Coping with service delivery deterrents in Tanzania: An eye on Lipsky's cutting-edge work

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Abstract

There is consensus in public administration literature that a robust service delivery is the result of numerous actors' interplay including policymakers, citizens, and street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). While this supposition has not been refuted hitherto, the Tanzanian experience shows that service delivery, particularly primary education, is still in a snail's pace. This challenge is associated with a lack of mutual interface between aforesaid actors because the central government dominates decisions regarding service delivery. This deterrent has opened up a new window for street-level bureaucrats to execute own de-facto policies. This notion is well featured in street-level bureaucracy theory, which assumes that at the end of policy chain SLBs can develop a pattern of practices to deal with difficult encounters. Since how SLBs respond to diverse context when faced with some difficulties in the due course of rendering public services is not clearly articulated in Tanzanian literature, this study sought to fill up this gap. The study employed street-level bureaucracy theory and a qualitative paradigm to explain how SLBs operate in difficult encounters to deliver primary education in the Tanzanian context. The findings reveal that in difficult moments SLBs can adopt a number of strategies to deal with service delivery deterrents by rationing resources as well as routinizing, modifying, and simplifying work or opting for exit strategies. Furthermore, coping strategies may either comply with public policy intentions or not. To ensure a robust service delivery, the central government is inclined to formulating feasible policies for enhancing mutual interaction among key stakeholders.

Key words: Street-level bureaucrats, policymakers, service delivery

Introduction

Numerous scholars in public administration have divergent views on the subject of service delivery. Despite not having a universal definition, service delivery is viewed as the interplay between policy makers (council officials and councilors), citizens (beneficiaries) and street-level bureaucrats (providers) (Ringoldand colleagues 2012; Boldand colleagues 2010; Ahmedand colleagues 2005). The aforesaid actors can enhance a robust service delivery by performing various public administration functions with a high level of commitment and integrity. This is imperative because a robust service delivery requires joint efforts in solicitation and allocation of resources. For example, council officials and councilors from Mvomero District and Moshi Municipal Councils can make feasible policies and execute them to address citizens' concerns, like access to primary education.

If the quality of education is in shambles, citizens may demonstrate voice or exit strategies. Moreover, citizens' concerns cannot be resolved if they do not constitute part and parcel of the decision making process. Taking part in decision making platform empowers citizens to demand accountability, which is their constitutional right. For citizens to demand accountability they need access to relevant information. Policy makers and frontline policy implementers (street-level bureaucrats) have the responsibility of enhancing citizens' access to right information. SLBs constitute part of policy executors who work in difficult environment that is associated with limited resources. Street-level bureaucrats referred to in this context are teachers, particularly from Mongwe, Dakawa (Mvomero), Mnazi and Njoro (Moshi) primary schools, who can interact with government officials, councilors, citizens, parents and pupils in the due course of rendering public services.

Since it has not been refuted that the interaction between government and non-government actors enhances a robust service delivery, studies conducted across the world, Tanzania inclusive, do not confirm that aforesaid interface always culminates in a robust service delivery as a result of existing restraints. Despite the fact that Tanzanian policies embrace joint action regarding service delivery, the experience reveals that service delivery, particularly primary education, is at a snail's pace due to lack of mutual interface among key actors. This is because the central government has always continued to extend its tentacles over local government affairs (Kamugisha 2019; Chaligha 2014; Faguet 2012). The interface between the central government and other actors does not always accord discretionary power to LGAs over finances, staff and infrastructures (Kessy and McCourt 2010). This raises the question of how this situation can be improved because schools seem to operate poorly. Surprisingly, in spite of the aforesaid deterrents, there are hardly any cases of closing the schools. This situation has opened up an avenue for cross examining how the theory (street-level bureaucracy)in use works in the context of Tanzanian.

