

Determinants of effective outsourcing of solid waste management in Tanzanian Local Government Authorities


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AJoGPL

ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 3.

pp. 42-56, June 2022

<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

Over the years, many countries have adopted outsourcing of service delivery as a means of increasing efficiency and recovering cost in service delivery. Nevertheless, in most cases, the outcomes of the outsourced services does not reflect the standards and expectations set at the beginning of the process. The situation also is similar in Tanzania where the solid waste management was outsourced to private service providers in local government authorities but overall, the outsourcing process resulted in mixed results with negative outweighing positive results. Literature on outsourcing cites various factors contributing to the failure or success of the outsourcing process. These include the capacity of local government, the nature of service, trust between partners and the institutional context but some of these factors have received little attention in the literature and the research studying the combination of these factors and the way they influence outsourcing process is scarce. The aim of this paper was to explore the determinants of effective outsourcing of solid waste management in Tanzania Local Government authorities and the way these factors (capacity of local government, the nature of service, the trust between partners and the institutional context) influence the process and its outcome. The study used a cross-case analysis with documentary reviews and 80 interviews conducted with local government officials, local politicians and service recipients in the four cases selected for this research. Data analysis involves contents analysis of policies and guidelines for outsourcing process in local government and thematic approach was used for the analysis of interview transcripts. The findings of this research shows that the outsourcing process in the four LGAs is guided by several regulations such as the Public Procurement Act, Public-Private Partnership Act and the guideline manual for the outsourcing process all of which together define the institutional context. On the other hand, the findings show that the four local government authorities involved in the research lack capacity, especially in the provision of dustbins. But also there is mistrust between the parties that has to a large extent affected the performance of the outsourcing process and the outcome. The overall conclusion is that, the outsourcing performance particularly of solid waste can be influenced by not only the nature of the service or capacity of local government but also the institutional context in which actors are operating. Therefore, policy reforms in outsourcing solid waste management should pay attention not only to the capacity of local government, nature of service or trust between the parties but also to the institutional context in which the actors are operating.

Key words: Solid waste management – outsourcing, solid waste management, Refuse and disposal, Tanzania Local Government

Introduction

Outsourcing has gained popularity in the literature across the globe. Some authors (Kern 1997; Child 2005) define outsourcing as a decision taken by an organization to contract out its activities to a private service provider who in exchange provides and manages services for monetary return over an agreed time.

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On the other hand, Lopez-sala and Godenau (2020) understand outsourcing as a process through which organizations assign the execution of some of its tasks or services to private service provider to improve the quality of service provided.

Currently, there is a growing agreement in the literature globally that the production of solid waste from human activities is inevitable because of the nature of the production of goods and services and the availability of technology and space for disposal. This agreement has influenced several initiatives taken nationally and internationally to address this problem. The initiatives are echoed in the different national and international policies. For instance, one of the sustainable development goals aims at striking a balance between the rate of consumption and production of solid waste without endangering the environment (UN 2020).

In Tanzania, in both the constitutions of the United Republic of Tanzania, different laws and policies have been enacted to support the management of solid waste. For example, the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 makes it mandatory to protect the human health of each citizen in Tanzania. To support this, the Government enacted the Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004 and the National Environment Policy intending to strengthen individual and community awareness and participation in the protection of the environment and handling of SWM services. In addition, the government has enacted the Public Procurement Act and Public-Private Partnership to guide the process and conditions of the outsourcing process. Nevertheless, the literature shows that in Sub Saharan Africa, the overall amount of waste products increase by three times in the year 2050 (World Bank, 2020). In Tanzania, urbanization together with the rising standards of living have resulted in the increase of solid waste generation by industrial and domestic activities. All these are expected to have negative impact on the environment, health, and prosperity of the population. Although the solid waste management has been outsourced to private providers in local government, the results of outsourcing presents a mixed results with negative results outweighing positive ones.

