of the law could help in the awareness of all actors directly or indirectly involved in public management.

For Costa (2021), the public managers in Brazil tend to be inert in the face of the legal uncertainty of statutory law (excess of written legislation). Their actions tend to be based on the preview of possible formal accountability and the production of detailed documentation to face them, thus leaving the focus of his management in a second plan. It is a bottleneck in the quality of public spending in effective terms, which also involves, in the case of Brazil, a tendency for a salvationist and heroic culture of controllers. In practice the opposite can happen if the systemic effects are not considered before actions. There are several disciplines involved, not just in the formalism of law or legislation

Example: considering Costa (2020), the mere literal interpretation does not reflect the spirit of the law, the intention of the legislator at the end. In Brazil, the excess of written legislation is often not sufficient for the solution of concrete cases, demanding a more sophisticated interpretation. So, it seems to be necessary analogies with other laws, general principles of law, or even uses and customs. Reductionist literalness tends to prevail today in various instances of controllers of public management in Brazil. There is no stimulation for the systemic view of the core business of institutions. As a result, managers tend to be reactive, not proactive, because they are focused on controls and on accountability. Finally, this is a matter of cost and benefit analysis, involving dialectics between control and management discretion, a trade-off to be faced.

5. Politics

Italy – Irene Viparelli¹⁰,

As far as scientific knowledge is concerned, the transdisciplinary attitude represents a complementary element that, although necessary, is external to disciplinary knowledge, in the case of the human sciences, quite the contrary, transdisciplinarity is a structural, immanent, essential element. In fact, we have, on the one hand, the relationship of the human sciences to disciplinary and technical knowledge, which reduces man to an object, actively collaborating in fragmentation and incommunicability between knowledge. On the other hand, and therefore, the human sciences have to recognize their transdisciplinary core, never forgetting the question surrounding the encounter between subjectivity and objectivity. [...]

We can then, in the form of preliminary conclusions, affirm that a transdisciplinary approach to politics implies the recognition of its humanistic core, making it impossible to reduce it. [...]

In sum, given the essentially expansive logic of instrumental rationality, politics cannot build only one “*beyond form*”, as Habermas intends, nor, following Nicolescu, a simple region of practical realization of the transdisciplinary view of the world. [...]

The included Third Party, finally losing its indetermination, should be recognized as a “*transdisciplinary policy*”, that is, as a critical process of restoring the autonomy of politics, as a legal process for defining

¹⁰Professor of law theory and constitutional law, master in law and PhD in philosophy in UFPR, Brazil.

⁹BRAZIL. National Board of Education. Chamber of Higher Education. Resolution No. 9 of 29 September 2004 Available in Portuguese at: <http://portal.mec.gov.br/cne/arquivos/pdf/ces092004direito.pdf>.

normative principles by subordination of systemic logic to the project of a “*human*” society, based on the transdisciplinary principles of Rigueur, ouverture et tolérance (Nicolescu, Morin and Freitas, 1994). It will be concluded then that transdisciplinarity allows us to rediscover a critical function of politics, removing its possible reduction to technical knowledge and imposing the centrality of the question around the meaning.

Free translation from Portuguese to English. (VIPARELLI, 2019:54-57).

Comments: the excerpts from author’s paper (including her concept of “*transpolitics*”) is a corroboration of our opinion:

- a) subjectivity and objectivity are inseparable;
- b) recognition of the humanistic core of politics, to overcome reductionism and analytical hypertrophy of the human sciences in general;
- c) rationalism is insufficient;
- d) Nicolescu Third Included is a critical process, to remove reductionism and to centralize the issue around the meaning. This reminds our ideas of dialogue between: i) synthetics of meaning and reasonableness; and ii) analytical feasibility and rationality.

Brazilian Professor Baesso (2021) corroborates this view, in sociological terms. The author gives the example of five people who describe a traffic accident. There will be five versions, according to the perspective of each one, hence the dialectics and the discussion to reach the common good of Aristotle in search of the agreement of different world views. In this connection, technical civil servants influence important policy decisions. The politicians are always between technical rationality and public opinion. Finally, the professor asserts that technicians will never have the neutrality that Max Weber and others imagined about rational bureaucracy.

Public servants should use their convincing power with their superiors. There’s nothing wrong with that, on the contrary. Such issues are essential in terms of the relationship between the internal and external actors of organizations, the dialectics between technical and the political aspect. It is wrong to think of politics as incompatible with the conduct and the compliance of a public servant. The same with psychology, when considered as mere treatment of emotional or mental disorders, not an instrument for cultural transformation. After all, psychology and politics involve the conscious development that provides relevant instruments to improve the quality of public spending. It is not advisable for the public servant to be naive or omissive in psychological or political terms, if the intention is to be effective in public management.

Example: in Brazil we have good examples of articulation of public servants with their superiors. The extinction of the PIS-PASEP Fund in May/2020 was the idea of a career server of the Ministry of Economy, who developed all the articulation and the process of convincing with his superiors, for the incorporation of the PIS-PASEP Fund by the FGTS Fund. The two are private funds of compulsory savings, under the tutelage of the public administration, whose coexistence did not make much sense in terms of public management, in view of the similarities between them. By joining PIS-PASEP, a smaller

fund with assets of around USD 4 billion, to FGTS, a fund with assets of around USD 100 billion, the idea of simplification and efficiency of management was simultaneously honored. In addition, there is now only one managing bank who was already an administrator of the FGTS, while in the PIS-PASEP Fund there were two managing banks for the accounts and another one for applications of the resources. For Costa (2021), some may confuse psychology and politics in public management with ideology, but ideology is inside those who can't understand psychological and political interactions in internal and external processes to organizations, which have nothing to do with partisanship. Everything unknown or unconscious can be mystified by the inattentive. In this connection, there is an excessive technobureaucratic preparation (technical, scientific and bureaucratic) to allegedly provide the servant with instruments for dealing with the quality of expenditure. Therefore, it is necessary to promote the transformation of the culture and behaviors of technobureaucrat servers, to also develop the soft skills, which complement the technobureaucratic hard skills.

6A Public Administration

South Africa and Uganda: **Uwizeyimana and Basheka**¹¹

According to Uwizeyimana and Basheka (2017), the history of public administration can help to understand how disciplines related to public management were formed, starting with political duality and administration before the 20th century, through the scientific administration of Taylor and Fayol in the early twentieth century, until human issues in public administration began to be considered, when history becomes more complex, culminating with e governance and the 4th Industrial Revolution in 2017.

Comments: Four key disciplines can be evidenced from the consolidation of twelve disciplines as shown in Figure 1 of this South African paper, in order to facilitate the vision of the whole system of Public Administration (COSTA, 2021:80).

- i. **Technoscience**, starting from Economics – the interaction between technology and science. including Economics, Administration and other natural sciences.
- ii. **Bureaucracy** – Law and Legislation.
- iii. **Psychology**, including other humanities, which are not Technoscience, meaning that they are not “*exact*” or biological. Technical leadership is included in this context.
- iv. **Politics**, considering not only the traditional politics, but also the intuitive leadership.

The idea of reducing the twelve disciplines from the South African paper to only four groups came from the four epistemic groups of disciplines showed by Weil, D'Ambrosio and Crema (1993): **technoscience, philosophy, tradition and art.**

¹¹D E Uwizeyimana.(School of Public Management, Governance and Public Policy University of Johannesburg, South Africa); B C Basheka (Uganda Technology and Management University Kampala, Uganda).

¹²Ways of understanding reality through the four basic disciplines. Considering also de MBTI system and Jung's psychology, the following scheme can be designed:

<i>Discipline</i>	<i>MBTI features</i>	<i>Jung's Functions</i>
Technoscience	concrete + objective;	sensation + thinking;
Philosophy	objective + abstract;	thinking + intuition;
Tradition	abstract + subjective;	intuition + feeling;
Art	subjective + concrete;	feeling + sensation;

So, our resulting model takes into account Weil's transdisciplinary four disciplines or epistemic forms, together with the scientific principles in the South African paper, considering:

- a) Economics is the dominant discipline in public management as a technoscience involved with the discipline of general Administration.
- b) Psychology is vital for understanding interactions between the internal and external environments of organizations, actors involved in the processes and the relationship of public servers at the individual and at the collective level.
- c) Law is essential for the understanding of Bureaucracy, which often becomes self-centered and dysfunctional, when the ends become the means.
- d) Politics involves dialogue and articulation between various actors with different ideas for solutions, whether in the internal or external environment of organizations. It applies here in a sense that goes beyond mere technicality of political science, not be confused with partisan ideology.