The theory assumes that when frontline workers are caught up in a difficult state to address certain beneficiaries' concerns such as client inability to access education, SLBs always develop a pattern of practices to keep things moving in semi-autonomous social fields (Lipsky, 1980). However, Moore (1973) contended that a pattern of practices may limit government's control over semi-autonomous social fields. This posed three questions. First, what are the deterrents of service delivery of schools from selected LGAs in Tanzania? Second, how do street-level bureaucrats cope with the deterrents of service delivery? Third, how do street-level bureaucrats' operations comply with public policy intentions in semi-autonomous social fields? This paper starts by defining concepts 'service delivery' and 'street-level bureaucracy'. It thenpresents the study's conceptual framework, followed by a description of service delivery deterrents and what causes them. It further explains how SLBs devise ways of dealing with service delivery deterrents, and how these strategies limit government's control over semi-autonomous social fields or how they affect execution of public policies. Finally the paper draws some concluding remarks.

Conceptual Framework
Concepts usually display diverse meanings to suit certain purposes. This part defines the key concepts '*service delivery*' and '*street-level bureaucracy*.' It further presents street-level bureaucracy theory by Lipsky (1980).

Service delivery

Service delivery as pointed out before is the interplay amidst state (government) and non-state actors (Ringoldand colleagues 2012; Boldand colleagues 2010; Ahmedand colleagues 2005). Astate actor covers a person who acts on behalf of a governmental body with some limitations in exercising his/her discretionary power. The good examples are policy makers (bureaucrats or council officials and councilors), citizens and frontline policy implementers. Non-state actors are organizations and individuals not affiliated with, directed by, or funded through the government. Several categories of them come from academic institutions, NGOs, CBOs, philanthropic foundations, private sector entities, to mention but a few. The joint interaction among actors facilitates a robust service delivery because there is no single actor that has all the necessary resources to address complicated issues. For instance, the delivery of services such as education needs a combination of several inputs, like qualified teachers (street-level bureaucrats in this context), direct or indirect citizens' participation in school matters, relevant text books, classrooms, student or pupils' dormitories, staff quarters, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. In a nutshell, service delivery, particularly primary education, can be illustrated by Figure 1, which defines the roles of actors (government officials, councilors, citizens and service providers) as they jointly interact to deliver services.

Figure 1: Stakeholders' Interface Regarding Service Delivery

Source: Modified from Kamugisha (2019), Ringoldet al., 2012

Figure 1 accords roles of key stakeholders as they interact to render services. First, policy makers (i.e. local government officials and councilors) have the role of promoting development by planning well and allocating scarce resources wisely through mutual decision making. This is anticipated by reformers to culminate in local government having substantial discretionary power or autonomy over human, physical and financial resources decisions. Despite the milestone realized hitherto, the study by Warioba (2008) revealed the mushrooming of conflicts between governmental and non-governmental actors over socio-economic and political affairs at the local level, implying a lack of mutual interface between them. Second, citizens could hold SLBs accountable through '*client power*' because they are '*part and parcel*' of decision making in school committees meetings. Citizens can also indirectly hold policy makers accountable for their actions or inaction, especially when the services they render are either of poor quality or are unreliable. The strategies citizens can use are '*voice*' and '*exit*' or removing the government in power through the ballot. The biggest problem citizens encounter when they want to make informed decisions is information asymmetry. Third, through a '*compact*', bureaucrats and councilors can come up

with flexible policies, laws, and procedures that enhance effective service delivery. However, to bring this about, policy makers would need to ensure that frontline workers are sufficiently motivated through the 'carrot' or 'stick' approach (Shafritz et al., 2011). This means that excellent performers would be positively rewarded (carrot) to maintain their outstanding performance, and negative reinforcement (stick) would be used to change bad behaviors over non performers, although this is not always practical. The purpose of motivation is to empower service providers (street-level bureaucrats) to provide essential services that meet or go beyond citizens' expectations.