Literature has identified factors that may influence the performance of outsourcing management; these include service characteristics (Corra & de Ridder, 2012), the institutional context (Domberger & Jensen 1997; Jensen & Stonecash 2005), and the availability of resources and the capacity of Local government in service delivery (Eisenhardt 1989; Laffont & Martinort 2001). Others factors identified include the level of knowledge on what counts for a service to be core or non-core, how to select a service appropriate for outsourcing (Barthelemy 2003) and the trust between the organization and the outsourcing vendor (Elmuti 2003). Studies on the combination of these factors and the way they affect the outsourcing process in local government are still scarce. This motivated the current study to investigate how service characteristics, availability of resources, institutional context, the level of knowledge and contract affect the outsourcing process in local government in Tanzania.

Outsourcing conceptualised

Outsourcing is defined as a decision taken by an organization to contract out some activities of the organization to a service provider who provides and manages services in exchange for monetary return over an agreed time (Kern 1997, Juras 2008). Other scholars (Child, 2005, Gradus *et al.* 2018) perceive Outsourcing as activities organisations contract out to private service providers for increasing its efficiency and effectiveness. Yet other scholars such as Weinert and Meyer (2005) perceive outsourcing as one of

the activities used by organizations to improve the quality of service. Overall, the outsourcing of services has become a strategy in the restructuring of a business for increasing efficiency (Burnes & Anastasiadis 2003, Andersson *et al.* 2019).

According to Child (2005), outsourcing can be categorized into two, outsourcing of core activities of the organization and outsourcing of support activities. Core activities of an organization include the supply chain activities such as distribution while the outsourcing of support activities include management of human resource and facilities. In addition, Alexander and Young (1996) distinguish between activities that are critical to the performance of an organization but only support the core such as the supply of spare parts and activities that provide competitive advantages such as IT services. According to the authors activities that support core functions should be considered as noncore. Overall, outsourcing initially involves non-core activities to reduce costs and improve efficiency in service delivery.

The theory of outsourcing

One of the professed goals of outsourcing is cost recovery. According to theoretical argument on cost recovery, public funds should pay for public goods and services and the agent should deliver the services (Altaf & Deshazo 1996). But in most case, governments particularly in developing countries lack enough capacity to finance the public goods and services; this leads to the use of cost recovery method as an alternative. Regarding solid waste management, most of SWM activities such as streets cleaning involving sweeping public streets and cleaning public parks and lands are considered public goods because they are provided to the public and not to specific individuals. As a public good, the local governments revenue is expected to cover all the costs of these services. However, most of the local governments in developing countries often fall short in meeting their revenue needs from tax bases. Therefore, user to cover cost of solid waste to facilitate service delivery (Cointreau, 1994). User charges also provide the private service provider some autonomy to be accountable for residents for the cost and value of SWM services that they provide.

The second goal of outsourcing is to increase efficiency; as observed by Clegg *et al.*, (2009), many organizations must use outsourcing as a method of increasing efficiency and gaining competitive advantage. This implies that the private sector provider is more efficient than the public sector provider because of the skills and resources the latter (PSP) are endowed with (Thomas *et al.*, 2008). Efficiency results from management flexibility, freedom of action and financial discipline of the private service provider. Apparently, in the competitive environment, private firms must perform efficiently to make a profit and maintain their position in the market. Therefore, optimum efficiency may not occur when there are no opposing competitive forces or when there is a public or private monopoly (Besley & Ghatak, 2003). In addition, Efficiency may not occur where private companies collude over prices or work practices.

Another goal of outsourcing is to increase accountability. The LGAs that represent the public at large have a special obligation to be accountable to the public. Therefore, outsourcing of solid waste management for example can result in the commitment to public values because it provides clear guidelines on how goods and services are produced, how equitably they are provided, how they are paid for, the benefits and working conditions of those who produce them. All these measures are important in increasing accountability (Cointreau 1994). Governments need to be accountable for fair safe labour practices. When LGAs outsource SWM services, PSP is accountable for any complaint of poor service delivery.

SWM services are highly visible and uncollected SW generates dissatisfaction among city residents. After outsourcing, LGAs is prone to blame the PSP whenever residents are unhappy with the SW service rendered. LGAs remain accountable for SWM services even if the services are outsourced. Accountability of LGAs is stipulated in the Local Government Act giving LGAs the mandate of being responsible for SWM services. Accountability challenges arise mostly due to performance measurement, problems essentially in the outsourcing process, principal-agent relationship terms and conditions in the contract (Saliterer & Korac 2013).