Example: this study expresses a dialog between theory and praxis in public management in Brazil. There are four interdisciplinaritys that can be identified in our approach (COSTA, 2021:83):

- A. Technoscience with Bureaucracy: this is the technobureaucracy, which risk is the gullibility of not considering Politics and Psychology;
- B. Technoscience with Psychology: this is the business management idea, which risk is not to observe the legislation of Bureaucracy and its limits to discretion;
- C. Psychology with Politics: this is the communication bias, which can result in manipulation if certain ethics milestones of compliance are not considered;
- D. Bureaucracy with Politics: this is the party ideology that can contaminate the public management if considered in a dogmatic way.

Those four interdisciplinaritys show the risk of each approach: A) gullibility, B) excessive discretion, C) manipulation and D) partisanship. In the end, transdisciplinarity applied do public management comes out as an alternative to balance all the limits of disciplinarity (Technoscience, Bureaucracy, Psychology and Politics) and interdisciplinaritys A, B, C and D. Concrete examples, in this case, are very delicate to be disclosed, as far as ethics is concerned.

6B Public Administration

Romania: **Mircea Aurel Nita**¹³.

Nita (2013) proposes a new type of education in Public Administration, which consists of learning to know, to do, to live and to be.

Comments: there can be analogies with the four intelligences from a Jungian perspective: rational, sensitive, emotional and intuitive, respectively. Here is a possible dialogue between the author's approach and our transdisciplinary vision based on Jungian psychology and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator – MBTI system:

¹³Senior lecturer, Eng PhD, Ec PhD, NSPPAS – National School of Political and Public Administration Studies in Bucharest, Romania.

- a. To know in the form of research, academia and intellect: objective rational intelligence.
- b. To do in the best possible way: concrete sensory intelligence.
- c. To live in society with self-control and relationship capacity appropriate to the norms and rules of coexistence: subjective emotional intelligence.
- d. To be in terms of self-knowledge, which the author understands as the idea of spirituality. However, it also involves, as a counterpart, learning to do in terms of innovation, because innovation is a characteristic derived from intuitive insights, from new ideas that come from the unconscious to the conscious, in the Jungian paradigm. In this sense spirituality can be related to the intuitive intelligence, which is abstract.

A point that could be added to the discussion: at the personal level (not collective or organizational) there is a fifth integrative element. In ancient traditions such as European alchemy it can be seen as the quintessence in terms of conscientious or beginning development, a process that Jung called in his psychological theory of “individuation”. Conscientious development is closely linked to cultural and behavioral transformations relevant to the management of public organizations or institutions. According to Crema, the integration of the four intelligences (Jungian functions) is manifested in a fifth Jungian function, the Self, an intelligence of psychic totality. (CREMA, 2017:166).

Example: a way to understand this Self principle is the integration of the four intelligences as duality of methods: analytical (rational + sensitive) and synthetic (emotional + intuitive). This duality represents the integration and interaction of opposites inside the psyche.

Conclusions


The transdisciplinary approach applied to public management is simple, based on the principles of 1) duality – interaction and integration of opposites, specially the analytical and synthetic methods and 2) four elements - rationality, feasibility, reasonableness and meaning. However, it is not a simplistic or a magical-vitalistic approach as it may seem to technobureaucrats and to rationalists at first, if modern physics is considered. The holistic view of reality, including holology (the study of the whole) and holopraxis (the praxis of the whole) can't be confused with political ideology, specially for technobureaucrats who consider themselves “*exempt*” and “*impartial*”. On the contrary, transdisciplinarity only incorporates Politics, as well as Psychology, relevant disciplines to be treated in the internal and external environment of public organizations, as much important as Technoscience (technology and science) and Bureaucracy (law and legislation). Currently there is an analytical hypertrophy between managers and controllers in Brazil, which can be verified by the dominantly scientific profiles, technicians, bureaucrats or technobureaucrats, who tend to disregard or to ignore the human and political aspects involving public management (the human phenomena). However, the business managers from the private sector who try to be public managers are also unbalanced, because they tend to not take into account the peculiarities of public management, such as the bureaucracy of doing only what law allows. In this aspect there are some concrete cases of entrepreneurs without the ability to listen to various public actors and understand the operating system as a whole. Therefore, the solution for public management involves dialogue, a dialectical process between generalist public managers and various specialists, so that culture and behaviors can be transformed. For sure this is the case in Brazil, where hard skills (technical, scientific and bureaucratic) are insufficient to provide instruments for dealing with management in a broad sense in terms of effectiveness.

Finally, the core idea is to promote transformation of the culture and behavior in public servants, so that they can develop soft skills, connected to reasonableness and meaning, emotional and intuitive intelligences, something relevant in Brazilian public management nowadays. Hopefully these transdisciplinary concepts and applications may be useful also for other countries.

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The timing and legitimacy in the announcement of presidential results in the 2018 general elections in Zimbabwe



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AJoGPL
ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 2.
pp. 67-79, Dec 2021
<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

Presidential elections since the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999 have become highly contested and disputed. The announcement of presidential election results in 2018 were reinforced by existing political divisions following two important historical events: (1) the delayed presidential results that took five weeks to be announced in 2008, and (2) the palace-military coup that took away power from President Mugabe in 2017. The suspicious MDC supporters took it onto the streets in protest to what they perceived as rigging processes caused by delays in election results announcements with dire consequences on seven lives gunned down by heavy-handed military personnel.

The study aims at establishing the best timing and legitimacy of announcing presidential results in view of the election laws and human rights observance for purposes of political and institutional success.

Election results for parliamentary and council results were announced immediately after the results, but there was a halt in the announcement rhythm after this. This convinced opposition supporters that Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) was purposefully delaying the announcement to rob them of their vote. MDC supporters went onto the streets demanding for an immediate release of this strategic and tactical electorate decision. This qualitative study used Mobile Instant Messaging Interviews (MIMI) to collect data from key informants and focus groups.

Results of the study indicate that the legitimacy of the 2018 presidential polls became based upon the military reaction on protesters rather than miscounting of results. It was also revealed that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) was short-staffed, and could not quickly verify and collate all the 210 constituency results into single figures for each of the 23 presidential candidates for release to the public. These challenges highlight the need for electoral reform, civic education on electoral law and political maturity on the part of parties to improve on timing and legitimacy in announcement of presidential results at the peak of the election-tide.

This article argues that the timing and legitimacy of presidential election results must be examined from the theory of the 'duration model' (period between start of elections and announcement of presidential results). The 2018 elections thus were criticised on the basis of human rights abuse by heavy-handed military reaction rather than rigging and the duration question as ZEC was left with five or seven days from its Constitution-mandate to release the presidential results. ZEC needs to be empowered to give all results within the election-tide, hence should act within the constitutional duration and in the context of human rights. The public needs to be educated on the law and processes of elections, including the challenges of ZEC at every moment. The armed forces do not need to be leashed against peaceful protesters.

Key words: Elections - Zimbabwe, Electoral democracy

Introduction

The constitution in Zimbabwe has mandated the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to administer all national electoral processes; hence ZEC is responsible for presiding over, and the announcement of presidential results. Presidents are important national stakeholders on economic, political and social development whose personal inclinations have a substantial impact on national relations between the army, civil society and business (Pigou 2019). This strategic election result sets political parties, the armed forces, and business into motion as soon as they are announced. Presidential elections have been a cause for concern since the formation of the MDC in 1999 reaching its peak in the 2008 presidential elections, and the 2017 military coup. Political party supporters were vigilant during the announcements of election results hence the 2018 peaceful protests that their vote could be stolen turned out to be bloody as the military dissented heavily upon civilians. The study aims to establish the significance of timing and legitimacy of announcing the strategic and tactical electorate decision (presidential results) with regards to existing election laws and human rights observance using the 2018 election experiences. The qualitative study has been done using media assisted interviews through Whatsapp platforms. The case under study indicated that state reaction was instigated by poll realities that were rigged, while ZEC hid from the truth using staffing shortages as its excuses. Electoral reforms, public education on elections and political maturity is required during the peak of the election-tide. The study used the theory of the duration model to examine inconsistent counting of votes and human rights abuses by armed forces.

