

Organized crime across the sub-Saharan African States: the case of corruption in Cameroon and Nigeria

Adewumi I. Badiora

adewumi.badiora@oouagoiwoye.edu.ng

Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Nigeria

Oluwole Ojewale

ENACT Regional Coordinator for Central Africa, Institute for Security Studies, Senegal



AJoGPL

ISSN: 2789-2298

Vol 1. Issue 3.

pp. 8-27, June 2022

<https://ajogpl.kab.ac.ug>

Abstract

Aside from sharing about 1975 km border length, Cameroon and Nigeria have issues in common which present a worthwhile opportunity for comparative research of certain socio-political occurrences manifesting themselves within the organized crime context. One of such is corruption. The 2020 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) rated both states at 149th position out of 180 states with a CPI score of 25 out of 100 (0=highly corrupt and 100=very clean). The aim of this study revolves around a comparison of corruption between Nigeria and Cameroon by way of a literature study and also measuring corruption prevalence by means of a closed-structured survey. A combination of purposive and convenient sampling was used to collect data that were analysed using frequency distributions and chi-square. Findings show that both states are not satisfactorily transparent. The judges, police, and how tenders' officials handle the government contracts are selected as the most corrupt in both countries. Although not statistically significant, findings show that corruption is more widespread among Nigerian police departments and judges. Conversely, results significantly show that self-enrichment is the order of the day in Cameroon compared to Nigeria, especially through prevalence of fraud in the administration of state development contracts. The study is of the view that whistle-blowing strategy, prompt trial of corruption cases, true independence of anti-corruption agencies and political willpower of government could serve as deterrence measures in both states".

Key words: Political corruption, Corruption - Africa, Sub-Saharan, Governance

Introduction

Transparency International (TI)'s 2018 Corruption Perception Index (CPI) shows that almost no country is completely free from corruption and related crime. This is understandable as not a single country out of one hundred and eighty nations surveyed in 2018 CPI comes close to top marks while over one hundred and twenty countries score below fifty on the scale of zero (highly corrupt) to hundred (very clean). This indicates that just about one third of countries are even above average. Among those nations below average, Sub-Saharan Africa is widely considered the world's most corrupt places.

Sub-Saharan Africa consists of countries found to the south of the Sahara desert (See Figure 1). The continent of Africa is commonly divided into five sub regions, four of which are in sub-Saharan Africa: West, East, Central and South Africa. The World Bank statistics from 2018 recorded a total population of 1.078 billion for the Sub-Saharan Africa, making it the second largest population region in the world (World Bank, 2018). The history of sub-Saharan Africa is characterized mainly by European colonialism, whereby white minority governments controlled the economic and political affairs in most countries. The 20th century witnessed armed struggles and violent confrontations as black majority parties and groups fought for their independence from colonial governments. Colonialism plundered the continent while stifling local political and economic development, and left behind a legacy with ramifications for the present, as reflected in the patterns of contemporary globalization (Ocheni & Nwankwo 2012; Heldring & Robinson 2013; Frankema, 2015; Austin, Frankema, & Jerven, 2016). Across the continent, many countries (e.g. Nigeria, Cameroon, Ghana, South Africa, Senegal, Kenya, Rwanda) have made significant strides in the social, political and economic spheres since the turn of the millennium, although some of these successes have yet to be firmly consolidated, with corruption proven to be playing a major role (TI, 2018).

Corruption is a factor seen as contributing to the stunted development and impoverishment of many countries in the Sub-Saharan region (TI, 2020). According to TI (2018), a leading global watchdog on corruption, six of the ten countries considered most corrupt in the world are in Sub-Saharan Africa. High levels of corruption across the Sub-Saharan Africa have become a threat to many countries considerable efforts towards the vision of a democratic, prosperous, and peaceful continent (TI, 2020). Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest-performing region in the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which uses a scale of zero (0) to hundred (100), where zero means that a country is perceived to be highly corrupt and a hundred means it has no corruption at all, in other words, it is clean. In the last three years, Sub-Saharan Africa's average score in Transparency International's CPI is thirty-two (32); a score that is well below the global average of fourth-three (43) (TI 2020).

According to TI's 2020 CPI, perceptions of corruption in a number of Sub-Saharan African states show little improvement from the previous years, nonetheless, major regional players continue to struggle. Alongside the problem of bribery, money laundering and mismanagement of public funds which is extensive in some parts of the region, the interrelated phenomena of fragility, crony capitalism, and poor governance have resulted in shocking forms of corruption, notably state capture (Crabtree & Durand, 2017; Logde, 2019). In response, countries in the region have enacted various anti-corruption legal instruments. Besides, regional organisations, civil society, and the media are also tackling the problem head-on. With all these anti-corruption instruments, a number of Sub-Saharan African states have improved both their scores and rankings in 2020 CPI, with countries like Seychelles, Botswana, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Cabo Verde and Guinea as regional outperformers. Nevertheless, some of the region's major economies such as Cameroon, Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and Senegal continue to underperform with flat or (in Cameroon and Nigeria's case) declining scores. At the bottom of the index are Sudan, Somalia and South Sudan (TI, 2020).

According to 2020 CPI, Côte d'Ivoire has considerably improved, by nine points since 2013. However, the political crisis surrounding the re-election of the country's president, which erupted into violence and human rights violations, risks derailing progress.

With a CPI of 19, the Republic of Congo significantly declined by seven points since 2012. This performance is reflective of endemic corruption and impunity by the country's political elite. The Republic of Congo has an anti-corruption framework in place, but its implementation remains weak. TI submits that, in Senegal, the political will of its leaders to tackle graft has declined in recent years. Nigeria also continues to under-perform, notwithstanding the country's anti-graft stance of its president. Similarly, Corruption in Togo continued to worsen in 2020, potentially undermining authorities' otherwise successful efforts to entice foreign investors, such as reducing corruption and bureaucracy (TI, 2020).




Figure 1: Study area in Africa and Global contexts

With CPI of 30 and 33 respectively, TI ensigns Malawi and Zambia as Sub-Saharan states to watch. Malawi is a significant decliner, dropping seven points since 2012. The country continues to grapple with misappropriation of funds after the notorious “cash-gate scandal” of 2013, involving high levels of public sector corruption. A recent government audit revealed public sector corruption of astronomical proportions, with an estimated one billion US Dollar allegedly stolen by the previous government (TI, 2020). However, the new government elected in June 2020 promises a fresh start, with several investigations into corruption already ongoing, and some key arrests made in connection with a cement import scandal (TI, 2020). Besides, the extradition of a high-profile Malawian pastor accused of money laundering in South Africa may be another test of the country's pledge to anti-corruption (TI, 2020). Zambia is a country to watch having dropped five points since 2013. Corruption is pervasive in Zambia and affects people's access to essential public services. According to TI (2019), nearly one in five Zambian citizens paid bribes to receive essential services like health care or education. The mounting levels of corruption may be attributed to an inefficient national public procurement system, operating against a backdrop of rising foreign debt and high levels of poverty (TI, 2020). Hence, stronger commitment to procurement reforms and open civic spaces will support greater transparency and accountability.