Literatures for example Barthelemy, (2003), Elmuti (2003), provides several factors that either constrain or facilitate the realization of the objectives of outsourcing discussed above. One of these factors is the service characteristics of a specific service whereby choices in each stage of the outsourcing process. The more complex the service the more difficult it is to define and measure the outcomes (Corra & De Ridder 2012). For example, outsourcing revenue collection can be easy because the results of revenue collection are more quantifiable and measurable than the results of other social services. Institutional context is another factor that influences the effectiveness of the outsourcing process. Institutional context includes both legal framework and policies that govern service delivery. Institutions define service goals that justify the outsourcing of a particular public service. A good example is procurement regulation that defines the goal of outsourcing but it can also limit or facilitate the outsourcing process. While public procurement ruling tends to influence the options and alternatives LGAs have at their disposal, availability of information on the quality of service providers and their products is another challenging area to LGAs during the outsourcing process (Domberger & Jensen, 1997; Jensen & Stonecash, 2005). The third factor is the availability of resources and the capacity of the Local government in service delivery (Eisenhardt, 1989; Laffont & Martinort, 2001). The theory suggests whatever resources (– whether finance or human resource) the local government is disposed of can to be an important determinant in the success or failure of the outsourced services (Eisenhardt, 1989; Laffont & Martinort, 2001). This implies that if the local government does not have enough financial resources to construct and maintain a landfill, install the dustbins for waste disposal or staff to manage the process, then that local government is unlikely to achieve the intended objective of outsourcing.

Finally, understanding core and non-core activities is another factor. literature (i.e., Barthelemy, 2003) shows that for the LGAs to be successful in outsourcing, they must have a clear understanding of the core activities, development of clear objectives, goals and expectations of outsourcing. In addition, trust or contract between the companies and the outsourcing vendor is significant in ensuring successful outsourcing. This includes contract negotiation and the signing of the contract by both the agent and the buyer. The contract should identify items, activities and services. It should also include terms of payment, an escape clause for each party and methods for making changes to the agreement (Elmuti 2003).

The case of outsourcing process of solid waste management

Like other services, outsourcing of solid waste management has also received attention in the mainstream literature across the globe. Authors such as Moosa (2007) and BSB (2020) perceive outsourcing of solid waste management as the process of storage, collection, transportation, processing and disposal of solid waste materials in a way that best addresses a range of public health, conservation, economic, aesthetic, engineering and other environmental considerations. This implies that disposal of wastes materials without proper management can damage not only the environment but also the development of the human race.

Furthermore, in order to reduce the problem of unmanaged solid waste, individual countries, international organizations and private organizations are currently working together through the formulation and implementation of solid waste management policies, laws, rules and regulations. For instance, at the global level, one of the sustainable development goals (SDGs): the twelfth goal concerns the strategies for “responsible consumption and production” of solid waste. This goal aims to help the world to strike a balance between the rate of consumption and production of solid waste without endangering the environment (UN 2020). Nevertheless, despite these efforts on solid waste management (SWM) by individual countries at regional and global level, out of 2.01 billion tons of municipal solid waste (MSW) produced yearly, about 33 per cent are not managed according to the environmental safe standards (World Bank, 2020).

In the past twenty years, the Tanzanian government as is the case in many other countries around the world adopted outsourcing as part of wider public service reforms. The goal of sourcing was to increase performance in public service delivery through contracting out service delivery to private service providers. Nevertheless, the problem of unmanaged waste is still increasing. This problem is even compounded by the increasing trend of urbanization and urban population which produce waste that is not within the management capacity of the urban authorities. Although the government has established several laws such as the Environmental Management Act No. 20 of 2004, the Local Government Act of 2000 and the Public Procurement Act of 2001 as amended in 2004 and 2011, the production of unmanaged solid waste is still increasing particularly in urban areas and the collection of SW is below half of the produced waste. Overall, the collected waste especially in cities and outskirts areas is about only 44 per cent of the total solid waste produced (World Bank, 2020). The question is what has gone wrong? How do local government capacity, service characteristics, resources and institutional context explain the failure or success of outsourcing in solid waste management in LGAs in Tanzania?

Methodology

The methodology is guided by the research question: How does local government capacity, nature of service, resources, contract and institutional context explain the failure or success of outsourcing in solid waste management in LGAs in Tanzania?