The Duration Model Theory

This study examines the timing and legitimacy of the 2018 presidential elections in Zimbabwe in view of the duration model theory (DMT), which is the amount of time that elapses between two important events. The DMT is used in various fields of study and captures the concept of time, for example in economics it allows for an opportunity to present itself – also survival tactics (Cleves, Gould & Gutierrez 2004). In politics, they use frustration to provoke reaction, having put all the moves in strategy to win a lost battle using non-battle specific tactics such as provoking violence to justify announcing a wrong result arguing that opposition parties knew they have lost the election that is why they are breaking the law. Presidential elections in Zimbabwe are presently treated with an aura of interesting puzzle. The 30th July 2018 general elections were carried out under the euphoria of both the 17th-21st November 2017 coup and the delayed pronouncement of presidential results in the 2008 general elections that took five weeks to be released. The controversy that challenged the legitimacy of the presidential results are based on incidences of 1st August 2018, following the shooting down of seven people rather than suspected rigging caused by delayed announcements of results as ZEC legally had five or seven days to announce the presidential election results. Interpretation of this section of law could give ZEC to announce results by the 5th or 7th day of August 2018 depending on how weekends were treated in the interpretation of the law, hence the duration model. Preliminary speculations on the election results were that the presidential race was tightly contested (Lewanika 2018). The duration between the pronouncement of council and parliamentary results on 31st July 2018 and the announcement of the presidential results could appeal to the question of how long ZEC could take to compile the 120 constituency results for every presidential candidate into single figures for each presidential candidate. Supporters, who did not appreciate the constitutional mandate, marched on 1st August 2018 to pressure ZEC to announce results resulting with gunfire that claimed seven innocent lives.

ZEC was still within its constitutional mandate to announce presidential results as the law gave up to the 5th or 7th to announce results. The use of the duration model on announcement of results has been supported by participants who also argued that election controversy changed from rigging to violence, hoodwinking observers to question the legitimacy of the results on the legitimacy of ZANU PF victory after the 2017 coup (Le Bas 2006). The duration model theory has proven to be inadequate in the politically polarised state. This study has purposefully interrogated the DMT in the increasing challenges of deligitimised election victory of the Mnangagwa administration (Lewanika 2018). However, participants showed no mixed feelings on the delay of the presidential results using the DMT. The DMT remains an inconclusive theory on the timing and announcement of presidential results in Zimbabwe.

Methodology

The study used literature studies, election reports, court papers and results, observations and field studies on data collection. The study carried out four interviews and two focus groups using mobile instant messaging interviews (MIMI) due to SI 77 of 2020, on COVID-19 Prevention, Containment and Treatment Regulations. MIMI used WhatsApp to collect in situ data. MIMI was developed in the real-time life experiences of study participants during the COVID-19 period (Kaufmann, Peil & Bork-Huffer 2021). The study contacted political parties, especially at ZANU PF and MDC headquarters in Harare. Most parliamentarians were unavailable. Respondents contacted were informed and gave key data on the timing and announcement of election results using purposive and convenience sampling for five parliamentarians. Also researchers in government ministries and embassies who were previously engaged in national elections were picked to participate. Seven key informants were successfully contacted. Participants were fairly distributed between men and women with seven women and five men. The study managed to send interview questions to a total of twelve participants. It was impossible to perform focus groups as planned as political parties did not provide their personnel for the study. This gap was filled by literature studies.

The study met required validity and reliability tests as the researcher acquired written court responses on the court challenge by the opposition, fulfilling an otherwise legal and constitutional requirement to the legitimacy of the presidential results. While the court proceedings and results did not represent the will of the challengers, the process met some semblance of the application of the law on the legitimacy of the election result. This study goes beyond the 2018 general elections as it attempts to provide progressive and international best practices on the timing and legitimacy of the announcement of presidential elections. Reliability has been met by the engagement of key institutions involved general elections.

Data was interpreted using Atlas.ti 8 and the study met minimum ethical requirements of informed consent, confidentiality and anonymity.

Presentation of Results

Timing of Announcement of Presidential Results and the Law

Participants indicated that they have the knowledge of electoral laws and national constitutions that provide timelines within which election results can be released and announced.

Most participants agreed that post-election conflicts in most parts of Africa emanate from controversial elections since attainment of independence and adoption of western principles of democracy (Huntington 2004). The first sub-Saharan African countries to attain independence were Ghana (1957); Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1958), and Zambia (1964). Between 1960 and 1980, there were waves of military coups. Beyond 1980, when Zimbabwe attained independence, the continent was introduced to new governance principles of democracy that took place in the 1990s and beyond. Since then, African states have moved away from inter-state conflicts to defend boundaries like in Ethiopia and Eritria; Botswana and Namibia (which was mediated by President Robert Gabriel Mugabe); and Nigeria and Cameroun to intra-state conflicts. With intra-state conflicts, frequent elections were introduced as defined by national constitutions and electoral laws. They moved away from violent usurpation of power through civil wars, secessionist conflicts (Sudan), liberation wars and ethnic cleansing to election disputes. Participants indicated that conflicts around the announcement of presidential results emanate from justice issues which may be presented as procedural or substantive in form (Ceva 2009). 'Procedural justice is defined herein more broadly as the fairness of a dispute management system' (Nyamutata 2012:64). 'Substantive (or outcome-oriented) theories of justice, by contrast, draw on the characterization of the inherent properties of just outcomes' (Nyamutata 2012:65). On justice, Nyamutata (2012:70) says 'Regional and sub-regional organizations are custodians of norms and therefore implementers of justice principles in managing conflict. Justice is vital to the management of conflict. This is because, in general, conflicts arise because of perceived injustices'. Thus conflict arises as a justice issue, hence even 'Electoral conflict is [also] a justice conflict' (Nyamutata 2012:70). In other words, we cannot understand the challenges of the 2018 election results in Zimbabwe without looking at the two justice concepts, procedure and outcome (Ceva 2009).

Participants are categorical that procedures are very important in that they rid the process of any possible manipulation, in which case the counting and posting of results at every polling station, filling in of official result documents (V11 and V23) as well as the timely announcement of results was a case in point. This concern was cited by participants in reference to the past where votes were not properly counted (Dorman 2005). While presidential results could be easily compiled in the same way with the council and parliamentary results, the compilation of the total vote was not completed neither in the district command centre nor the provincial command centre, but in the national command centre. Participants stated that presidential results were the last to be announced because all constituencies had to ferry their filled forms and ballot papers to the national command centre for recounting and verification before a result could be reached. While the outcome was as important as the procedure, embassies concurred that ZEC had up to five days to finish the process and release its results. While procedural or substantive justice is the case in point here, fears of election rigging by the incumbent presidents have been topical across the continent inclusive of constitutional manipulations to extent their terms of offices. Where constitutional manipulations were difficult to carry out, incumbents, delayed in announcing results. This has thwarted the aspirations of most African people as opportunities for economic growth slipped away due to predatory and authoritarian rules by liberation movements (Juma & Brazaville 2018).

¹This has happened in Burundi, where Pierre Nkurunz stole elections; and it happened in Cote de Voire as well. In 2007 the Kenyan Uhuru/Odinga saga was caused by this; and in 2008 Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe/Morgan Tsvangirai, was based on delayed announcement of the polls.

The Electoral Law and the Delayed Announcement of Results in Zimbabwe

Participants in the 2008 delayed announcement of presidential results stated:

The problem of Zimbabwe was not on the death toll or the atrocities that were meted against the people by the government in 2008 but the delayed announcement of the presidential results. At the time, the country had no clear legal provisions to force the ZEC to announce the elections because the legal 'concept of reasonableness' they were using could mean anything to the applicant of the law.

In Section 18 (6) of the Lancaster House Constitution it says that an adjudicatory authority should conclude a case within a 'reasonable time'. What one asks is the 'reasonableness' of investigating an election result after five weeks, especially in terms of the eligibility of 4 million or 5 million voters, yet results that triggered conflicts were posted on the boards at the polling stations. One also needed to ask what 'reasonableness' meant to the mediator who said 'I wouldn't describe that as a crisis. It's a normal electoral process in Zimbabwe. We have to wait for ZEC to release [presidential results]' (Harper & Mkhabela 2008). The 2008 lengthy delay in the release of presidential results was a novel thing that was never experienced before. This delay was curious for the opposition MDC, and is termed 'electoral authoritarianism' (Schedler 2006) as the ZANU PF party President, after consulting the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), appointed the ZEC chairperson, and if he chose to appoint another person other than the recommended candidate could inform the Senate without informing the JSC. The President would further appoint six other members of the ZEC of whom three were women according to Section 61 (1) (b) of the Constitution. In this case, ZEC has been labeled as partisan because the procedures for its appointment were always not independent.