Street-level bureaucracy

This concept was coiled in 1960s and it became popular in 1980s after the publication of Michael Lipsky's seminal work. Since then much attention has focused to street-level bureaucrats' behavior, principally the discretionary (administrative) notion, which denotes the feasible or stretchy exercice of judgment and the power of making decisions by bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010). Generally, the term 'street-level bureaucracy' entails both 'granted' and 'used' discretionary autonomy or power by street-level bureaucrats (SLBs). The latter embraces 'judgmental discretion', which means 'frontline policy implementers with a high level of discretion operating in the bureaucratic structure of lower-level governments with a high level of contact with citizens' (Kamugisha, 2019: 1). As pointed out earlier, SLBs in this context stand for primary school teachers, whose level of interaction with citizens or parents or pupils is very high, as well as with lower-level government leaders, who execute policies in a given social context with certain autonomy. Although the body of knowledge on the SLBs concept has shifted from behaviorism to institutionalism, across the globe, the former has not been thoroughly studied in the Tanzanian context. However, the following SLBs characteristics provided in the literature are a help:

> The experience has shown that primary school teachers, SLBs, repeatedly interact with parents and learners with considerable discretion in the course of doing their job (Hupe, 2013). In this process they experience insecurity caused by a number of factors including an unmanageable workload as a result of poor quality staff, infrastructure, financial and non-financial incentives. Despite this obstacle, SLBs have to remain committed to delivering essential services beyond expectations. Although under normal circumstances they cannot fulfill their mission, they are compelled to develop certain strategies to cope with these difficulties, regardless of whether or not their endeavors are congruent with public policy. SLBs have a certain level of freedom to undertake their obligations, which may include implementing public policy or making certain decisions (Lipsky, 2010). According to Doh (2013) and Dada (2013), SLBs discretionary power regarding service delivery increases along the continuum from de-concentration to devolution because government control over LGAs becomes less in both theory and practice. The legal framework accords substantial power to lower tiers of government to define their own destiny without central government interference although it has been difficult to implement. The mere presence of such a clause implies that SLBs and primary school teachers have some discretionary power to develop and execute their own curriculum.

SLBs have the potential to demonstrate a high level of commitment to serve citizens with whom they interact in a given context to ensure the delivery of essential service (Lameck 2017; Lipsky 2010). However, SLBs face shortage of personnel to deal with individual cases or clients. For instance, teachers as SLBs fail to spend time with individuals or pupils because they teach big classes (Kamugisha, 2019).

It should be remembered that SLBs do not choose their pupils despite the fact that they come from the populations they serve. Nevertheless, their teaching behavior may have a positive effect on the pupils, their parents and the entire population.

Performance of SLBs depends on the nature of the resources available (Lipsky, 1980). However, to carry out their duties, SLBs and teachers may need more resources than are available. For instance, increased enrolment has led to a greater demand for teachers, infrastructure, textbooks, pit latrines drop holes, desks, classrooms, libraries and staff quarters. To cope with this situation, SLBs may develop certain strategies to limit demand, utilize the available resources to the maximum, and modify their work to meet their objectives. Weatherley and Lipsky (2002: 172) suggest that SLBs can operate freely by developing routine procedures and rationing the prevailing resources, modifying goals, and controlling the number of service recipients. This means that SLBs have the opportunity to implement policy to fulfil their responsibilities at work. These characteristics relate with Lipsky's (1980) contention by airing out that public policies are not only those formulated by members of parliament or top administrators, but in reality they come from crowded work place offices shaped by regular interactions. Anchored on the public administration field, SLB is thoroughly embedded in the notion of administrative discretion. This impliesa high level of implementation of certain public policies and programmes by SLBs, especially when they are under pressure to produce results, as supported by Lipsky (2010), Tummerset al., (2014). It also describes the characteristics of SLBs focusing on their personal views, beliefs, norms and demographic characteristics. Concerning administrative discretion, Walker and Niner (2015), Hupe (2013), and Brodkin (2012) maintain that SLBs' behavior and policy outcomes can partly be a result of public trust, and of the administrative culture or system in different contexts. Based on Lameck's (2017:2) view, SLBs are frontline workers with a degree of discretion, who are faced with a heavy workload and conflicting demands from within and outside the organization. While discretion in Lameck's view covers only individual judgments, in reality, it captures both granted and individual verdicts. Therefore, SLBs may exercise granted and judgmental discretion to make decisions regarding service delivery.