To answer this question, the study employed a qualitative approach with an exploratory case study design. The exploratory design was relevant because this paper aimed to gain detailed insights on the factors that influence the success or failure of outsourcing management in LGAs in Tanzania. To this end, the four cases were studied namely: Moshi, Arusha, Meru and Dodoma Municipality. The four cases were selected in order to increase the maximum variety and richness of data, Although the four local governments are subject to a similar formal administrative system, they vary substantially with regards to LGAs capacity, the nature of services and availability of resources. For example, Arusha City Council (ACC) is the first city in Tanzania that contracted SWM to private Service Providers through in door to door collection. Furthermore, Moshi Municipal Council (MMC) is leading in keeping its environment clean. It is among 17 municipalities in Tanzania that have successfully maintained the records of the clean city for more than five years. Meru District Council (MDC) on the other hand performed well in solid waste management in the years 2017 and 2018 but recently it encountered problems with the quality of dustbins and the landfill (MoH 2018).

Finally, the City Council of Dodoma (CCD) has outsourced solid waste management to CBOs, but the performance has not been good. Overall, the factors which account for these variations are still uncovered. To explain these variations, a sample of 80 respondents was selected purposely from the four cases and the research activities began with the analysis of important documents such as the Public-Private Partnership Act of 2010, the Public Procurement Act of 2011, the Local Government Act no 8, the minutes of the meetings and annual and quarterly reports. Others include contract documents, tendering documents, tender Evaluations reports, council strategic plans, regulations and guidelines, council environmental by-laws and LGA laws. The review of documents was followed by an in-depth interview with 80 respondents from the four cases. The information from the documents was analysed through content analysis and interviews transcripts were analysed through thematic analysis.

Formal institutions for outsourcing management

The formal rules and regulations show that the governance of outsourcing in Tanzania consists of a set of responsibilities, roles, objectives and controls which define the institutional arrangement for the outsourcing process. Institutional arrangement is a process that an organisation needs to adapt to provide a common, consistent and effective approach to the outsourcing arrangement. The procurement rules for example identify actors who are involved in the process of outsourcing public service. In this law, rules and parties with their functions and responsibilities are identified. According to this rule, the parties involved are the user departments in which the activity originates, Procurement Management Unit which deals with processes and tendering, Tender Board which deals with awarding of tender, Accounting Officer who authorises the requirement and the Evaluation Committee which evaluates proposals and makes recommendations. The role of each party in different stages of outsourcing is presented below.

The first stage is initiation. This begins with the identification of needs, approval of needs, conducting a feasibility study, analysing costs and writing technical specifications. Most of the activities in the initiation stage are undertaken by the user department in collaborating with the Procurement Management Unit. The feasibility study is the activity that should be carried out by a team of experts formed in the council after the approval of needs.

The content analysis shows that parties involved in this stage are those prescribed in the rule. In ACC and MDC, parties involved in the initiation stage conducted the activities as required by the rules. The User Department in MMC and CCD did not fulfil their duties as required by the rules. In MMC, there was no feasibility study conducted, no analysis of costs nor was the preparation of technical specification done. The reason provided is that in MMC SWM, services have been delegated to the wards. However, the wards are not user departments and cannot be taken as user departments. The need can originate from the wards but the should be forwarded to the department responsible for that need and discussed and thereafter approved. The User Department is staffed with experts and headed by the Head of Department who reports to the Council Director. However, it is good to conduct a feasibility study, analyse costs and prepare technical specifications, expertise in carrying out these activities is not available in the wards.

In the CCD the User Department did not analyse cost and prepare technical specifications. A review of the evaluation report shows that no-cost analysis was made. Regarding technical specification, the report shows that the assessment of equipment and vehicles cited by the SP was used as the criteria for the selection. In conclusion, the parties responsible for the initiation were able to play their role in ACC and MDC but failed to do in MMC and CCD.