In the 2018 saga, findings indicate that the law was clear for the presidential results, which had to be announced or released within five days, and depending on our interpretation of the law, if weekends were not included, it could take up to seven days. The Zimbabwe Constitution under Section 156, as read with Section 110 of the Electoral Act provides for the timing of announcement of Presidential Election results. Specifically, section 110 (3) (h) (i), empowers the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), to announce results within five (5) days from date of polling. Depending on the interpretation of such a law, ZEC had 5 to 7 days to announce the presidential results, as the literal number of days was five or legal number of five working days gave it seven days to do so. Thus in terms of procedural justice, ZEC could be justified although we still have another justice question the international community has not asked, the substantive justice question (Ceva 2009). Firstly, the 2018 general elections had the highest number of presidential hopefuls in the history of Zimbabwe (23 candidates), although the contest was largely between ZANU PF's Emmerson D. Mnangagwa and the then MDC-Alliance's Nelson Chamisa. For the parliamentary elections, there were 1648 candidates from 55 political parties of which 220 were independent candidates to fill the 210 parliamentary seats (Lewanika 2018). It needs to be understood that the Afrobarometer in its opinion polls in May 2018 predicted a tightly contested election where the ZANU PF candidate, Emmerson D. Mnangagwa had a slight upper hand of 40% after losing 3% from 43% in the earlier month, and the MDC-Alliance leader, Nelson Chamisa had gained 7% from 30% to 37% (Lewanika 2018). In this context, it can be argued that Nelson Chamisa was not clearly sure to win the election, and neither was the incumbent Emmerson D. Mnangagwa due to factional fights within ZANU PF. Rather, Mnangagwa's formidable party that was conflated with government

could use this 'election as an opportunity to legitimize the November 2017 coup' (Lewanika 2018:2). Chamisa who had inherited a financially broke party, with no support from the international partners, civil society nor white farmers, and was conservative on women and gender, could hardly mobilize and organize MDC machinery by use of social media which could not guarantee numbers on polling day (Lewanika 2018). In the process, opposition MDC-Alliance had publicly warned that it would defend its vote, and the 'public mood' was contradictory, giving ZEC a 'hazard caution' in hope for positive change (Bratton and Masunungure 2018:1-22). This therefore was a 'closely watched vote' and 'tensions' were rising and souring after the election (Pigou 2018). This influenced the timing of the announcement of the presidential results as well as the August 1st events. For purposes of this study, the 2018 MDC petition for the release of the presidential results was concerned about substantive justice, yet the constitutional court used procedural justice to defeat the petition (Pigou 2019; Malaba 2018). This therefore makes many believe that the announcement by 'the Progressive Democratic Party leader and former finance minister in the 2009-2013 Zimbabwe Government of National Unity, Tendai Biti, [who] claimed [that] Chamisa had won [the election]; But the parliamentary results pointed to a massive ZANU-PF victory, which the opposition did not believe was possible without rigging' cannot be trusted (Pigou 2019:4). For this reason, Tendai Biti is believed to have preemptively announced the figures they compiled from the posted results on the polling stations and had to run from arrest to Zambia for he was charged with announcing the results yet the law specifically mandates the ZEC to carry out the duty of announcing the polls. It is not the purpose of this paper to judge whether the opposition was justly treated or not, but to state the facts in rolling out the need for a re-engagement strategy in a deeply divided nation concerning who should and who should not rule the country.

In Zimbabwe, struggles to deal with time-lines of announcing the presidential polls under the new Constitution began in 2013, where Tsvangirai claimed that the results were rigged, and he went to the courts but did not win the case. Similarly, on the 30th of July 2018 Zimbabwe went to the polls, but on the 1st of August 2018, the populace was angry that the results were not released or announced during the election-tide. The result was announced 2 days after the closure of the polls on the 30th of July 2018. Though within its time limits, the populace argued that ZANU PF wanted to rig the election; while on the other hand, ZEC argued that they needed to verify the result at the national command centre, even though the ballots, V11 and V23 forms had been completed and verified by the district and provincial command centres. The verification processes were done first at the polling stations where councilors were announced winners or losers, then at the constituency levels, where Members of the National Assembly (members of parliament (MPs)) were announced winners or losers, and finally at the national centre, where the president was announced winner or loser. One participant with government stated:

Candidates for the ward councillors were pronounced winners or losers at district/constituency command centres; MP candidates were declared winners or losers at provincial command centres and the presidential candidates were announced winners or losers at the national command centre.

Further, the MDC-Alliance leaders claimed that their examination of the commission's results and the poll results posted at the polling stations indicate that the numbers were falsified to give the ZANU PF candidate a 50+1 result so as to avoid a re-run. The argument that was finally taken to the court was seeking substantive justice, yet the events of August 1st were provoked by procedural justice, which makes the argument against the 2018 presidential results, in our view, not a legal argument per se, but

one of both perception and politics (Ceva 2009). As stated above, the 2018 elections were regarded as a watershed election that was tightly contested (Lewanika 2018).

It further needs to be understood that the 2018 election was done under the 2013 national constitution, but that the nation had lost trust in the institutions of government, reaching to a state of fatigue. People believed the nation had no political leaders and were almost on their own, especially basing on the 2017 'palace coup that was not regarded as a coup' (Bratton & Masunungure 2018:1; Pigou 2018:5). The behaviour of ZANU PF to its long-serving president by removing him through forceful means placed democratic processes at stake in Zimbabwe, meant elections could be manipulated by the same means to install a candidate favourable to the security system (Oxford Analytica 2018). Participants were convinced that 'The 2018 general elections were to define the course of Zimbabwean history', hence everyone regarded them as 'watershed elections' - just like a shed that determines where to throw the water. The premises of 'watershed elections' were on that the opposition had a chance to turn a new leaf in the political landscape of Zimbabwe, and to be numbered among a few cases where opposition parties defeated incumbents in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria. In the history of elections in Africa, since the collapse of colonialism, MDC hoped, through a new leader, Nelson Chamisa, to bring a new political horizon on Zimbabwe (Juma & Brazaville 2018).

Participants openly stated that they hoped MDC-A had a chance because both candidates were new leaders, although the MDC faction was bedeviled by factional fights, pitting the youthful Nelson Chamisa against the veteran of the liberation struggle, Emmerson D. Munangagwa who had been at the helm of government for over 37 years and was involved in factional politics for many years. Participants further acknowledged that the ZEC followed International Best Practices (IBP) as its Electoral Act clearly stated that ZEC should announce the election through the public address system within a period of five days from close of election. This means honourable Tendai Biti violated the Zimbabwean electoral law by announcing his own figures for the presidential results before the ZEC announced its own figures. Biti's announcement was justified in that Zimbabwe's authoritarian ZANU PF party, cum, military government, which had forcibly taken power from the country's erstwhile founding leader could be reluctant to allow ZEC to announce a genuine result, hence was buying time to manipulate the results in favour of ZANU PF candidate (Oxford Analytica 2018). The question however remains on the truthfulness of the results, whether they were 'nicely counted this time' (Dorman 2005:155-177). 'The army's deployment on the streets of Harare to quell protest confirms the uncomfortable truth that the military remains a pre-eminent force in Zimbabwe's politics' (Pigou 2019:5). Previously, the MDC was fighting for the cleaning up of the electoral roll, gerrymandering and vote-buying, which had been posed as tipping points for the election scale against opposition candidates during the polls. The declines in opposition election victories have further been cited as being caused by improper vote counting, which is the reason why the timing of the elections has become an issue in Zimbabwe.

In all, the timing of the announcement of presidential elections in Zimbabwe was reviewed in light of the national constitutional mandate that gives timelines for the announcement of results.