Nigeria and Cameroon (See Figure 1) are republics who are still in their nursing stages. Both were governed by dictatorial colonial masters and self-governments with an oppressive history. Particularly, Wallechinsky (2006) ranked President of Cameroon, Paul Biya with three others (Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, and King Mswati of Swaziland) as the most corrupt dictators in the world. Having been ruled by military and authoritarian governments, both states were plagued by political violence. While Nigeria was beset with a civil war, Cameroon was plagued with two violent conflicts. Yet, both countries face rising ethno-political tensions. In Cameroon, main conflict is between the government and separatists from the English-speaking minority who felt neglected. The situation is not in any way different in Nigeria as minority ethnic groups have revolted against the government because of nepotism. Moreover, there is a growing body of evidence of corruption in both countries, particularly as a result of political impunity. For instance, the same set of elites has been ruling Nigeria since the transition to democracy in 1999. In fact, two of the four presidents who have ruled from 1999 till date were also former Military Heads of State. Cameroon has been ruled by a single political party since independence and only two authoritarian presidents.

Although located in different sub-region of the African continent, Nigeria (West Africa) and Cameroon (Central Africa) have several issues in common which present a viable opportunity for comparative studies of certain social-political occurrences manifesting within a criminal justice context. One such issue worthy of studying is corruption. The common ground, denoted by a number of evidences making such a study reasonable includes: the political background of both countries; economic disparity and underdevelopment of certain sectors of the populations of both states; the ruling class and politicians often misuse their powers; nepotism, favouritism, and clientelism; the obvious lack of political will to get rid of bribery; and corruption, which exists worldwide, in Global North and South, predominantly, those with infant democracies.

Furthermore, the CPI ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be (TI, 2018). The CPI provides the best information on corruption and that international comparison is a vital way of assessing a state or a region's performance objectively (Check, Madise, Majozi, & Hamada, 2019). According to the 2020 CPI, both Nigeria and Cameroon have been ranked 149th respectively and in terms of a CPI score rating, both countries were allocated twenty-five (25). Compared to their 2017 CPI score, Cameroon rating remain unchanged, while Nigeria dropped two score in the direction of becoming worse on corruption despite the country's anti-graft stance. Although corruption as a social phenomenon has previously been subjected to scientific scrutiny in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Prinsloo & Naude, 2001; Folarin, 2009; Agbor, 2019; Badiora, 2020; Badiora & Bako, 2020), the prevalence of this crime has never been investigated by means of a comparative study between two countries like Cameroon and Nigeria.

This study therefore tries to compare the levels of corruption between the two respective republics in an empirical approach. The aim of this study revolves around a comparison of corruption and anti-corruption through legal measures, protocols, agencies among others, between Nigeria and Cameroon by way of a literature study and also measuring the prevalence of corruption by means of a closed-structured survey. The study is both exploratory and descriptive, and is used to design a more comprehensive solution and further research inquiry as crucial issues surrounding corruption in the region are properly identified and described.

Before proceeding, it is important to note that in many cases, the newspaper media are the sole source of information about the Nigerian and Cameroonian corruption. Certain information such as government levels of corruption, and mismanagement practices is not always readily available to the public through official sources, and even when data is available at a given time, frequent and drastic changes in the political system and structure can often lead to changes in availability over time. As a result, journalists often investigate these topics and subsequently make them available to the public through various media outlets. Therefore, much of the information throughout the following paper is drawn from journalistic sources rather than official statistics or academic research.

Concept of Corruption

The term, Corruption is a concept with diverse meanings and explanations. It could mean: to destroy, ruin, to turn from a sound into an unsound, impure condition, to cause to rotten, to make morally unsound, to pervert, to lead somebody to act dishonestly or unfaithful among others. Nye (1967) defines corruption as a behavior that digresses from the formal obligations of a public role for the purpose of private gains. Similarly, TI (2012) defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It is the abuse of public power and role for private benefit (Chiodelli & Moroni 2015).

To United Nations [UN]-Habitat (2010), corruption is defined as the misuse of office for private gain. This may include bribery (misuse of power in favour of someone in exchange of benefits given by the person); fraud (misuse of discretion for personal gain without third parties involvement); various forms of favouritism, such as nepotism and cronyism (whereby someone in an official position exploits their power and authority to provide a job or favour to a family member or friend, clan, ethnic group, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving) and patronage (whereby a person is selected for a job or government benefit because of affiliations or connections and regardless of qualifications or entitlement); clientelism (a system of exchanging resources and favours based on an exploitative relationship between a patron and a client); conflict of interest (a situation where an individual is in a position to derive personal benefit from actions or decisions made in their official capacity); trading in influence (using one's connections with persons in authority to obtain favours or preferential treatment for a third party (person, institution or government), usually in return for their loyalty or any undue advantage) (UN-Habitat, 2010).

Corruption can involve various actors, ranging from public officials and local leaders to private investors. Actors may include government officials and individuals that command socio-political and economic influence. The communal authorities, civil society organisations and even, the mass media may also get snarled in corruption's web. Although, corruption comes in a variety of forms, three main types are identified: legislative and regulatory; bureaucratic and public works corruption. The legislative and regulatory corruption refers to the manners and the extent to which legislators can be influenced. According to Chiodelli and Moroni (2015), decision makers can be bribed to introduce and/or revise regulations that can change the socio-economic benefits connected with certain situations. Bureaucratic corruption refers to fraudulent acts of the appointed administrators in their dealings with the public, while public works corruption is the systemic graft involved in building public infrastructures. Individuals bribe bureaucrats either to speed up bureaucratic procedures or to obtain a service that is not supposed to be available (Chiodelli & Moroni, 2015).

From the above concepts, three theoretical approaches explaining corruption and illegality are identified: political-economic, sociocultural and neo-institutional. The political-economic approach appears like mathematic expression that corruption equals monopoly plus discretion minus accountability (Chiodelli, 2018). A reviewed form of this proposition reflects the role of confidential information as well: backhanders can be paid also so as to gain access to this type of information (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999; 2012). Thus, the political-economic approach highlights the role of economic incentives, disincentives and opportunities for corruption. It upholds that corruption is a result of a rational scheming, and its spread is associated to the expected costs and benefits along with other alternatives.

The socio-cultural approach explains the spread of corruption with reference to traditions, moral norms, civic culture and values that form the moral inclinations of individuals (Chiodelli, 2018). This approach upholds that internalised values and social pressures drive individuals to engage in corrupt practices. Furthermore, this approach underscores the “moral costs” of corruption and emphasises that individuals are less predisposed to corruption within a communal system that respect the rule of law (Chiodelli, 2018). To the neo-institutional method, corruption is beyond external factors such as moral costs or economic incentives to internal factors such as the dynamics of networks and transactions (Chiodelli, 2018). This approach stresses the impact of the corruption legacy in a specific setting (Della Porta & Vannucci, 1999). Considering these approaches concurrently, Vannucci and Sberna (2014) cited in Chiodelli, (2018) provide all-inclusive viewpoint and recognise six (6) main roots of corruption within a given system: (i) the economic yields generated by a communal decision; (ii) the degree of discretion allowed to the public administrators in creating, distributing and expropriating those economic yields; (iii) the potential of reserved information accessible to public administrators; (iv) the extent of accountability within the public organisations; (v) the “moral weight” of the illegitimate transaction; and (vi) the build-up of corrupt acts and how this promotes further participation in corruption.