Besides the review shows that the procedure for the selection of competent SP follows that of open tendering. Open tendering is the one-stage bidding process where all interested SPs are invited to submit a tender. The normal procedures are followed in the selection process except for CBOs where the selection process is conducted at the ward level under the WDC. The roles of parties in the granting process start from the approval of requirements up to the contract management. According to the HPMU from these councils, the process should be guided by public procurement rules. This part presents the roles of parties in the granting process activities.

as for the approval of the need for outsourcing SWM as noted earlier, all the requirements in the councils should be approved by the relevant authority. Research shows that in all cases, the approval of the requirement was done by the relevant authority. In MMC and CCD approvals was conducted at the ward level whereby WDC approved the need for outsourcing. The parties involved in the approvals are the user department where the requirement for outsourcing originated. The user department presents to the Council Management Meeting the need to outsource SW. The council management team discusses the proposal and forwards it to the Finance Committee of the councillors for deliberation. The full Council, which is the highest organ in the council, is the final organ to approve the need. All these parties played their role except for the cases mentioned above.

Furthermore, as for the identification of Service Provider, as narrated earlier an open tendering procedure was used and which, in the end, awarded the tender to the winner. However, the identification starts with pre-qualification where those who respond to the advertisement and submit their proposals are first listed and thereafter awarded the tender after their suitability has been examined. In these cases, the pre-qualification was not conducted instead the tender was advertised and applications were received evaluated and thereafter awarded to the winner. In the tender documents, one of the requirements is for bidders to indicate their area of interest to operate. After evaluation, the winner is given the specified area as requested. With CBOs, it is different because they are required to apply and indicate the ward where they reside. CBOs are automatically be awarded tender according to the Ward they come from. In CCD for instance, CBOs were not required to apply but to be awarded tender as long as they are from the ward I question. The Evaluation Committee, the User Department and the Tender Board are the parties involved in the identification of SP. All these parties played their role according to the procurement rule.

Nature of SWM services outsourced in the four cases

Solid waste management refers to the collection, transfer, treatment, recycling, resource recovery and disposal of SW in urban areas. Solid Waste Management has emerged as one of the greatest challenges facing LGAs in Tanzania. The volume of SW being generated continues to increase surpassing the ability of the SP to handle the load. In the selected cases (LGAs), SWM is characterised by inefficient collection method, inefficient coverage of the collection system and improper disposal of SW. The selected LGAs have different problems in SWM in terms of composition, the waste amount, access to waste collection, awareness and attitude. The collection of SW was done by contractors and CBOs for a fee. Stationary containers and door to door collection system was adopted.

The performance of SW collection in LGAs showed that 43 to 81percent of the total SW generated were collected. In the past, LGAs focused on the technical aspects of different means of collection and disposal.

However, recently, the attention has been on enhancing institutional arrangement to the services with emphasis on outsourcing. To guide the management of SW, LGAs established Environmental by-law which encompasses the outsourcing of SWM services. In Arusha City Council, the collection of SW accounted for 81 per cent of the SW generated; the cost of collection was also reduced to a significant amount. Another significant positive result was an increase of the awareness among the beneficiaries of the service on the payment of SW fee. In this regard, the ACC managed to collect revenue above the estimated budget for three consecutive years.

The findings from MMC indicate that SW was collected at the rate of more than 72 per cent and the service receivers were ready to pay more than half of the SW fees they were paying. Generally, the environment of the Municipal was clean. In MDC, more than 76 per cent of the SW generated was collected. The frequency of collection was known and documented in the contract. The cost of SW collection was reduced and the council remains with the cost of supervision and monitoring. In CCD, the collection of SW was poor whereby only 43 per cent of the SW generated was collected. The city did not manage to reduce the cost and therefore the cost of transportation of SW from the household to the landfill was very high compared to what is paid by clients.

LGAs capacity and the availability of resources in the four cases

The LGAs capacity was measured based on the capacity to provide the enabling environment for the waste collection which include maintenance of collection centres, maintenance of landfills, the provision of dust bins and the capacity to collect revenues from the service provider.