ZEC's Constraints in the 2018 General Elections

Participants sympathetic to ZEC indicated that events of the 1st of August 2018 should not be associated

with ZEC's competence or incompetence because it had within five or seven days to announce the results. Some sections of the opposition interviewed criticised Justice Priscilla Chigumba for triggering conflict that resulted in the killing of seven lives during the protests (Pigou 2019). As observed by several lieutenants of opposition politics, ZEC moved quite fast in announcing parliamentary results, but its feet became tied-up and moved too slowly for the comfort of the voters to bring to the fore an authentic presidential election result. In this case, ZEC waited for over 3 days after closure of the polling on the 30th of July, and 2 days after all other elections had been released, to announce the presidential results. Given the enormity and importance of the presidential results for the nation of Zimbabwe, participants concurred that local, regional and international observers wondered why it took ZEC so long to announce the results. They questioned why ZEC did not seize the election-tide mood to announce the presidential results before many speculations could be given? Participants observed that ZEC announced rural constituencies first before announcing results for Harare and Bulawayo. However, demonstrations happened before the lapse of the time to announce, which connotes towards the duration model. Chikwawawa (2019:315) says:

There were apparent anomalies in the announcement of results, which ZEC claimed were being physically delivered from the constituencies and were being announced as they came. What was surprising was why ZEC started announcing results from remote parts of the country before announcing results from constituencies in Harare, where the results were being announced. This triggered unrest, which resulted in demonstrations in the city centre in Harare. However, the demonstrations were controversial, since ZEC was still within the time-lines within which it is legally required to announce election results.

The experiences of the 2018 election results' announcement have a lot of loopholes from the political parties because in every institution ZEC acted out of suspicion. Despite this, presidential results carry substantive importance to the army, business and civil society. While paying attention to the 2018 alleged delays in the announcement of presidential results, anticipation created despair and civil unrest as happened on August 1st. The August 1st was the first experience when the military fired live ammunition upon opposition protesters on the Harare streets since independence, which further deepened divisions between political parties and 'the election left the generality of the Zimbabwean populace deeply disillusioned, with their hopes of returning to democracy and economic revival depressingly shattered' (Chikwawawa 2019:312). Chikwawawa further argues that:

The government reacted by unleashing soldiers with live ammunition on the demonstrators, resulting in the fatal shooting of at least six people. The unconstitutional deployment of the army to shoot unarmed civilians dented the credibility of the elections and President Mnangagwa's pledge to entrench constitutionalism and democratic governance. The shooting was followed by a police crackdown on the MDC Alliance leadership, including senior leaders Tendai Biti and Morgen Komichi, further undermining the credibility of the elections (2019:315).

The release of the army onto the civilians delegitimized the incumbent even though he requested the nation to remain peaceful, and blamed the opposition MDC for the violence, but said nothing against the security forces (Le Bas 2006). On the other hand, the ZEC argued that it needed to go through the verification process as the V11 and V23 that were presented were presumably a larger workload compared to parliamentary constituency results, and that they were short-staffed to finish as early as the electorate expected.

The importance of the presidential elections thus forced ZEC to be thorough in its verification process and hope the results were 'nicely counted this time' (Dorman 2005:155-177). A ZEC official also stated that:

There were 3 ballot papers, one for the councilor, one for the Member of Parliament and another for the President, yet the MDC did not challenge the two-thirds majority in Parliament, but only the presidential result. Unlike parliamentary results which are fully compiled and released as complete results at the provincial command centre, presidential results are compiled and completed at the national command centre, hence the delay in the announcement of such results.

This study attempted to assess the experiences of announcing results from the presidential results of the Zimbabwe 2018 general elections as well as systematically study how the timing of the announcement of the presidential results can improve the legitimacy of the winning candidate. The study suggests how announcements of presidential results should be conceived, the timing of announcing and the constraints associated with the verification process for purposes of legitimacy. The study argues that the electoral law's provisions of one week to announce the elections could justify that ZEC did not delay on the timing to announce the presidential results, but that winning the trust of the people required her to set aside the legality of the process by taking advantage of the election-tide rhythm to announce the presidential result. The study further assessed the tenability of the electoral law and the ground realities of the counting process.

Experiences of Delayed Announcement of Results in Africa

There is extant research on the timing of the announcements of presidential results in Southern Africa although most elections in Africa are marred by post-election violence instigated by delayed announcements of presidential results (Smith 2004). The nation was assured that the 2018 general elections were going to enhance Zimbabwe's credibility in order to help the country recover economically. The delays in announcing presidential results in Africa vary from country to country (Githaiga 2012), and the length of time it takes to finally announce the results is usually constitutionally vague. To note are the delays that were done in other countries, and announcement of presidential results have been cited in the 2019 Democratic Republic of Congo elections; it has also been cited in Kenya, Zanzibar, Lesotho, Angola, and Ivory Coast (Kaaba 2015). These delays suggest that the electoral commissions have little liberty and independence to announce the outcomes without seeking for confirmation. Timing in this case takes regard of power-politics, the office of president and the candidate under consideration. Little information has been extracted to assist in this exploratory study, but allegations from participants indicate that results were meant to favour candidates who were compatible with the national historical ideology; conversant with a complex diversity of stakeholders; and whose credentials will not stifle the feathers of the national security system. For Zimbabwe, the unprecedented numbers of voters, and the result that came out that E.D. Mnangagwa had won the election was of little shock to the pollsters who predicted a tight election; but to MDC it was not a shock because ZANU PF rigged the election. Thus 'The opposition is accusing the electoral commission of bias and fraud in its legal petition to overturn the election results' (Pigou 2019:5). The ZEC personnel who responded to study questions however indicated that verification of presidential results was time-consuming and that the disposition for announcing presidential results ranged from a couple of days to a week due to the enormity of the process as stated in the national constitution.

Opposition supporters who participated in the study stated that ZEC was a 'captured institution' because 'ZEC sought to announce an election result in favour of its preferred candidate'. They further argued that: 'The ZEC used a model of election release that is in harmony with the desires of the incumbent', but ZANU PF participants suggested that 'ZEC acted in the interest of national sovereignty, stability and security'. A few publications on the subject (Lewanika 2018) have been confirmed by participants who argued that 'The ZEC cannot immediately announce a result that negatively affects the incumbent as we saw from the 2008 election result'. Participants were pessimistic that even the judiciary was captured as 'There are no legal appeals against the ZEC announcements of results that have been won in court, making the ZEC release of the results final'. The announcement of results, while they conformed to legal parameters, did not legitimise the correctness of the votes cast and counted as the result always indicated that the incumbent was always leading in every poll.

This qualitative study has observed that there were strategic differences between the opposition leader, Nelson Chamisa and the incumbent leader and President of Zimbabwe, Emerson D. Mnangagwa on the timing and strategic behaviour of the candidates to the masses. ZEC personnel were appointed by the incumbent, pitting the opposition against ZANU PF. Thus opposition participants argued that 'The ZEC Chairperson, who is appointed by the incumbent president for both credentials and partisan politics, acted in favour of the ruling party'. Use of legal constraints thus meant to be used for personal security concerns of the masses by either delaying or fast-tracking the announcement after confirmation of final results. A ZEC official who declined to be mentioned stated: 'The process of verification can be done by junior officers, while in the case where the indication is that the election result is tightly contested; the senior officers in the commission are called upon to do a thorough verification process'. This may allude to the accusation of the Commission by the opposition that it acted in favour of the losing incumbent.

Further, the claim by ZEC that it had staffing challenges to release election results remains inconclusive. ZEC was given its annual budget for 2018, and the general elections had their own budget, making the claim that ZEC was short-staffed very difficult to sustain. This study focuses on the theoretical and strategic aspects of the timing of the announcement of results, where a mannequin reasons have to do with the difficulty of verifying the results in a minimum period of time or the anticipation of the effects of the results. Some participants mentioned 'palace theories' on the ZEC rationality of ZEC's delays on releasing results acceptable to power-holders. This dynamic has to consider inter- and intra-party relations as an announcement may trigger rising tensions within an organization or organizations hence the need to test the mood of the voters by holding on to contestable result due to human error or manipulation (Kadima 2006). The predicament which faces electoral authoritarian regimes 'is an unexpected electoral outcome that poses a threat to non-democratic rule ... in which a new opposition inflicts a surprising defeat on the non-democratic regime' (Nyamutata 2012:69). In other words we expect intra-party tensions rather than inter-party tensions to constrain the timing of the release and announcement of presidential results in which case it was less about MDC rather than G40 in the 2018 delay of the announcement of presidential results.