Perceived Prevalence of Corruption in the Sub-Saharan Africa

Corruption has been around for a very long time. Some countries and regions are more affected by corruption, some are less. TI's 2020 CPI ranks Sub-Saharan states (South Sudan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen) as the most corrupt countries in the world. This seems to corroborate a popular perception of the sub-region as the world's most corrupt region. Such a general description may be true, yet it hides significant differences between Sub-Saharan states: whereas a few are among the fairly-ranked in the world, others struggle with pervasive, if not endemic corruption. Cameroon and the other countries in the region of Central Africa belong to the category of countries which are considered to have a serious corruption problem. Other countries in the region of study are also rated low on the 2020-CPI index. Central Africa Republic, for example, is ranked 146 with a CPI score of 26. The Democratic Republic of Congo was ranked 170 with a score of 10, Chad was ranked 160 with a score of 21 while Gabon, for instance, was rated 129 with a CPI score of 30. Some of the West African regional states are also low on the CPI, with Cape Verde rated the best with a score of 41 in 2020. Guinea Bissau appears to be the worst in terms of corruption in this sub region with a CPI score of 19 on the index of 2020, followed by Nigeria with a rating of 23, Togo and Mauritania on 29 each (TI, 2020).

The reasons for such low ranking of the countries in these regions are multiple. Studies have shown that traditional and cultural heritage favoured high levels of corruption (Folarin, 2009; Roelofse, Potgieter, & Simonovic, 2014; Agbor, 2019; Badiora & Bako, 2020).

Since the belief that corruption and nepotism are inseparable twin companions and thus deeply rooted in the minds of the ruling class as well as the common people of the two countries, corruption has never been viewed as a serious problem. Some authors argued that it was the colonisation by foreign power structures. In another case, the Africa culture, by tradition, did not really make a distinction between private interest and public function (Roelofse, Potgieter, & Simonovic, 2014; Badiora & Bako, 2020). For Nigeria, previous studies have linked the reasons for high levels of corruption to political prohibitions in military regimes which were in power until about twenty-three years ago (Folarin, 2009; Badiora, 2020). Similarly, for many of the Central African countries (e.g. Cameroon), the current problems of government and police corruption could be traced to the elaborate and extensive system of corruption that existed in these countries during the period when they were under military and authoritarian form of government (Hammadi, *et al.*, 2019; Agbor, 2019). For instance, since independence, in 1960, Cameroon has been ruled by a single political party and only two authoritarian presidents: Ahmadou Ahidjo and Paul Biya. Both repeatedly used the security forces to stabilize their authoritarianisms. President Biya's Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) was the only legal political party until December 1990.

As far as West and Central Africa is concerned, quite a number of countries (e.g. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo) of this region were conquered by and lived for long periods under the influence of colonial powers under whose rule, the exploitation of natural resources as well as the inhabitants through the slave trade took place primarily to benefit the economies of those rulers. Previous studies believe that the reasons for corruption should not be sought in remote or recent history, but in the economic underdevelopment, lack of economic freedom, monopolistic markets which have been common in countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria and Cameroon where colonial power ruled for many decades (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Other researchers have shown that corruption blooms in areas lacking economic freedom. Corruption is not more or less linked with the character of people in a particular region, but is, principally, a product of a system (Roelofse, *et al.*, 2014; Chiodelli & Moroni, 2015; Badiora & Bako, 2020). Since the system, especially after transformation in Nigeria, 1999 into a democratic dispensation is the one that generates corruption, the emphasis should be put on the reparation of the system. This perception closely relates to the Klitgaard's formula: $C = M + D - A$, where Corruption equals Monopoly plus Discretion minus Accountability (Klitgaard, 1998).

When comparing events in Nigeria and Cameroon, there are some obvious similarities. First are the colonial periods. Where the Germans elite and latter (when Germans were defeated during the 1st World war), France and Britain were the main benefactors of the political and economic systems in the Cameroon, the previous British colonial system exploited the Nigerian economic system. Nigeria, Cameroon and the other countries in the Sub-Saharan region are characterised by a weak state, weak government institutions, disorganised societies with large political influence, all of which being fertile soil for the development of corruption and its persistence. States from the Sub-Saharan region represents undeveloped societies with few and weak defensive mechanisms and, in cases of unrestrained state expansion, may easily result into a relapse anti-democratic sentiments. Researchers from other regions of the world also point to the same problem relating to weak states and undeveloped democratic institutions (Ogitcu, 2005; Roelofse, *et al.*, 2014). Particularly, Ogitcu, (2005: 207) stated that "*corruption and abuse of public authority occur in countries where the rule of law institutions are weak or non-existent, where a free and independent professional media and civil society agencies are absent, and where there is no independent judiciary or oversight mechanisms*".

While Cameroon is made-up of a political system consisting of French Cameroun and British Southern Cameroons, Nigeria is characterised by a political system consisting of three main ethnic groups and a two-thirds majority system. These features make it possible in both states to manipulate administrative decisions, tamper with tender documents and to cover-up related misdemeanours. Nepotism appears to be everyday occurrences, especially in political and cadre appointments to key government positions. In the Republic of Cameroon, human rights organisations allege that the government suppresses the freedoms of opposition groups by preventing demonstrations, disrupting meetings, and arresting opposition leaders and journalists (Amnesty International, 2006). Furthermore, press freedom seems to be an important requirement if the Nigerian government wants to uproot corruption (Odey & Eric, 2017).

According to comparative studies at global level, there are some obvious indicators which are common to both countries which fall in the category of highly corrupt states and those experiencing a low level of corruption. It seems that there is a mutual dependence between the degree of economic development and the degree of corruption. Research has indicated that corruption is widespread and has particularly serious economic consequences in developing countries (Mutonyi, 2002; Roelofse, *et al.*, 2014; TI, 2020). Highly corrupt states are, by rule, unsuccessful and expensive states, with a low level of foreign investment. The police and judiciary in these countries are extremely inefficient in discovering corruption and successfully prosecuting offenders which sends a negative message when planning a general strategy to act against such dangerous phenomenon in a repressive way (Fijnaut & Huberts, 2002; Agbor, A. (2019).

With political changes taking place globally, and given that significant processes in all spheres of social, economic and financial life as well as other ties and interdependencies between states and regions are also present, there is an awesome belief that the issues of corruption and organised crime cannot be discretely treated as the exclusive internal affairs of states. Organized crime, and especially corruption, have the tendency to proceed beyond national borders and adversely affect international eco-political relations and, thus, must be globally addressed in a planned and systematic way. All these positions led to the creation of an idea about the necessity to define international standards and develop positive practices in controlling organized crime in general, and corruption in particular. The United Nations' Convention against Corruption adopted in 2003 and similar regional and national conventions that followed, have contributed largely to the development of international standards against bribery and corruption. Regrettably, the adoption of such international and regional standards and anti-corruption strategies have not yet been realised with the same pace and success in all the countries and regions of the World. For instance, Cameroon established anti-corruption bureaus in twenty-nine ministries, but only seven (25%) became operational (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2007).

It has been noted that some states, separated by a large geographic distance from each other and which share short traditions of civil or social institution building, encounter common problems in combating corruption. These countries, with a high level of corruption, share a common trait such as the absence of a genuine will and readiness on the side of the government to seriously tackle corruption. For example, the Cameroon anti-corruption campaigns serve the purpose of showing the public that something is being done, but they do not seriously attempt to eliminate the problem (Agbor, 2019). This observation can be fully applied to all anti-corruption strategies in many other countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa. The keenness to fighting corruption, verbally expressed by politicians, is very often confined to speech-making in the framework of political campaigns, lacking sincerity and intentions and thoughtful designed actions.

However, with political pressure from the international community, donors, investors, and the ratification of various anti-corruption initiatives, it becomes clear that a distinctive disproportion between verbal political declarations of government officials and adopted international and regional anti-corruption regulations and standards are observable on one side and challenges with the execution of anti-corruption laws in practices, on the other.