Concerning landfills, the findings revealed that ACC has one dumpsite located at Muriet- outskirts of Arusha city. The findings show that the management of the dumpsite encounters some challenges of being too close to the residential houses. Therefore crude dumping activities are insensitive to environmental protection. Despite this deficiency, the city has constructed one cell of the sanitary landfill and other infrastructures to facilitate the operation of the sanitary landfill. Although the landfill has some of the necessary infrastructures it has missed operating machines such as compactors, weighbridges to measure the weight of the SW brought in and office accommodation for the landfill manager to monitor all the landfill operations. Concerning the collection of SW from collection centres, the city can collect 81 per cent of the SW generated. Storage of SW is done by dwellers and the collection is from door to door and is done by PSP who collect in six wards in the city centre and CBOs in the outskirts of the city. The collection points are found in the market using a vehicle that parks from morning to an evening where the entrepreneur in the market put their waste in it. Monitoring of the SW services is done by the Ward Health Officer.

On the other hand, the MMC management of SW has been decentralised to the ward. The ward has been mandated by the municipalities to monitor the collection of SW from households make environmental and cultural awareness and law enforcement making municipality have easy management of SW. MMC has 12 collection points operated by both the municipal and CBOs. The collection system is based on door to door. Skip buckets, which are normally placed in the collection point are used to collect SW. Thereafter the council transports the waste to the dumping site.

The use of communal collection points is another system used in the collection whereby all nearby residents dump their waste at one point. The collection point must have a container recognised by nearby communities. MMC has one dumpsite located at Kaloleni- the outskirts of Arusha city. The dumpsite, which is close to the residential areas lacks a weighbridge and security fence. The dump is not highly managed, in that anyone can dispose of waste without permission. In addition, the dumpsite lacks important equipment such as wheel loaders to dispose of waste with effective use of space.

On the other hand, the management of SW in CCD is done by both CBOs and the city. CCD provide free SW transportation services. Collection and removal of SW amount to only 34 per cent of the generated waste. Landlords store their SW in the dustbins which are then collected and transported to the collection points by CBOs. The city takes the responsibility of transporting waste from the collection point to the dumpsite for final disposal. Collection points in the CCD are few and mostly located in the marketplace and bus stops. Since skip buckets are not enough many of the collection points are on the open grounds. The World Bank once funded the CCD to construct and operate a new landfill for proper management of SW. The landfill, which has received some of the operating equipment, is now located at Chidaya. The dump has not been able to operate due to the lack of other important equipment such as compactors and weighbridge machines. There was no landfill manager to monitor all the landfill operations.

The management of SW in MDC is done by the council and the nominated PSP. In this council, the collection of SW amounts to 76 per cent of the SW generated. SW generators store their SW in the dust bins to be collected by PSP and transported to the landfill. The SW is collected by the PSP, but the council intervenes only where SP fails to perform. A few dust bins are located in the centres where SW is highly generated; these include the marketplaces and bus stops. The PSP and the council are responsible for ensuring that all the waste from the households is collected and transported as per the timetable. The Ward Health Officer and the Ward Executive Officer are responsible for the coordination of the service and for ensuring that thorough inspections are conducted in every street and the household. Regarding the management of the landfill, MDC has acquired land for the construction of the landfill. However, MDC faces challenges in managing SW which include an insufficient budget for operations and maintenance and purchasing of SW equipment.

Capacity in the provision of dustbins

According to guidelines, the LGAs are required to provide dustbins in the streets for SW collection. This role is vital as it facilitates the easy removal of waste by the service provider and the council. The study findings however reveal the following from the selected cases.

In practice, in ACC, dustbins are not available in many parts of the city. Responding to the question on the problems regarding the lack of dustbins for garbage collecting in the street, one of the respondents said, "In the past, the government bought us the materials (dustbins) but people took them for domestic use" On the same, another respondent said, "In my memory, I remember the council issued dustbins but people stole them for personal use" The two extracts are the testimony that the council provided dustbins but people misused these bins.

The study findings reveal that the lack of dustbins in the city streets for waste collection is attributed to the belief among the respondents that the council lacked goodwill to supply the bins.

This view was held by 72.7 per cent of the respondents as shown in Table 1. About 25.4 per cent believed that dustbins are not necessary because people will still litter the city streets, 1.9 per cent thought that financial constraints on the part of the council were the cause of this situation. Table 1 provides the causes for inadequate dustbins in the four cases.

Table 1: Causes of inadequate dustbins in the four cases.