Finally, ZEC had to follow the etiquette and courtesy of announcing results for the office of President of the Republic in line with the legality of the office. While ZEC cannot prioritize candidates for the office, it is very difficult for the Commission to veto a result without going through consultations on how

to present a seemingly contestable result. Timing of the results thus, which the opposition could have regarded as having been fabricated in favour of the incumbency, where the opposition could not concede defeat, could have required the Commission to make necessary consultations and allow the security services to provide adequate measures and backup to contain a revolt. Participants also argued that 'The legitimacy of a delayed result has always been shrouded in questions of legitimacy', wherein similar cases in Malawi have been cited, where they delayed to announce a forged result (Smith 2004). This process, rather than the verification of results, may lengthen the period of time in which results can be announced, and we hereby hypothesize that presidential courtesy need to be attended to before the announcement is made.

In all, ZEC was also constrained by the constitutionality of their mandate. The job of ZEC is to receive results, verify them and then make announcements. In its limitations, it needed to observe both the constitutional requirements, election-tide mood and public concerns as well as public security and social stability. In all, ZEC must expedite its processes to avoid unnecessary excuses.

Discussion of the Results

The Hazard Rate in Election Announcement

The results indicate that ZEC had to consider the hazard rate in the announcement of results because there was instantaneous risk if the result was presented without considering public reaction. The hazard rate is conveniently evaluated in view of the duration model below, which is a length of time between the end of election and the period when the announcement is finally made and the inverse relationship between the two. The study supports claims that intra-party conflicts rather than inter-party differences posed a greater challenge to the announcement of results as factional fights could escalate violence within political parties. The dynamics of hazard therefore determined the amount of time to announce results within the ZEC Constitutional mandate.

The Duration Model in Election Announcement

The duration model allows candidates to re-evaluate the effects of their performance before a final result is announced. An assessment of the timing and announcement of results need to use the regression model where intra-party conflicts may be the major causes for the delay of the announcement of results rather than the effect the results may have on the candidates. Duration should also consider the distances through which the ballot materials and the result slips moved from across the nation to the national command centre for the purposes of verification.

The Acceptability of Results by the Incumbent

The timing and announcement of presidential results depends on the extent to which results are acceptable by the incumbent. ZEC can expeditiously complete the counting of ballots and the process of verifying results in view of the time constraints meted against its office if the results are favourable or unfavourable to the incumbent. Where the incumbent leads in all the ballots, the process is done speedily; but where the incumbent lags, the process is slowed. ZEC has a great incentive when the incumbent leads as the ruling party acts in friendly terms and results announced immediately are acceptable. Given that announcement of results is a political act, ZEC has to consider intra-party conflicts as well as contestable polls, especially

where ties are probable, making an immediate announcement futile. The announcement has to be done in the best interests of the country and the candidates where ZEC should have less incentives to act quickly or delay, hence not all presidential candidates.

Conclusion

The paper has discussed the timing in the announcement of presidential results by ZEC, and suggests that there must be more innovative ways of managing the process in light of a variety of outcomes. This may be because the long-drawn struggle for democracy, economic recovery, and the well-being of citizens in Zimbabwe has been on the agenda of many people, hence this great interest in presidential elections as they provided an opportunity to transform both politics and economics (Chikwawawa 2019). It is obvious that the important role of ZEC has been neglected on its treatment of results due to past experiences of rigging and delayed announcements of presidential results. This study has focused on the legal, practical and theoretical aspects of the timing of the announcement of presidential results, and there is much to be gained by studying the 2018 general elections, especially ZEC's choice and strategies of the time to announce the results.

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
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Determinants of employee's retention in Tanzania local government authorities: the study of Ikungi District Council in Singida Region

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AJoGPL
ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 2.
pp. 80-89, Dec 2021
<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

This paper investigates the managerial and personal factors influencing employees' retention in local government authorities in Tanzania. Over the years, studies of employee's retention have been focusing on managerial or organizational factors with family factors in local government authorities receiving little attention. This paper therefore, aimed at exploring managerial and personal factors influencing employees' retention particularly in local government authorities in Tanzania. Accordingly, a qualitative approach was adopted and Ikungi District Council was selected as a case study particularly because it is one of the rural local government authorities in Singida Region in Tanzania with high labour turnover. Data were collected through documentary review and focus group discussion comprising a sample of 150 respondents among the staff members selected from different departments of Ikungi District Council. The data were analysed using thematic approach. The study findings indicate that although the managerial factors influence employees' retention, they do not reveal the complete picture explaining the reasons of turnover particularly in Ikungi District Council in Tanzania. Some personal factors such as searching for a better offer, or changing working environment, equally influence employees' retention. To understand employees' retention, both personal and managerial factors should be taken into consideration.

Key words: Employee retention, managerial and personal factors, Local Government Authorities

Introduction

The growing trend of employee turnover around the world has forced many organizations to devise strategies of ensuring that the best and the most talented people are retained within the organization. This is because retaining employees enable the organizations to be more productive and achieve organization goals and objectives (Sushma, 2014). This implies that, the success of an organization depends not only on good business strategy but also on the ability of an organization to appreciate and motivate their employee, which can in turn maximize organisational performance for the benefit of the organization (Steinmetz et al. 2014; Mahadi *et al.*, 2020).

New developments theoretical and empirical literature on employees' retention provides accounts for the factors influencing employee's retention. For example, motivators and de-motivators factors propounded by Herzberg through two factor theory provided strong motivation for this study.

Furthermore, some empirical literature (i.e., Bycio *et al.*, 1995; McNeese-Smith, 1995) extended these factors to include leadership and personal factors. Literature by Andrews and Wan (2009) shows that leadership style influence employees' intention to leave an organization as well as the degree of employee's commitment, which is related to the intention to leave. In addition, Andrews scholar (i.e., Wan, 2009; Mahadi *et al.*, 2020) emphasized on the importance of leadership style as a retention factor through which leaders create a vision of guiding employees through transformation and inspiration. This in turn influences employee's commitment of staying with the organization. This suggests that having a good relationship with the supervisor can influence the intention of the employee of staying in the organization (Mahadi *et al.* 2020).

Besides leadership factors, personal factors such as age, gender, marriage, education level and years of working experience were also found to influence employees' retention (Liu and Wang, 2006). Studies (i.e., Babajide, 2010; Mamun & Hasan, 2017) have proven that employees who are inexperienced, young, and have a high level of education have lower levels of job satisfaction and lower levels of commitment to the organization. These negative attitudes have an impact on employee's turnover.

Despite this new development, the trend of employees leaving the organization has increased especially in local government authorities (Mahadi *et al.*, 2020). Furthermore, studies on factors influencing employees' turnover particularly in local government authorities are scarce. For example, it is not clear as to how leadership style used by leaders in local government authorities in Tanzania or personal factors such as new job offer, marriage or age influence the employee's intention to leave the organisation. Accordingly, the question what are the managerial, leadership and personal factors influencing employee retention in local government authorities is worth investigating. To respond to this question the study was carried in Ikungi District Council, which is one of the rural local government authorities with high employee turnover in Singida region in Tanzania. The remaining part of this paper is organized in the following sections: the concept of employee retention, the analytical frame, methodology and the findings.

Employee retention conceptualized

The term employee retention has been described and defined by different management scholars in different ways. Scholars (i.e., James & Mathew, 2012; Das & Baruah, 2013; Lam *et al.*, 2015) perceive employee retention as a process in which employees are encouraged to remain in the organization for the maximum period. On the other hand, Mahadi *et al.* (2020) define employee retention as a systematic effort by employers of creating and fostering an environment that encourages current employees to remain with the organization. In another study, Kossivi *et al.* (2020) defines employee retention as a practice companies adopt to maintain effective workforce and simultaneously meeting operational requirements. This study adopted the last two definitions because they are consistent with the goal of this study, which is to analyse managerial and personal factors influencing employee retention in local government authorities in Tanzania.

The concept of employee retention has been subsumed into a number of factors, which include mental and physical dimensions. The mental dimension factors consist of work characteristics. Employees always prefer flexible work tasks where they can use their knowledge and see the results of their efforts, which in return, help in retaining the valuable resources.