It is therefore significant to carry out comparative studies related to the implementation of anti-corruption standards in practice in the Sub-Saharan states that belong to different sub-regions, but still share some mutual comparative indicators. Hence, the research problem captured in this paper entails a comparison of anti-corruption state strategies in Nigeria and Cameroon showing some common features: lack of tradition in developing democratic institutions, high political influence and weak state institutions. In addition, both states have made efforts to adopt major international corruption standards, pass anti-corruption laws and orders. However, they are staggering at the implementation of such formal prescriptions in daily practice. Besides, corruption has gotten worse, regardless of the existing anti-corruption bureaus, as TI ranked both countries 149 on a list of 180 countries in 2020.

Research Methodology

Since it is technically impossible to include the large populations of Cameroon and Nigeria, samples of the countries' people were taken. A combination of purposive and convenient sampling was employed. Purposive sampling was used because it allowed researchers to use their knowledge of the populations to select a sample that are conveniently situated within their reach. Therefore, the first selection criterion is that respondents must be and/or above the age of 18 years. This is the official adult age in both countries. Furthermore, the selection was on respondents from major, randomly selected towns such as: Abuja and Lagos (Nigeria), and Yaoundé, Douala and Bamenda (Cameroon). These are the federal and regional capitals of both countries. The cities are cosmopolitan in nature; thus, diverse ethnics and population groups that constituted both states could easily be accessed. Supported by convenient sampling approach, the current study included suitable respondents who are employed in a public and/or private position, agency, department or ministry which may encounter corrupt activities by officials.

In the final sample, a total of 156 respondents were secured in the case of Cameroon while 233 respondents were secured in the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Although both samples are not representative of either Cameroon or Nigeria people, they nevertheless allow the researchers to at least compare the opinions of the respective respondents as far as their perceptions of corruption are concerned. To allow equal samples for comparative purposes, the original Nigerian sample of 233 respondents had to be statistically worked-out and reduced to 156 respondents.

The questionnaire was prepared and presented to respondents in English. The authors and assistants helped respondents in completing the questionnaires only when they encountered unclear language relating to statements in the questionnaire. Furthermore, few Cameroon respondents were served with French translators. The survey was conducted using a pre-coded, closed-structured questionnaire. A 5-point, Likert-type scale with five response categories (1-strongly agree, 2-agree, 3-neutral, 4-disagree and 5-strongly disagree) was used to measure the perceptions of the respondents. Data from both Cameroon and Nigeria were then transformed and entered into the SPSS version 16 and was analysed using frequency distribution, percentages and chi-square.

Before its application, a pilot study was conducted on 15 respondents from a conveniently available pool of respondents. The rule of thumb is to test the survey on at least 12 to 50 people prior to full-scale administration (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Feedback was obtained about the length of the instrument, the format of the scales, content validity, and question ambiguity. The instrument was revised and further administered to 12 residents. Besides, a social psychology expert checked the developed scale. Improvements were made on the overall style of the instrument. With his expertise, only relevant and necessary questions were retained. The questionnaire length was also shortened to reduce respondent's burden and ensure the seamlessly flow of the instrument from one questions to the next. For analysis of the internal reliability of the items in the questionnaire, Cronbach's alpha values were tested with a cut-off value of 0.75 (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Reliability analysis has revealed the instrument used is acceptable (alpha coefficient: 0.82) which exceeded the recommended satisfactory level of 0.70 (Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). Unless where otherwise stated, the tables through which data were summarized are extracts of a survey carried out by the authors and their field assistants

Results and discussion

Description of respondents

In the case of Cameroon, results (as presented in Table 1) show that 53% of respondents were male while 49% were in the age group of 41 to 60 years. Findings show that most of the respondents (62%) had post-basic education with some 31% employed in the nation's public and civil services. In the case of Nigeria, findings show that 19% of the respondents were 60 years and above, the proportion of male respondents was 62% while 39% had tertiary and advanced education. As obtainable in Cameroon case, findings show that majority of the people sampled in Nigeria are employed in government services. Significantly, there appeared to be variation in the demographic characteristics of the respondents in these two states (none of the variables were the same in the two nations). Thus, these give the impression of no problem with skewness, and the demographic variables appeared to be normally distributed even though purposive with convenient sampling approaches were used.

Table 1: Demographic information of respondents

Item	Variable	Cameroon		Nigeria		Total	
Gender	Male	82	53.0	97	62.0	179	57.0
	Female	74	47.0	59	38.0	133	43.0
Occupation	Business and private enterprise	28	18.0	30	19.0	058	19.0
	Government (civil and public) services	49	31.0	56	36.0	105	34.0
	Industries and manufacturing	19	12.0	15	10.0	034	11.0
	Education and training services	22	14.0	17	11.0	039	13.0
	Health and medical care	18	16.0	13	08.0	031	10.0
	Others (including students, retirees, etc.)	20	13.0	25	16.0	045	14.0
Age	18 – 40 years	46	30.0	39	25.0	085	27.0
	41 – 60 years	77	49.0	87	56.0	164	53.0
	Above 60 years	33	21.0	30	19.0	063	20.0
Education	Basic education	42	27.0	25	16.0	067	22.0
	Post-basic education	62	40.0	71	45.0	133	43.0
	Tertiary and advanced education	52	33.0	60	39.0	112	36.0

In general, data summary presented in Table 1 shows a fairly large difference between the total figures of male (57%) and female (43%) respondents. Similarly, convergence between age distributions, some educational qualifications and occupation are also noticeable. The highest collective concentration among the age groups was found among the 41 to 60 age category (53%). This is immediately followed by the age group, 18 to 40 years (27%). The largest number of respondents (43%) obtained a Post-basic education. Respondents with tertiary and advanced education accounted for 36%. The majority of respondents (34%) who are workforce were found in the nations' civil and public services. This is followed by business and private enterprises (19%) and then, others occupation category. It is important to note that included in the 14% of the other occupation category are students, retirees and unemployed residents; all of those who do not form part of the actively employed groups.

Perceptions of aspects relating to corruption practices

Presented in Table 2 is the summary of respondents' perception relating to aspects of corruption in the two countries. The first aspect is on regular, general, free and fair elections. It should be mention that regular elections afford citizens the right to decide whether or not their government officials are fit to remain in office, particularly as far as management functions at all levels of government are concerned. On the other hand, unstable governments may precipitate large scale corruption which may lead to mismanagement, money laundering, and other related crime. In this regard, results show that a good proportion (65%) of Nigerian respondents specified that their country is holding regular, general and fair elections since the advent of democracy in 1999. On the other hand, only half of the Cameroonian respondents (50%) favoured regular, general and fair elections, suggesting their country also holds regular, general and fair elections. However, it is interesting to see nearly half (46%) of Cameroonian respondents opposed that their country holds regular, general and fair elections. There may be several reasons for this assertion. Since independence in 1960, Cameroon has been led by two presidents, Ahmadou Ahidjo, for 21 years, and the incumbent president, Paul Biya. President Ahidjo, who was designated by the French to take over Cameroon at independence, held five terms as president of a single-party democracy with no political oppositions. In November 1982, due to ill health, Ahidjo transferred power to his constitutional successor, Paul Biya. Since 1982, seven Presidential elections have taken place in Cameroon; two under a single-party system and five under a multi-party system and all of which were won by Paul Biya: the victories, many Cameroonians has attributed to rigging and illegal use of armed forces. Wallechinsky (2006: 288) describes Cameroon's electoral process in these terms: "Every few years, Biya stages an election to justify his continuing reign, but these elections have no credibility.