Street-level bureaucrats' discretion

Discretion used by SLBs is more meaningful in a devolved system than in a centralized one (Doh 2013; Dada 2013; Hupe 2013; Ringoldet al., 2012). The scholars contend that the exercise of discretionary power leads to the gradual devolution of autonomy by central government, embracing both granted discretion (autonomy) and judgmental discretion that can be used by individuals or SLBs. The problem with judgmental discretion is that it contains an element of leniency regarding the decisions public servants make because according to Burns (2004), people's behavior follows the perception of reality and not reality itself. Discretion in this context focuses on SLBs' actual behavior in relation to the contextual mandate (Hupe, 2013), which involves 'discretionary choices' (Brodkin, 2011), 'discretionary users' (Oberfield, 2010), and 'discretionary behavior' (Walker and Niner, 2005). This implies that SLBs (teachers) can exercise their freedom to make an informed choice in developing or implementing the curriculum in relation to their objectives. Tummers (2011) views that SLBs act differently. This freedom can be exercised in a specific context (Evans, 2010). Consequently, execution of discretionary power may be deterred by a situation or context (environment).

The foundation of judgmental discretion is laid down by Locke and Davis. Whereas Locke (1948) argues that at the end of policy chain cruelty commences, Davis (1969) refutes Locke's view by asserting that at the end of the law not only does tyranny starts, but also discretion commences. Davis conceptualizes discretion as either beneficence, justice, reasonableness, or tyranny, injustice, arbitrariness. Although Locke looks at this concept from a pessimistic viewpoint, Davis remains realistic considering both pessimistic and optimistic versions. For Locke, the use of judgmental discretion to deliver primary education always contradicts policy intentions. This implies that SLBs' strategies address only frontline workers' intentions rather than people or pupils' interests. For Davis, street-level bureaucrats and primary school teachers focus either on their own or people's interests depending on circumstances. This is substantiated by Anisman (1975) who asserts that under certain circumstances public officials bestowed with authority may choose to act or not; rely on one path, or opt for the other; hire a professional, or a friend, or a foreigner, or an indigenous. In so doing, the government official may be influenced by own goals or interests more than people' interests. Although Anisman agrees with Davis, he is more inclined to Locke. Based on this controversy, the exercise of discretion may result in both public and personal gain. When a person gains more than the public gains, it may be interpreted as the misuse (abuse) of power.

However, an understanding of discretionary power is not complete without shedding some light on 'granted discretion', which embraces a degree of freedom accorded by policies, legislation, statutes and other mandates (Hupe, 2013). In this regard, Robert (1975) mentions three types of discretion. The first is 'explicit discretion', expounded by Keith (2005) as discretionary powers conferred on administrators through statutes. Where there is a statutory or legislative vacuum, judgmental discretion is manifested. The second type of discretion is 'Prosecutorial discretion' whereby decisions on law enforcement may differ according to context. A good example is of a prosecutor and defendant or offender. Prosecutorial discretion accords power to a prosecutor to choose whether or not to charge a wrongdoer (person) for wrongdoing (crime) and files the charge. In this context, a primary school teacher may decide to warn a pupil being suspected of burglary or charge him/her with burglary. This goes to show that decisions and outcomes regarding service delivery may vary across contexts and the nature of the service being offered (Robinson 2007, Alsop *et. al.*, 2006). The third type of discretion focuses on 'appraisal of evidence' where decisions conform to situational (value) judgment. It is about taking gathered information and analyzing their significance (relevance), reliability and validity and applying them to the specific context, education in this regard.

Bryner (1987) points out two types of discretion: 'rule making' (legislative) and 'application of rule'. The latter covers all three types of discretion highlighted by Robert (1975). Although teachers' main role is to implement a policy, in a certain context they may formulate and execute their own policies. There is no doubt that teachers as SLBs in a given framework of a certain policy (Burns 2004) may use discretion differently; they can either follow the rules or be rebellious, which means that all types of discretion have both beneficial and detrimental repercussions.