The physical dimension factors consist of working conditions (working environment) and pay (fair payment) Das and Baruah (2013). The section below will unpack the theoretical framework of this study. Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory

The prominent theory explaining employees' retention is the Herzberg's motivation-hygiene theory (also known as the Herzberg two – factor theory). This theory was coined by Fredrick Herzberg in 1959. Herzberg divided the employees' retention factors into (Intrinsic factors/content) for example employee rewards, recognition, autonomy, training and development, personal growth and hygiene factors (Extrinsic factors/context). Extrinsic factors are those factors which prevent employees from any job dissatisfaction; examples include salaries, rules and policies and working conditions (Wan *et al.* 2013; Busalic and Mujabasic 2018). Despite their presence, employee's dissatisfaction will not be affected, but its absence will cause employee dissatisfaction and feel uncomfortable to work in the organization (Wan *et al.*, 2013. They only affect or prevent employees from the feeling of dissatisfaction and attract them to stay with the organization for a long period. According to this theory, extrinsic factors are less likely to contribute to employee's motivational needs. Intrinsic factors are factors that when they are supplied can influence employees' satisfaction, or affect employee's attitude or behaviour on work performance (Wan *et al.* 2013; Busalic and Mujabasic 2018), This means that, intrinsic factors tend to motivate employees so as to increase work performance and love the job they do and their organization. One of the flaws of Herzberg theory is that it focuses on managerial factors and pays less attentive on personal factors. However overall, the theory indicates, how motivation plays an important role in influencing employees' retention. This means motivation and retention are directly related. A motivated employee is expected to perform higher and better than unmotivated employees (Busalic & Mujabasic 2018).

On the other hand, another category of theories explaining employee retention are managerial/leadership theories. Leadership style in the organization can influence employees to decide on whether to stay or leave an organization. Andrews and Wan (2009) emphasized on leadership as a strategy to increase an organization retention capacity. Mahadi *et al.* (2020) categories leadership styles into two categories; transformational and transactional leadership. Transformational leadership is characterized by a leader who creates vision to guide subordinate. This leadership style is sometimes called quiet leaders and one of the most inspiring leadership styles. While transactional leadership style is characterized by a leader who expects the subordinate to carry out their duties based on leader instruction. They will be given reward if are able to carry out the duties well and given punishment if they fail to do so.

The study conducted by Bycio *et al.* (1995 as cited in Mahadi et al., 2020), found that the higher the degree of transformational leadership the lower the intention to leave the organization. Similar observation is reported in a study by McNeese-Smith (1995 cited in Mahadi *et al.*, 2020) which found that, leadership has a strong constructive relationship with employees' commitment towards organization and employees' job satisfaction. The employee's intention to stay in the organization might depend on human factor especially leadership rather than on organization itself. Employees are human beings, as human beings any emotion related aspect can greatly influence their decision of quitting or remaining in an organization. Poor leadership is practiced over time it may cause stress and emotional exhaustion to employees

Furthermore, according to Mahadi *et al.* (2020), the relationship between leaders and their subordinate is an important variable and can affect the turnover intention of employees.

For example, according to this research, the relationship between employees and their immediate supervisors or managers was ranked the third most important factor for employees' retention. A good relationship with the supervisor bears a positive impact on employee's intention to remain in an organization. A considerate leader will make employees stay longer in the organization. Any employee working in any organization has a free will of working with trustworthy and respected supervisor, who understand and treat employee with respect. A good relationship with the supervisor contributes indirectly to other positive values such as receiving good supervisor's support that motivates employees to perform better. This in turn creates stress-free work environment, improves job satisfaction, increases employees' commitment and reduces voluntary employee turnover (Mahadi *et al.*, 2020). In addition, literature shows that personal factors such as age, gender, marriage, education level and years of working experience also influence employee's retention (Liu & Wang, 2006). Scholars (i.e., Babajide, 2010; Mamun & Hasan, 2017) have proven that employees who are inexperienced, young, and with high level of education have lower levels of job satisfaction and a lower level of commitment to the organization. Nevertheless, overall the theory and empirical literature cite management and leadership factors as influencing employees retention; however, there is little or scarce empirical literature on the role played by personal factors on employee's retention particularly in local government authorities in Tanzania. This study proposes an analytical framework that takes into account the impact of managerial/ leadership factors and personal factors on employee's retention particularly in local government authorities. In this respect the current study sought to respond to the following question: what are the managerial or leadership and personal factors influencing employee retention in local government authorities in Tanzania?

Methodology

To respond to the research question stated in the preceding section, this study used qualitative approach with Ikungi District Council as a case study. Ikungi District Council was selected on ground that the District Council is young Rural Local Government Authority (LGA) established from Singida District Council in 2013. However, unlike other LGA's, over the years most of the staff have moved to urban areas in search for greener pastures. In order to get an in-depth data for the current study a sample of 150 respondents was picked purposely from the population of 300 staff from different departments of Ikungi District Council constituting top managers/head of departments/division, line managers and extension officers. among these, there were 80 lower cadre staff. The data analysis began with content analysis of relevant documents such as Ikungi District Council profile, pay and incentive policy, employees' exist survey reports and quarterly reports of the Council. The review of documents provided information of the formal rules governing employee's retentions such as incentives and pay policy of the council. The review was followed by an in-depth interview and focus group discussions. About 70 policy officers were involved in the in-depth interviews and 80 lower carder staffs were involved in 14 focus group discussions. The data from interviews and focus group discussion were analysed using thematic approach in which themes and categories were identified to match the interviews patterns. For the purpose of ensuring reliability, the interactive questioning of the same respondents and probing was used. In addition, the researcher reviewed important documents including employees exit surveys.

Ikungi District Council – An overview

The Ikungi District Council was established in March 2013 as a new district council in Singida Region in Tanzania. The council was established through the Government gazette no 87 of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No.7 of 1982. Based on data of the population and housing census of 2012, the total population of the district is 272,959 (URT 2014). Administratively, the district is led by the District Executive Director who is the head of executives, and politically the district is under the council chair assisted by four standing committees responsible for decision making. These committees include Finance, Administration and planning committee; Education, health and water committee; Agriculture, economics, environment and works committee and HIV/AIDS committee. The Council Management Team which constituted by the heads of departments and units is responsible for the day-to-day activities. The departments include Planning, Agricultural, Irrigation and Cooperatives, Livestock and Fisheries, Land and Natural Resources, Environmental and Sanitation and Community Development and Human Resource. The units include Legal Unit, Procurement, Internal Audit, Information and Communication Technology (URT 2014)

Staff education profile

The level of education of the respondents in Ikungi District Council varies from primary school to Master's Degree level. Overall, the qualification of staff involved in the research varies from the primary school until the Master's Degree level certificate to bachelor degree levels. About 2(1.5%) of the respondents had primary education and these mainly constituted security guards, Ward and village Executive officers and primary school teachers. About 7(5.3%) had secondary education, 13(9.8%) had certificate level of education, 45(33.8%) had diplomas, 39.8% had bachelor degrees and 6(4.5%) had master's degree.

Working environment of employees at Ikungi District Council

To understand the trend of employees' retention in Ikungi District Council, the study began with the review of documents including the council profile and the exit survey. The findings from documents review indicate that the council has three hundred staff currently working in the council and 75 employees which equals to 25 percent had left the organization in the past five years. One of the reasons reported is low salary and unsuitable working environment (URT 2014).

When the respondents were asked about the factors which influence their decision to leave or remain with the organization, the findings show that, working environment was one of the main factors. For example, most of respondents especially those working in low cadres reported that they were working in very poor conditions, because they did not have an office and had to perform their duties under a tree. This makes them believe that Ikungi is not a good place to work as one of the interviewee says,

“I and my fellows do not have an office, we are working under a tree, and there is no even money to rent a single room.”

The findings show further that, although Ikungi District Council is aware of the importance of ensuring good working environment to their employees, low cadre staff also experience a lack of job security problem and increased exposure to occupational risks as witnessed in the following extract:

“ we're collecting revenue during night with no security or police support, we are risking our life and the management doesn't seem to care, they just want to see revenue arise”.

Furthermore, long distance to work is another challenge. The respondents said that they experience a problem of walking long distances to work due to lack of staff housing facilities in the council. The situation becomes worse during rainy season because some local roads are in bad conditions. Consequently, the impassable poor roads together with lack of staff housing facilities restrict them from attending their work as is was reported in the following extract

“there is no houses for staff or for rent to stay; we have decided to stay far from our working station because we don't have other options for a place to stay near our working station”.