Findings show that 61% of Cameroon respondents believe that their government is not open and transparent enough compared to the perceptions of 53% of the Nigerian respondents who have also indicated that their government cannot be viewed as open and transparent as is expected of a democratic government. This finding may be the reason why Cameroonian respondents (71%) strongly opposed the existence of an open flow of information between their government and citizens. Some Nigerian respondents also denied open flow of communication between government and citizens, however, to a lesser extent (48%) compared to that of Cameroon. Nigerian respondents almost equally responded favourably and unfavourably regarding their views on media freedom. Those who perceive media as being not totally free from government interference accounted for 47% while those who consider the media to be free from government snooping accounted for 43%. On the other hand, over half of the Cameroonian respondents (55%) do not consider the media in their country to be free compared to the minority

(39%) who perceive the media to be free of government interventions. With these findings, it could be established that in relation to press freedom, both countries are just partly free. However, a free press plays a key role in sustaining a healthy democracy, as well as contributing to greater accountability, good government and economic development (Freedom House, 2019).

Table 2: Comparative evaluation of perceptions relating to aspects of corruption

Aspects of Corruption (Dependent Variables)	Cameroon (N = 156)			Nigeria (N = 156)		
	Favour	Neutral	Oppose	Favour	Neutral	Oppose
Regular, general, free and fair elections	78 (50.0%)	06 (4.0%)	72 (46.0%)	101 (65.0%)	14 (9.0%)	41 (26.0%)
Government is open and transparent	58 (37.0%)	03 (2.0%)	95 (61.0%)	62 (40.0%)	11 (7.0%)	83 (53.0%)
Media are free from government interventions	61 (39.0%)	09 (6.0%)	86 (55.0%)	67 (43.0%)	16 (10.0%)	73 (47.0%)
Information flow between citizens and government	42 (27.0%)	03 (2.0%)	111 (71.0%)	25 (16.0%)	56 (36.0%)	75 (48.0%)
Government corruption in the past four years	119 (76.0%)	28 (18.0%)	09 (6.0%)	116 (74.0%)	34 (22.0%)	06 (4.0%)
Regulation to check corruption and related crime	50 (32.0%)	03 (2.0%)	103 (66.0%)	73 (47%)	17 (11.0%)	66 (42.0%)
Corruption charge against government officials in the past four years	108 (69.0%)	15 (10.0%)	33 (21.0%)	111 (71.0%)	17 (11.0%)	28 (18.0%)
Regional agreements to deal with corruption	16 (10.0%)	101 (65.0%)	39 (25.0%)	22 (14.0%)	90 (58.0%)	44 (28.0%)
Compliance with UN anti-corruption protocols	59 (38.0%)	95 (61.0%)	02 (1.0%)	75 (48.0%)	78 (50.0%)	03 (2.0%)

Note: Favour = (1) Strongly Agree + (2) Agree while Oppose: (4) Disagree + (5) Strongly Disagree.

Both Cameroonian respondents (76.0%) and Nigerian respondents (74%) react positively to the claims of government corruption in the past four years. Perhaps, some allegations of corruption during the past four years among the ranks of government by the mass media prevail on both respondents to closely react positively and favourably to the claims of government corruption in the past four years. Further findings show that no less than 70% of Nigerian respondents indicate that some government officials have been charged for corruption. Similar findings was found with Cameroonian respondents as 69% indicate that some government officials have been charged for corruption and related crime compared to only 21% who opposed this. Some contemporary examples in the news are evidences of these favourable and disagreeing views.

For instance, in 2016, the Nigerian Senate ad hoc committee led by Senator Shehu Sani indicted the then secretary to the Government of the Federation, Mr. Babachir Lawal in a N200 million contract scandal (The Sun Newspaper, 2017: 3 November). On October 30, 2017, President Buhari sacked Lawal based on the report of a three-man panel led by Vice-President Yemi Osinbajo. Also, in 2016, Buhari was presented evidence that his chief of staff, Abba Kyari, took five hundred million naira bribe from Mobile Telecommunication of Nigeria (MTN) to help it slash the five Billion USD fine slammed against it for violation of Nigeria telecommunications regulations bothering on national security. The MTN fired the staff involved in the bribery scandal (Sahara Reporters, 2016: September, 20).

However, Abba Kyari was left intact in his position as chief of staff. This led to national outrage forcing Buhari to announce the probe of Kyari (Vanguard News, 2016: October, 21). The findings of the investigation were never made public. Besides, in 2017, former director general of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA), Mr. Ayodele Oke and his wife were charged with the theft and laundering of staggering amounts of public money. One of the charges relates to roughly \$43 million, £28 thousand, and ₦23 million (all in cash) that were found in their apartment in Lagos following a raid (Premium Times, 2019: January, 30). Another charge relates to \$160 million that the couple allegedly diverted from the Nigerian federal government for their own use (The Guardian, 2019: January, 30). In 2017, Mr. Oke was suspended as director general of the NIA. Vice president Yemi Osinbajo headed a committee that investigated the incident and recommended to President Buhari that the director general be removed.

Unlike Nigeria, in Cameroon, President Biya himself, after about 4 decades in power has never fulfilled article 66 of the constitution of 1996 by declaring all his property. This article 66 demands all government officials to declare their assets before assuming a position in government so that it will be possible to measure what they have gained (or lost) during their tenancy. This is a credible means to fight against government embezzlement, but Paul Biya has never declared any of his assets. President Biya created the CONAC (National Anti-Corruption Commission) in 2006 in order to actively fight corruption. Indeed, the CONAC has done multiple arrests of top government officials. The notable ones being Marafa Hamidou Yaya, former Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, arrested and convicted for having embezzled US\$ 29 million in the case named "*presidential jet*" by local media. Similarly, Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo'o, former Minister of Defence was arrested on corruption charges with US\$5 million recovered in cash at his residence (Takambou, 2019: March, 18). These are only a few of many incidences of corruption within government of both countries.

Compared to Cameroon respondents (66.0%) who oppose that their country has effective anti-corruption legislation, findings show that almost half of the Nigerian sample (47.0%) perceives their country as having effective anti-corruption regulations. Nonetheless, almost an equal number of respondents (42%) oppose that their country has effective anti-corruption legislation. Finding show that majority of respondents in both countries (65% - Cameroon and 58% - Nigeria) are not sure whether or not their countries subscribe to regional agreements (such as the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption [AUCPCC]) that deal with corruption and organized crime. The large numbers of uncertainty among respondents may be indicative of a lack of knowledge in this regard. However, Nigerian respondents (14.0%) are somewhat persuaded that their country is part of regional agreements to deal with corruption compared to Cameroonian respondents (10.0%) who are less persuaded in this regard. Furthermore, Nigerian respondents (48.0%) are somewhat more aware that their country abides by the UN anti-corruption convention (United Nations Convention against Corruption [UNCAC]) compared to the Cameroonian respondents (38.0%). It is therefore evidence that Nigerian respondents are more cognisant of regional and global corruption interventions compared to Cameroonian respondents.

The prevalence of and counteracting corruption in Cameroon and Nigeria

Presented in Table 3 is the summary of respondents' perception relating to the prevalence of corruption within government and steps taken to counteract it in Cameroon and Nigeria. Although, no significant difference exist ($X^2 = 57.11$; $p = 0.078 > 0.05$) findings show clearly that corruption is somewhat more widespread Nigeria among the police (91.0%) and benches (89.0%) compared to Cameroon.

Of a truth, reports abound of high-level police officials who embezzle staggering sums of public funds meant to cover basic police operations in Nigeria.