Merits of discretion
Discretionary power can enhance the making of sound choices, depending on the prevailing circumstances. In principle, discretionary choice carries justice and righteousness with it. For instance, primary school teachers exercise their duties as per legislations, policies, circulars, and guidelines under MoESTVT.

Burke (1996) substantiates this by asserting that discretionary choice helps to keep street-level bureaucrats on track in terms of 'right and justice'. This means that in undertaking their duties and taking discretionary decisions teachers are accountable for their actions. Based on Dillman's (2002) view point, wisely exercised discretion ensures that the decisions made by frontline policy implementers, meaning that teachers in this case are both right and effective. Decision makers ensure 'sufficient flexibility' …and use information in a prudent and humane manner' (Michael and Don Gottfredson 1988: 263). Consequently, in conveying knowledge to learners for example, the exercise of discretion is inclined more to promoting the justice, equity, fairness and equality of beneficiaries than something else. Aristotle asserts that 'treating unequals in the same manner is an abuse of discretion or it is injustice to treat equals in an unequal manner' (ibid.).

Challenges of discretion

Abuse of discretion in the delivery of services, particularly education, has become a common phenomenon today. For instance, it is not an issue to find teachers evading classes; parents not making follow ups on school development of their pupils; school committee not holding teachers accountable for their wrong doings; and government officials not allocating funds for schools development including monitoring and evaluation. The exercise of discretion in this regard manifests itself as malfeasance due to enforcement gaps, injustice, prejudice, favoritism, segregation, stigmatization, diverse interests, and biases in the execution of public policy (Ball et. al., 1985). These problems arise as a result of a breakdown in the interaction between policy makers, citizens and public primary school teachers, where one actor may undermine others due to the imbalance of power. Generally, policy makers seem to be more powerful than other actors, a situation which may hamper their relationship with other actors (Boven and Zouridis 2002). Thus, decisions regarding service delivery may be frustrating if they do not focus on citizens' interests, particularly in the absence of formal rules or at the end of policy chain. if schools have no strong monitoring mechanisms to teachers, there is a likeliness that teachers may not prepare lesson notes, attend classes, teach, compose examinations, mark examination papers, monitor pupils' discipline.. To sum up, the positive and negative sides of discretion are that at one point teachers' interaction with service recipients may or may not enhance compliance with public policy intentions.

Street-level bureaucracy theory

The SLB theory applies to where there is a high demand for services, coupled with inadequate resources, abundant physical and/or psychological threats, and ambiguous job performance expectations (Lipsky, 2010, 1980, 1969). This reflects the ongoing situation in Tanzania. There is an increasing demand for primary education with limited finances, staff and infrastructure or equipment in many parts of the country. Although many efforts have been made by the government to address these predicaments, it seems that school teachers in liaison with people have tried their best to develop strategies for coping with the status quo. This confirms the exercise of internal arrangements at the grassroots to address stubborn predicaments. Doing the internal arrangement at the local level without government's knowledge reveals limited effectiveness of the government in controlling and managing selected schools thoroughly. This leaves SLBs with the discretion to jointly work with people or citizens in their premises to define their fate. This is what Moore (1973:721) observes that at the local level there are certain forces (customs, norms, rules) that shape people's behavior to comply or abide by customary laws. This entails that interaction at the grassroots exhibits distinct operational boundaries in social fields expressed through moral obligations not enforceable by legislation. Frontline workers as they interact with people under certain circumstances

observe existing cultures. This means that social obligation is an established loyalty that is not easy to break as there is the fear of one being excluded from society. Wilhelm (2011) observes that the internal environment provides strong pressure for an individual to comply with the existing system unless one wants to alienate or disentangle oneself from this social field's relationship. Figure 2 demonstrates how this works. It shows how coping strategies are practiced and how they limit government's control over a semi-autonomous social field in selected LGAs in Tanzania.

Figure 2: Slim Efficacy in Dispensaries and Schools

Source: Adapted from Wilhelm (2011) and Kamugisha (2019).