Salary and fringe benefits were other factors which influence employees' high turnover at Ikungi District Council. For example, one of the respondents reported the following during focus group discussion.

“I will leave soon as if I get the better offer especially to any government institution”.

Work life balance of employees at Ikungi District Council

Moreover, work life balance is another factor influencing high labour turnover. The respondents reported to have been working more than 12 hours a day without any motivation and sometimes in most cases they find themselves working during weekends. Long working hours limit their private time. Consequently, this makes them busy with official activities most of the time and hence limiting the balance between official work and their private time.

The findings indicate further that low cadres are among the category of staff affected by lack of work life balance. This category of employees work even during weekends, and during late hours in the night. The findings indicate that the most affected staff are those working at the Headquarters. For example, one of the respondents had the following to say during interview,

“we are lacking time to perform our private life activities, most of our time we do perform official works especially during the revenue season” “sometimes we even sleep three to four hours a day, most of time we use to be busy on collecting revenue”.

Leadership style and employees retention at Ikungi District Council

With respect to leadership style, the respondents reported that leadership style is another factor influencing employee retention at Ikungi District Council. For example, through interviews and focus group discussions, many respondents reported to work under poor leadership style. Leaders do not care much about their employees. They just care about themselves. For example, one of the respondents during the interview had this to say,

“most of them do not have qualities of leadership to handle cases, they forget about us they just care about themselves by been afraid of losing their position”.

During the interview, another respondent said “there is a gap between managers and lower cadre employees; we lack good communication with our bosses”.

Career development and employee retention at Ikungi District Council

Career development was reported by many respondents as another challenge, indicating that they do not get opportunities for growth and time for training. For example, through interview, one of the staff of Ikungi District Council from Human Resource and Administrative Department had this to say,

“Training is provided to everyone who wants to, and they policy is quite clear what they supposed to do is to follow the procedures when they have the requirements”.

On the contrary, through interviews and focus group discussion with lower cadre staff, the respondents said, “Training for career development provided to some levels and it has poor system (bureaucratic system). They provide opportunities to the people who are closely to them and perhaps they have same interest”.

In addition, the motivation policy emerged as another factor that contributes to high labour turnover. For example, one of the factors reported during the interviews was poor motivation policy. Most of the respondents said, motivation policy at Ikungi District Council, is very poor because motivation was provided once per year on May Day (Mei Mos Day), and normally for only one or two people per departments, and on issues of extra duty. There are some cadres who do not get any pay for extra working hours despite that the nature of their work make them qualify for extra duty payment.

Personal factors for employee retention at Ikungi District Council

The researcher asked this question in order to identify personal factors that may causal factors for employees’ exit from the organisation. According to the respondents, family matters such as age and better work packages are the main causes for employees’ leaving Ikungi District Council. For example during the interview, one of the respondents said,

“I am here because I have not secured a good job in town. If I get another job which pays more like central government I will leave Ikungi District Council because I have good education and am still young “

Another respondent said,

“Ikungi is my home, is my place of domicile and I love working here but I would like to stay close to my family which is now in Singida town. I must leave Ikungi District Council because I want to join my spouse and children” .

Discussion of the findings and cross referencing

One of the factors for high turnover which featured the most is poor working environment. The study respondents reported that, most of them were working in poor environment that minimising their level of satisfaction and leading to poor work performance. For examples, some cadres reported working under trees because due to lack of office space, furthermore most of Ikungi staff were working in remote areas with no or limited access to the internet and other networks, and with poor health system and other social amenities. These findings are inconsistent with the findings from other studies (i.e., Adriana & Giovanni, 2008; Sandhya & Kumar (2011); Shao, (2013); Calist, 2015) who showed that, controllable factors such as short contract, poor working conditions, poor recruitment procedures, lack of motivation and poor or inadequate incentives and rewards are the reasons that influence voluntary turnover.

Furthermore, changing working environment came out regularly because the respondents claim to have been working at Ikungi District Council for a long time, thus they would like to work somewhere else to acquire new experience. These findings are consistent with the findings in a study by Babajide (2020) who observed that all the personal factors (work family life, job satisfaction, commitment to organization and general health) taken together predict workers’ turnover intention. Elsewhere, scholars (Shen & Hall, 2009; Andresen, 2015; Nor, (2018); Chepkosgey *et al.*, 2019) argue that, employees may leave companies in search for better payment packages, better career development and opportunities and job satisfaction among other factors.

Furthermore, the lack of work life balance was reported as another important factor for employee's decision to exit at Ikungi District Council. The findings indicate that, some cadres (lower cadres) sometimes work seven days a week and even during midnight and thereby most of their life is spent on official duties. They do not have enough time to deal with their personal life.

This is unhealthy because work demands interfering with personal life results to stress and emotional exhaustion among employees. These findings are inconsistent with the findings from other studies showing that work life balance is comparatively a recent trend which is being used by various organizations to retain its employees by promoting a healthy balance between one's personal and professional life (Nasir & Mahmood, 2018).

Poor career development and training were cited as other factors influencing employees' retention. The findings show that, the most affected employees are those in lower cadres working in the extension or field areas such as wards, village, primary schools, and dispensaries. This category of staff does not get adequate opportunities for career development at Ikungi District Council. This is consistent with the findings from other studies (i.e., Ahmad & Azumah, 2017) revealing that provision of promotion and career development opportunities to individuals can make them stick to an organization.

In addition, leadership style is another factor reported to have had an impact on employee retention. The interview with the respondents indicates, that there were poor working relations between managers and their subordinates at Ikungi District Council. The findings show that the leaders and subordinates at Ikungi District Council are divided into classes: the class of leaders who are the superiors who care little about their subordinates and the class of subordinates (lower class) who fail to get assistance from their bosses. This is also proven by the absence of a room for communication between leaders and their subordinates. The leaders sometimes put their staff in the police custody for minor offences without giving them opportunities of expressing themselves. Similar findings are reported in a study by Callist (2015) who found that leadership style can influence organizational commitment and job satisfaction that can in turn have an impact on organizational commitment and work performance.

Finally, family matters were found to be the main personal factors influencing employee's retention. Most of staff said that they wanted to leave Ikungi District Council, because they wanted to stay close to their families including spouses and children. Similarly, looking for better job with better pay was a push factor. Through interview, the respondents reported that comparatively other institutions especially the central government institution pay more than do local government institution. However, it is the local government staff who perform a lot of work, serving citizens and working many hours. These findings are consistent with the findings in a study by Babajide (2010) and (Mamun & Hasan 2017) showing that employees who are inexperienced, young, and have a high level of education have a lower level of job satisfaction and a lower level of commitment to the organization. These negative attitudes have positive coloration with employees switch or labour turnover.

Conclusion

To understand the factors influencing employees' retention particularly in local government authorities, both managerial or leadership factors together with personal factors should be taken into consideration.

Managerial factors such as the working environment, work life balance, career development are instrumental in creating a conducive and comfortable work environment for local government staff while leadership factors contribute to moderating the relationship between leaders and subordinates. This study indicated how leadership style of district local government authorities affected leaders and subordinate relationship. Oppressive District leaders against the local government staff at Ikungi District Council, family matters especially the need to be close to family members and better pay are among the most important personal factors that influence employee's turnover intention at Ikungi District Council.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and the conclusion in this study, this paper recommends the following; first, the management of the local authorities should establish a reward system, which is fair and reasonable especially to lower level cadre's staff. Furthermore, the local government authorities should revise their motivation policy. Motivation of staff should not wait for the May Day, which occurs once per year. There should be a system of recognizing good work regularly and rewarding it accordingly.

Moreover, the local government authorities should devise a strategy of improving working conditions of staff by providing housing facilities to staff, and improving local roads to enable the staff reach the working place without difficulties.

Besides, the District Council leaders should be trained on the importance of leadership and on the strategy of building good relationship between leaders and subordinates through communication.

In addition, the management of the council should devise a new strategy of improving carrier development of staff and the staffs who qualifies for training, according to the training needs analysis of the council should be given the opportunity for further training.

Finally, the council should devise a strategy of balancing work and life and allow employees to enjoy their private time instead of regularly interfering with employee's private time and forcing them to work beyond their capacity.

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