In 2005, former Inspector General of Police (IGP), Mr. Tafa Balogun was sentenced by a Federal High Court, Abuja to a six months imprisonment for concealing vital information to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over his alleged business concerns and interests in some companies amounting to over N17.7 billion (Vanguard Newspaper, 2017: 19 August). In 2012, another former Inspector General of Police, Sunday Ehindero faced trial for embezzling money meant for the police force. An Abuja High Court judge said Ehindero, in his capacity as Inspector General of Police embezzled N16 million, meant for the police. The Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) had said Mr. Ehindero, and a Commissioner of Police in charge of Budget at the Force Headquarters, John Obaniyi, connived to embezzle the funds. While Mr. Ehindero was retired from the police, Mr. Obaniyi was suspended (Vanguard Newspaper, 2017: 19 August). These are just few cases among many sexual harassments, extorting money at checkpoints to top officials embezzling public funds, beating and even killing of innocent civilians.

In a survey carried out by the Anti-Corruption Academy of Nigeria, an arm of the ICPC indicated that the Judiciary is on top of the Nigeria Corruption Index between 2018 and 2020 (The Guardian, 2021: 26 January). ICPC report had claimed that about N9.458 billion was offered and paid as bribe by lawyers to the benches. The ICPC through its chairman Prof. Bolaji Owasanoye (SAN), said six female judges reported that they were offered N3,307,444,000 billion and five male judges reported N392,220,000 million. The anti-corruption agency explained that cases of outright demand and offer of bribes were mostly linked to election matters (The Guardian, 2021: 26 January). Similarly, recent studies like TI, (2016) and Agbor, (2019) have found Cameroon judges and the police department to be the most corrupt institutions.

With chi-square ($X^2 = 73.32$; $p = 0.01 < 0.05$), findings significantly show that self-enrichment is the order of the day in Cameroon (92.0%) compared to Nigeria (87.0%), especially through prevalence of corruption in the way government contracts (at all levels) are being administered. Public procurement in Cameroon generally lacks transparency, and details about government contracts are generally not made public. Most large-scale projects put up for public procurement involve the decision of the president directly (TI, 2016). Perhaps the most recent allegations of possible corruption in Cameroon levelled against contractors and President Paul Biya is regarding the hosting of the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON). The 2019-AFCON project was one of the largest projects recently rocked by a financial scandal in Cameroon. Whistleblowers claim that an estimated 1.8 billion euros of Cameroonian public money has been mismanaged through contracts shrouded in controversy (Kindzeka, 2019). In a recent article on Deutsche Welle (DW), a Germany's international broadcaster, John Ako, a university lecturer and civil society activist in Cameroon, said that the prices of the 2019 AFCON infrastructure were ten times more than is usual for the same kind of infrastructure in other Sub-Saharan African nations. Within Cameroon, those who implement decisions or grant the order for contracts always have a percentage reserved in their name (Kindzeka, 2019).

Table 3: Prevalence of corruption within government and steps taken to counteract it

Corruption prevalence and steps taken to tackle it	Cameroon (N = 156)			Nigeria (N = 156)		
	Favour	Neutral	Oppose	Favour	Neutral	Oppose
Corruption in the Police	138 (89.0%)	02 (1.0%)	16 (10.0%)	140 (91.0%)	00 (0.0%)	17 (11.0%)
Corruption in the benches	135 (87.0%)	02 (1.0%)	19 (12.0%)	139 (89.0%)	03 (2.0%)	14 (9.0%)
Corruption in tenders or government contracts	143 (92.0%)	00 (0.0%)	13 (8.0%)	136 (87.0%)	08 (5.0%)	12 (8.0%)
Corruption in the appointment and promotion of senior government officials	42 (27.0%)	03 (2.0%)	111 (71.0%)	25 (16.0%)	56 (36.0%)	75 (48.0%)
Government officials protects corrupt employees	118 (76.0%)	25 (16.0%)	13 (8.0%)	115 (74%)	16 (10.0%)	25 (16.0%)
Special agencies that can investigate corruption	81 (52.0%)	62 (40.0%)	13 (8.0%)	142 (91%)	00 (0.0%)	14 (09.0%)
Such agencies are free from political interference	03 (2.0%)	25 (16.0%)	128 (82.0%)	08 (5.0%)	22 (14.0%)	126 (81.0%)
Such agencies are successful in their investigation of corruption	25 (16.0%)	36 (23.0%)	95 (61.0%)	22 (14.0%)	59 (38.0%)	75 (48.0%)
Public-private partnership that can deal with corruption	28 (18.0%)	47 (30.0%)	81 (52.0%)	84 (54.0%)	49 (31.0%)	23 (15.0%)
Public-private partnership counteracting corruption is effective	19 (12.0%)	34 (22.0%)	103 (66.0%)	17 (11.0%)	48 (31.0%)	91 (58.0%)

Note: Favour = (1) Strongly Agree + (2) Agree while Oppose: (4) Disagree + (5) Strongly Disagree.

Findings further show that corruption is almost evenly present in both countries when kinsmen and family members of politicians and senior public office holders are appointed in senior political posts of government. In this regard, Nigerian respondents' perceptions (85.0%) are almost equal to that of the perceptions of Cameroon respondents (84.0%) regarding corruption in the appointment and promotion of senior government officials. For instance, it has been mentioned that the entire staff of the Nigerian president are his direct biological relations (The Guardian, 2020: June 20). In fact, the president has been described as the most nepotistic leader that Nigeria has ever had (The Guardian, 2020: June 20). It also appears that corrupt public and private officials are protected by government (i.e. suspended by one MDA but re-appointed by another one) according to both Cameroonians (79.0%) and Nigerians (81.0%) respondents. For instance, in 2015, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, pressed charges of corruption on Mr. Maina and his accomplices. However, Mr. Maina fled before the trial. Despite the Interpol arrest warrant, he still managed to return to Nigeria, where he was said to have enjoyed protection from the Buhari's government (Vanguard Newspaper. 2017: 27 October). Besides, Maina was dismissed from his position by Jonathan's government in 2013.

Nonetheless, Mr. Maina surreptitiously resurfaced, reinstated to the Nigeria civil service in 2017 and was issued a double promotion as acting director of Human Resources at the Ministry of Interior under the Buhari administration (Premium Times Nigeria, 2017: October, 20; Premium Times Nigeria, 2017a: October, 22).

Nigerian respondents (91.0%) are to a great extent convinced that special agencies, units and commissions exist to curb corruption (See Table 3). In 2000, President Olusegun Obasanjo, for instance established the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and subsequently the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2004 with power to investigate corruptive practices at all three government levels: national, state and local authority levels (Folarin, 2009). Few years later, the same government echoed her intentions to introduce the so-called Advance Fee Fraud and Other Related Offences Act and Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act to clamp down on dishonest civil and public servants and speeding-up disciplinary trial processes. Despite the existence of the National Anti-corruption Commission (CONAC) in Cameroon, it is surprising that only 52% of Cameroonian respondents favoured that special agencies exist to curb corruption. An undecided score of 40.0% as well as an opposing response of 8.0% may just point to the functionality, operations and/or a lack of knowledge about whether or not any of such anti-corruption units do exist in Cameroon.

Whatever the case, both countries (Cameroon - 82.0% and Nigeria – 81.0%) have opposed the possibility that, should any such anti-corruption agencies exist at all, they would neither be independent nor free from political interference. This is in agreement with literature. In their study, Anders and Page (2019) argue that the anti-corruption agencies' independence has not proven to be an effective safeguard against political influence in Africa. Presidents and their allies (as in the case of Cameroon and Nigeria) are still able to intervene in the anti-corruption agencies' investigations, as the Director General is appointed and crucially dismissed by the President (Anders & Page, 2019). For example, in Nigeria, very few Chairmen of the EFCC have served a full term, and many of those who were prematurely dismissed either attracted the President's resentment and/or were dismissed when a new President was elected. This shows the anti-corruption agencies' vulnerability to political influence in spite of their independence from the rest of government.