The kind of arrangement in Figure 2 is what compels people while interacting with frontline workers to adhere to informally created rules concerning compliance or non-compliance with public policy intentions; and efforts to change this will not succeed a great deal (Wilhelm, 2011). Moreover, the execution of a legal order may produce results which are different from those anticipated due to the influence of semi-autonomous social fields (Moore, 1973). This means that coping with and limiting a legal order is reflected in the delivery of primary education in several ways in Tanzania. Lipsky (1980) showed what can hamper the robust delivery of primary education in the context of Tanzania, namely, too few textbooks, desks, toilets, staff, staff quarters and classrooms. Others are the lack of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation for staff and the funds needed to run the schools, implying that schools will have to close down if these problems are not resolved. The fact that LGAs have not been given substantial autonomy to run primary schools but they are still operating them confirms that SLBs are exercising their discretionary powers as an imperative to deal with the status quo.

Discretion and service delivery trends in Tanzania

Understanding the trends regarding the delivery of essentials services particularly primary education in LGAs since independence in Tanzania (Tanganyika by then) is the notion that discretion had been given through modes of governance in the name of decentralization to enhance a robust service delivery. Autonomy of LGAs is accorded by the United Republic of Tanzania Constitution (1977) articles 145 (1) and 146 (1) which establish their existence and accord some roles respectively. Decentralization was anticipated to increase the quality of governance and service delivery (REPOA 2010). Quality of governance would be understood by local government councils expressing freedom to make policies

and operational decisions without being encroached by central government institutions (URT, 1998). Decentralization, as defined by Cheema and Rondinelli (2007), carries both 'forms' and 'dimensions'. While the former covers de-concentration, delegation, devolution, privatization and partnership, the latter encompasses administrative, political, financial, and economic (market) dimensions. The exercise of discretion and service delivery can be understood under unicentric, multicentric and pluralistic systems varying in 'forms' and 'dimensions' of decentralization as elaborated by Doh (2013).

In the Unicentric era where the governance system embraced de-concentration form of decentralization, decisions regarding collective service delivery were only under the custody of central government. It was at zenith from 1972 to 1982 when local government's autonomy was disbanded (Liviga 2011; Max 1991). It was reflected in various legislations, particularly education, where Act No. 25 of 1978 of Education restricted its provision only to government, implying that non-governmental actors had no opportunity to contribute in the delivery of primary education. Furthermore, centralization hindered primary school teachers from exercising their discretionary power regarding the delivery of primary education. Although these challenges hampered effective delivery of primary education, little has been written about how primary school teachers muddled through. The failure of the unicentric mode of governance to enhance a robust service delivery in local governments fueled a shift from collectivist to individualistic, market-oriented (multicentric) system.

The multicentric system dominated decisions regarding service delivery from the year 1985 to the early 1990s in the form of privatization focusing more on the 'market' than the 'state' (Masue 2014; Sorensen and Torfing 2004), promising to bring a significant improvement on the state's financial capacity as was propagated by IMF and WB. It was anticipated that the state would set sound budgets for the delivery of essential services, like education. However, these neo-liberal policies did not lead to economic recovery as was promised, but instead they increased external debt and frustrated socio-economic and political spheres, which were aggravated by the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the retrenchment of staff (Kamugisha 2019, Masue 2014). Subsequently, the delivery of essential services, including primary education, deteriorated greatly because the government was unable to finance them. In line with that, Mushi (2009) pointed out that public schools were nearly collapsing characterized by obsolete school infrastructures, lack of authorized teaching materials, qualified teachers and inability of the government to motivate teaching staff. This state of art affected service delivery including education. The literature does not explain how street-level bureaucrats and public primary school teachers were able to proceed with the provision of education.