Causes of inadequate dustbins	ACC		MMC		MDC		CCD	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Lack of goodwill of the council to provide bins	40	72.7	32	61.5	38	69.1	13	23.6
Financial constraints	1	1.9	17	32.7	6	10.9	6	11
Lack of knowledge	14	25.4	3	5.8	11	20	36	65.4
Total	55	100	52	100	55	100	55	100

Moreover, the study results from the researcher street visits and interviews show that dustbins are not supplied in most areas in Arumeru District Council including Usa River Township, Makumira and Leganga. Responding to the council's inability to provide dustbins for refuse collection, one of the respondents said,

“The council managed to provide dustbins in areas where they thought are important but some of these dustbins disappeared and the council did not replace them”.

Another respondent said the following regarding lack of dustbins in their township and street,

“Dustbins are very important for the cleanness of our environment; the council should provide more and replace some in areas where they were taken”.

The two extracts are a testimony that the council should provide dustbins to keep the town clean. The results from the survey show that the absence of dustbins in their areas is attributed to respondents' belief that the council lacks goodwill to supply them. This view is held by 69.1 per cent of the respondents as shown in Table 1. About 20 per cent responded that dustbins are not necessary because people will still litter their environment and 10.9 per cent thought financial constraints on the part of the council was the reason.

In CCD, I observed that many parts of the city are not well covered by dustbins. Responding to the council's inability to provide dustbins for refuse collection, one of the respondents said

“This council do not see the importance of dustbins that is why you see there are not enough dustbins in our city. There are other dustbins that disappeared and the council did not replace”.

On the same, another respondent said,

“The council is required to provide dustbins in every corner of this city to make it look clean otherwise there will be littering therefore in areas where dustbins are not installed council should ensure they are installed”.

The two extracts are testimony that dustbins are not enough in the council. The results from the survey show that the absence of dustbins in their areas is attributed to the assumption that the respondents believe dustbins are not necessary because people will still litter their environment.

This view is held by 65.4 per cent of the respondents as shown in Table 2. About 23.6 per cent reported that the council lacked goodwill and 11 per cent thought that financial constraints on the part of the council were the reason for the problem.

The capacity to collect revenue

For the SWM services to be sustainable, receivers of the service have a duty of paying SWM fees according to the council by-laws. These by-laws set a payment structure for each group in the council starting from households to business premises, hotels and industries. The payment structure for SW fees in the selected cases is as follows:

In ACC, the SWM fees range from Tsh. 1,000 to Tsh.20,000. One of the service providers had this to say on the modality of payments by service receivers,

"Payments are made after services and normally the end of the month and after issuing an invoice. After receiving cash from service receivers, an official receipt is issued".

Another service provider said the following,

"Monthly charges are imposed from households and businesses. Market wastes are charged on weekly basis. Invoices are issued to hotels and big businesses so that they can prepare payments. We normally issue an official receipt given by the council."

Service providers were required to remit 15per cent of all collection made from service receivers. This has been stated in the contract signed by the council. According to the Council Treasurer, the council was able to collect the required amount due to compliance of service providers to this agreement.

According to data from the Council's Revenue Accountant, the council was able to collect 15per cent of the estimated amount. Table 2 shows the amount collected against the estimated collection.

Table 2: Revenue received from SWM fees (15% of the actual collection) in Tsh.

Years	Estimates	Actual	Percent
2011/2012	54,000,000	40,758,397	75.5
2012/2013	44,000,000	39,422,013	89.6
2013/2014	44,000,000	47,252,630	107.4
2014/2015	45,600,000	57,503,860	126.1
2015/2016- to April	42,408,000	42,841,575	101

Source: ACC Revenue and Expenditure report 2016

According to the findings in table 2, the council was able to collect the estimated amount for the three years consecutively. Therefore, outsourcing of SWM services enhanced revenue collection, which enabled the council to have sustainable SWM services. An interview with the head of the Environmental and Cleanness Department reveals that the city council is not worried about the expansion of the city where the delivery of solid waste services is crucial. This is because the communities are aware of the importance of managing solid waste and are ready to cooperate with the existing SP.

For MMC, SW fees were paid by receivers of the services as per the council's by-laws. These by-laws are used by service providers in charging fees for SW services.