With the chi-square value ($X^2 = 91.22$, $p = 0.00 < 0.05$), findings further indicate that such agencies are not really successful in their endeavours in Cameroon (61%) as compared to Nigeria (48.0%). For instance, since its establishment, President Biya's CONAC has done multiple arrests and have prosecuted more cases of the embezzlement of astronomical amounts of money, but with very few or no successes recorded (Agbor, 2019). The notable unsuccessful ones being Marafa Hamidou Yaya, former Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralisation, arrested for having embezzled US\$29 million and Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo'o, former Minister of Defence arrested on corruption charges with US\$5 million recovered in cash at his residence. Efforts to combat corruption in Cameroon have proven to be inadequate, ineffective and shallow due the absence of credible political will that ought to complement all legislative and institutional mechanisms in place (Agbor, 2019).

Whether any public-private partnerships exist, capable of dealing with corruption in a reactive way, is favoured to a large extent by the Nigerian respondents (54.0%), but is opposed in a similar way by Cameroon respondents (51%). Perhaps, the Nigerian Whistle-blowing policy might have informed these

findings. Whistle-blowing Policy in Nigeria is an anti-corruption programme that encourages people to voluntarily disclose information about fraud, bribery, looted government funds, financial misconduct, government assets and any other form of corruption or theft to the Nigeria's government. A whistle-blower who provides information about any financial mismanagement or stolen funds is rewarded or entitled to 2.5% - 5% from the recovered funds (Premium Times, 2016, December, 21). Furthermore, both Nigerian (58.0%) and Cameroonian (66.0%) respondents doubt the possibility that such public-private partnerships would be effective in counteracting corruption and related crime in their countries. The disappearance of crucial evidence, witnesses, withdrawal of cases by the Anti-corruption agencies prosecutors, plea bargain, poor crime reporting culture, fear as to what could happen to whistle-blower and his/her family are only some factors hindering the successful functioning of such public-private partnerships.

Conclusion and recommendations

This study revolves around a comparison of corruption and anti-corruption through legal measures, protocols, agencies among others, between Cameroon and Nigeria by way of a literature study and measuring the prevalence of corruption by means of a structured survey. In each case, responses of the respondents of both countries had been empirically analysed, compared and described.

Obviously, the research findings cannot be generalised to the total populations of both countries due to a non-probability sampling procedure that was used. However, quite a number of comparisons representing the perceptions of the respondents in the two countries have unveiled remarkable similarities on certain instances. The research was based on the assumption that while Cameroon and Nigeria both survived oppressive authoritarian pasts, they would be well-suited for a comparative inquiry into the social phenomenon and crime of corruption. The data on both sides reveal tangential points. For instance, corruption is somewhat more widespread in Nigeria among the police and the judges compared to Cameroon, yet the responses are reasonably close with no statistical significant difference but, more importantly, and very high for both countries. Findings further show that corruption is almost evenly present in both countries when kinsmen of politicians are appointed in senior political posts of government. Furthermore, Nigerian respondents are to a great extent more convinced that special agencies, units and commissions exist to curb corruption compared to Cameroon respondents. Whatever the case, both countries have opposed the possibility that, should any such anti-corruption agencies exist at all, they would neither be independent nor free from political interference.

It is recommended that similar corruption whistle blowing policies like the one introduced into the Nigeria civil and public services be extended and introduced in all other spheres of public and private lives of citizens of Cameroon and Nigeria. Speedy trials for those who have been indicted of corruption and related crime should be given the highest priority. Moreover, evidence (documents, whistle blowers and eye witness) about corruption already mentioned, ready to be presented to the courts should be secured in safe custody and in a manner that is above suspicion in an effort to ensure the best outcomes of the trials. Furthermore, the entire Act that created Anti-corruption agencies should be replaced with one which places emphasis not so much on independence, but on even-handedness.

For this to happen, composition of the anti-corruption body would be the sole responsibility of a Board of Trustees drawn from members of the civil society, labour union, and retirees of honour from the civil service and judiciary. In addition, the political parties should also have the right to nominate one representative each onto the anti-corruption body. With that multiple locks clamped in, the soul of the Anti-corruption body would be tied to everybody, and to nobody. Efforts to combat corruption in the study area have proven to be ineffective due the absence of credible political will. This study therefore makes the case for the inclusion of political will in this regard.

Reference

- Abdulaziz A. & Kemi B. 2017. SHOCKING: Buhari administration recalls wanted ex-pension boss sacked for alleged corruption, *Premium Times Nigeria*, 20 Oct 2017, viewed: 05-May 2021, <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/246791-shocking-buhari-administration-recalls-wanted-ex-pension-boss-sacked-alleged-corruption.html>>
- Abdulaziz A. 2017. Why we reinstated fugitive ex-pension chief Maina – Nigerian government, *Premium Times Nigeria*, 22 Oct 2017, Viewed 09-May 2021, <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/246882-reinstated-fugitive-ex-pension-chief-maina-nigerian-govt.html>>
- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. 2012. *Why nations fail: The origins of power, prosperity, and poverty*. London: Crown Publishing Group.
- Adebayo, M. and Abuja J. O, 2017. Fresh trouble for Babachir Lawal, *The Sun Newspaper*, 03 Nov 2017, viewed 24 November 2021. <<https://www.sunnewsonline.com/fresh-trouble-for-babachir-lawal/> >
- Agbor, A. 2019. Cameroon and the Corruption Conundrum: Highlighting the Need for Political Will in Combatting Corruption in Cameroon, *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, 27 (1): 50-75. *Amnesty International Report 2006 Cameroon*. Viewed 6 Apr 2021, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2006/en/>
- Anders, G & Page, T 2019. *African anti-corruption agencies and the problem of independence*, viewed 17 Dec 2021, <<https://www.globalintegrity.org>>
- Austin G, Frankema, E & Jerven, M. 2016. Patterns of Manufacturing Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: From Colonization to the Present,” (pp.244-261) in K O’Rourke and J G Williamson (Eds), *The Spread of Modern Manufacturing to the Periphery, 1870 to the Present*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Badiora A., & Bako, A. 2020. The Illicit and Illegal Sides of the Nigerian Public Administration: Corruption in Town Planning and Land Services. In Aransi, I.O et al., (Eds), *Contemporary issues in Nigerian Public Administration* (pp. 299-.326).
- Badiora, A. 2020. Perceptions on corruption and compliance in the administration of town planning laws: The experience from Lagos Metropolitan Area, Nigeria. *Town and Regional Planning*, 76, 1-13.
- Buhari Presented With Evidence His Chief Of Staff Took N500m to Help MTN Reduce Fine*, *Sahara Reporters*, 20, Sep 2016, viewed 09 May 2021, <<https://saharareporters.com/2016/09/20/buhari-presented-evidence-his-chief-staff-took-n500m-help-mtn-reduce-fine>>
- Check, N., Madise, T., Majozi, N. & Hamada, Y. 2019. *The Integrity of Political Finance Systems in Africa: Tackling Political Corruption*. International IDEA Policy Paper No. 20.

- Chiodelli F, & Moroni S. 2015. Corruption in land-use issues: a crucial challenge for planning theory and practice, *Town Planning Research*, 86 (4), 437–455.
- Chiodelli F, Hall T & Hudson R (Eds) 2017. *The Illicit and Illegal in the Development and Governance of Cities and Regions: Corrupt Places*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Chiodelli F. 2018. The illicit side of urban development: Corruption and organised crime in the field of urban planning, *Urban Studies*, 1-17.
- Chiodelli F., 2012. Re-politicizing space through technical rules, *Planning Theory* 11(2), 115–127.
- Chiodelli, F., Hall, T., Hudson, R. and Moroni, S., 2017. Grey governance and the development of cities and regions: the variable relationship between (il) legal and (il) licit. In *The Illicit and Illegal in Regional and Urban Governance and Development* (pp. 1-16). Routledge.
- Chioma G. 2017. Corruption: Nigerian Police under scrutiny, *Vanguard Newspaper*, 19 Aug 2017, Viewed 17 Dec 2021, < <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/08/corruption-nigerian-police-scrutiny/> >
- Crabtree, J & Durand, F., 2017. *Peru: Elite Power and Political Capture*. London, United Kingdom: Zed Books Ltd.
- Della Porta D & Vannucci A. 1999. *Corrupt Exchanges: Actors, Resources, and Mechanisms of Political Corruption*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Della Porta D & Vannucci, A. 2012. Political corruption. In: Amenta E, Nash K and Scott A (Eds) *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Political Sociology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 130–143.
- Fijnaut, C. & Huberts, L. (2002). *Corruption. Integrity and Law Enforcement*. Available at: http://www.fsw.vu.nl/en/Images/Corruption,%20Integrity%20and%20Law%20enforcement_tcm31-41822.pdf. (Accessed: 08-Dec 2021.)
- Folarin, S. F. 2009. The Anti-Corruption War in Nigeria: A Critical Appraisal of the Role of the ICPC and EFCC. *Nigerian Journal of Economic and Financial Crimes*, 1 (2): 14-36.
- Frankema, E. 2015. How Africa's Colonial History Affects Its Development. Avail at: <https://www.weforum.org>. Accessed on December 26, 2021.
- Freedom House. 2019. *Freedom of the Press data*, viewed 28 Jun 2021, <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom/>>
- Hammadi, A., Mills, M., Sobrinho, N., Thakoor, M.V.V. and Velloso, R., 2019. *A Governance Dividend for Sub-Saharan Africa?*. International Monetary Fund.
- Heldring, L. & Robinson, J. 2013. *Colonialism and Development in Africa*, viewed 26 Dec 2021, <<https://voxeu.org>>
- Kindzeka, M., 2019. *Conflicts and corruption in Cameroon drain the economy*, viewed 23 Dec 2021, <<https://www.dw.com/en/conflicts-and-corruption-in-cameroon-drain-the-economy/a-47202553>>
- Klitgaard, R. 1998. *International cooperation against corruption, finance & development*, viewed 20 Dec 2021, <<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/klitgaar.pdf>>
- Lodge, T. 2019. "State Capture: Conceptual Considerations" In Meirotti, M. & Masterson, G (eds). *State Capture in Africa: Old Threats, New Packaging?* EISA Publications.
- Maina has put a big question mark on Buhari's integrity, *Vanguard Newspaper*, 27 Oct 2017. Viewed 24 Nov 2021, < <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/maina-put-big-question-mark-buharis-integrity/> >
- Mutonyi, J., 2002. Fighting Corruption: Is Kenya on the right track?. *Police practice and research*, 3(1), pp.21-39.
- Nigeria and the Maina case, *The Guardian Nigeria News*, Viewed 03 Jun 2021, < <https://guardian.ng/opinion/nigeria-and-the-maina-case/> >
- Nye J. 1967. Corruption and political development: A cost-benefit analysis. *The American Political Science Review* 61(2): 417–427.
- Ocheni, S., & Nwankwo, B. 2012. Analysis of Colonialism and Its Impact in Africa. *Cross Cultural Communication*, 8(3): 46-54.

- Odey S., & Eric N. 2017. *Effects of Corruption and Bad Leadership on Journalism in Nigeria*, Munich, GRIN Verlag, viewed 6 April 2021, <<https://www.grin.com/document/354371>>.
- Ogitcu, M., 2005. Economics and Politics of Corruption in Turkey: Fighting for a “Clean Government and Business”. In: Sarre, R., Das, D., Albrecht, H.J., (Ed.). *Policing corruption: International perspectives*, Oxford, Lexington Books, 207-221.
- Okakwu E., 2018. EFCC files corruption charges against Babachir Lawal, Ayo Oke. *Premium Times*, 30 January 2018, viewed 17 Dec 2021, <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/308926-efcc-files-corruption-charges-against-babachir-lawal-ayo-oke.html>>
- Omonobi K. 2016. N500m MTN Bribery Allegation: Presidency orders probe of Abba Kyari, *Vanguard News*, 21 October 2016, Viewed 09 May 2021, <<https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/10/n500m-mtn-bribery-allegation-orders-probe-of-abba-kyari-presidency/>>
- Onwubiko E. 2020. Buhari’s government for Buhari’s hometown? *Guardian Nigeria News*, 18 Jun 2020, viewed 17 Dec 2021, <<https://guardian.ng/opinion/buharis-government-for-buharis-hometown/>>
- Onyekwere J. 2021 ICPC corruption verdict unsettles judiciary, *The Guardian*, 26 Jan 2021, viewed 17 Dec 2021, <<https://guardian.ng/features/law/icpc-corruption-verdict-unsettles-judiciary/>>
- Prinsloo, J. & Naude, C. 2001. Corruption in Southern Africa. *Acta Criminologica*, 14(1): 39-47.
- Roelofse, C. Potgieter, P. & Simonovic, B. 2014. A comparative study of corruption and government efforts to combat it across borders: The case for South Africa and Serbia. *Internal Security*, 6, (2): 1-25
- Sani T. 2016. Expose corruption and make money as Nigerian Government adopts new whistle blowing policy, *Premium Times*, 21 Dec 2016, Viewed 25 Nov 2021. <<https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/218608-breaking-expose-corruption-make-money-nigerian-govt-adopts-new-whistle-blowing-policy.html>>
- Tavakol, M & Dennick, R. (2011). Making sense of Cronbach’s alpha. *International Journal of Medical Education*, 2, 53-55.
- Odita S. 2019. EFCC declares NIA ex-DG Oke, wife wanted, *The Guardian Nigeria News*, 25 Mar 2019, viewed 03 Dec 2021, <<https://guardian.ng/news/efcc-declares-nia-ex-dg-oke-wife-wanted/>>
- Transparency International 2016. *Cameroon: Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption*, viewed 16 Jan 2022, <https://www.transparency.org/files/content/corruptionqas/Country_profile_Cameroon_2016.pdf>
- Transparency International 2018, *Global Corruption Perception Index*, viewed 26 Aug 2021, <<http://www.transparency.org>>.
- Transparency International. 2019. *Global Corruption Barometer Africa 2019: Citizen's Views and Experiences of Corruption*, viewed 26 Dec 2021, <<https://www.transparency.org/en/publications/gcb-africa-2019>>
- Transparency International 2020. *CPI 2019: Sub-Saharan Africa*, viewed 26 Sep 2021, <<http://www.transparency.org>>
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2006. *Cameroon: New anti-corruption drive leaves many sceptical*. IRIN, viewed 6 April 2021, <<https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2006/01/27/new-anti-corruption-drive-leaves-many-sceptical>>
- Wallechinsky, D. 2006. *Tyrants: the World's 20 Worst Living Dictators*, Regan Press, pp. 286–290.