The SWM fees range from Tsh. 10,000 to Tsh.50,000. Those who litter the environment, are charged a fee with a fine of Tsh. 50,000. According to the WEO of Bondeni Ward, service providers were required to remit 20per cent of all the collection made from fines of defaulters of the by-law every month. This has been stated in the contract signed by the council.

In MDC, SW fees were also paid as required by the Council Environment by-laws. One of the service providers had this to say on the modality of payments made by service receivers:

"We pay after the service normally at the end of the month; the service provider is issuing an official (electronic) receipt. the amount of fees is categorised in two groups of users of the services."

Service providers are required to remit 20 per cent of all collection made from service receivers. This has been stated in the contract signed by the council. According to the Council Treasurer, the council was able to collect the required amount and met the budgeted amount due to compliance by service providers on this agreement.

The findings from CCD revealed that SW fees were not paid as required by the council by-laws. An interview with the Environmental and Cleanness Officer revealed that some of the service receivers were resisting paying because they believe that it is the responsibility of the council to provide the services without charging any fees. Service receivers who are paying SW fees are very cooperative with the SP. One of the service providers had this to say on the modality of payments made by service receivers,

"SW fees are paid monthly. The payment is done to the council and the council paid back to the service provider"

Service providers were required to remit 20 per cent of all the collection made from service receivers. This has been stated in the contract signed by the council. According to the Council Treasurer, the council was able to collect the required amount due to compliance of service providers to this agreement.

Conclusion

Outsourcing of SWM in LGA was carried out to improve waste management and overall governance by transferring SWM functions to the PSP. Because of this new approach, the findings from the selected cases show that the performance of SWM is influenced by LGAs capacity, service characteristics, resources and institutional context. Private participation varies in its focus when engaged to deal with the provision of SWM services. The main challenges of solid waste collection revolve around service quality, institutional arrangement, LGAs capacity and resources issues. The efforts made by LGAs to build their capacity are vital in the provision of SWM services, especially during the transition period where SWM functions were transferred to PSPs. Achieving urban SWM that will be effective in the long term requires participation of stakeholders who plays vital role in the while process of outsourcing SWM services. The strength of the institutional arrangement in the outsourcing of SWM services is an indication of the delivery of improved services that enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This is a result of close monitoring and evaluation of the outsourcing process. Clear terms and conditions of the contract have enabled PSPs to provide SWM service in the selected LGAs covering a wide area and ensuring stakeholders' involvement, despite decentralization of MSWM to the ward in one of the LGAs.

Consequently, adequate waste collection, frequency and payment of SW fees are the major public concerns and contribute to users' satisfaction with the services. Meanwhile, the capacity of LGAs in terms of management of the collection points and landfills has been important in eradicating SW problems while the provision of dustbins by both LGAs and service receivers led to reliable and sustainable service. In an institutional context, the competition during the tendering process, allowing broad participation of competent service providers must be encouraged and adopted by all local governments. In this transition and specific local context, responsibility, competitive tendering and transparency with regards to financial accountability are essential for enhancing system viability. The study revealed that despite the LGA's adoption of outsourcing strategy, waste management issues have not been fully addressed among the LGAs. However, the cases may vary based on the political will and commitment of stakeholders including the central and local governments, the private sector and the communities.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and critical review, the following recommendations can be made:

Enhancing community participation: LGAs can enhance the SW collection system by involving the community and other stakeholders by considering the public interest, economic interest and preventing political manipulation and involving the will of LGAs.

LGAs need to have the capacity and good resource management in order to be self-sustaining in their waste management funding to reduce reliance on the private sector and the central government subsidy. One of the roles of LGAs in SWM is the provision of collection bins for SW collection which helps in compliance with environmental by-laws and the reduction of illegal dumping. This should be enhanced in any new policies regarding SWM.

Reduction of the fiscal and financial burden, LGAs must implement feasible SW fees that will adequately fund the LGAs and provide viable financing to PSP for a modern and sustainable system.

LGAs should monitor the quality of service offered and prioritise cooperation between the PSP and LGAs so as to improve the quality of SWM services.

The capacity of LGAs in dealings with SWM has to be enhanced so as to have adequate personnel through proper training of this personnel as suggested in other studies (i.e., Seng *et al.*, 2010; 2013; 2018; Spoann, 2010; NLLC, 2016).

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