The challenges of multicentric and unicentric systems were to be addressed by pluralistic system in the 1990s, which focused much on increasing a venue for interaction between governmental and non-governmental actors or public private mix regarding service delivery, particularly education. The National Education Policy of 1995 uplifted the restrictions posed by Act No. 25 of 1978 restricting the delivery of primary education to the government only. In this era the government of Tanzania adopted decentralization by devolution to transfer human resources, financial resources, physical resources, autonomy, and responsibilities and improve governance or making of decisions at LGAs, including communities (Kamugisha 2019; Kessy and McCourt 2010). It was thought that the interface between key policy makers (local government officials, councilors), citizens and street-level bureaucrats would culminate ina robust service delivery. Despite the interface between the aforesaid actors, the practice

reveals that service delivery is still ineffective; implying that not always such interaction is mutual and that it always culminates in a robust service delivery. This means that the operations of the aforesaid actors to enhance service delivery may be deterred by a lack of mutual interface between them. Government's interference with local government affairs, information asymmetry among service beneficiaries, conflicts between government officials and councilors, and misappropriation of resources, express some of such deterrents. This provides avenues for application of street-level bureaucracy theory (Lipsky 2010; 1980; 1969).

Methods

This study adopted a qualitative research approach to study how SLBs in Mvomero District and Moshi Municipal Councils develop certain strategies to cope with the deterrents of primary education delivery in Tanzania. The two councils were selected because they constitute the earliest councils formed in phase one and two of the Tanzania local government reform. Similarly, the two councils varied in terms of location, income, population size, performance, and socio-economic activities (CAG Report, 2019). For instance, Moshi council normally got unqualified report while Mvomero council got qualified reports from CAG. Regarding income, most inhabitants of Moshi are Chaga with a relatively higher level of income than their counterparts- Lugulu.

The study was carried out using numerous methods of collection of data. The first method (primary) focused on in-depth interviews covering 32 primary school teachers and six (6) government officials. Observation covered some school sites to ascertain the state of resources, namely human, infrastructural, and financial. Secondly, documentary review facilitated collection of secondary data by reviewing national documents such as policies, guidelines, legislation, research reports and educational programmes.

Results

This section presents the deterrents of service delivery with a bias on primary education (through documentary review, interviews, and observation observation), coping with service delivery (education) deterrents (through interviews, observation and documentary review), and how coping strategies shape (education) public policy.

Primary education deterrents

Since independence, the Tanzanian government has been making deliberate efforts to ensure a robust service delivery. Despite the milestones reached as a result of its initiatives, the reviewed documents reveal that service delivery at LGAs' is still at a snail's pace, implying that a lot more effort is needed, particularly in relation to indicators of primary education (Awinia, 2019). Statistics on enrollment clearly articulated that while pupils' enrolled in public schools increased by 18.6 % (from 7,083,063 pupils in 2004 to 8,639,202 in 2016), the number of teachers enrolling in colleges dropped by 39.2 % in 2008 (from 30,892 to 18,754), implying that when pupils' numbers were growing, teachers' numbers graduating from colleges were going down (Awinia 2019; BEST 2016; URT 2012) and a significant number of school aged children were still out of school (URT-MEST, 2018).

Statistics on the pass rate indicated that there had been a decline in the number of pupils passing the primary school leaving examination based on the set threshold (Mkumbo, 2010). For instance, the percentage went down from 70.5 (2006) to 49.4 (2009) (ibid). Mvomero District and Moshi Municipal Councils indicated that very few children scored an 'A.' "Score trends in 'A' in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 were 0.3, 1, 1.7, 3.4; in 'B' 42.4, 58, 37.9, 44.9; in 'C' 48, 37, 47.5, 44.5; and in D+E 9.3, 4, 12.9, 7.2" (Kamugisha, 2019). The same trend was reflected in the number of pit latrines, drop holes, staff, textbooks, classrooms and desks against the set threshold, as summarized in Table 1. Focusing on the teacher-pupil ratio (TPR), the national level statistics disclosed that while the TPR should be one to forty-five (1:45), practically it was 46 (2000), 54 (2009), 51 (2010), 48 (2011), 70 (2012) and 42 (2016) (Awinia 2019; BEST 2016; Kamugisha and Mateng'e 2014). The TPR in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa, and Mongwe primary schools was 1:39, 1:30, 1:38, and 1:70 respectively (Table 1, No.3). While the first three schools met the required threshold, Mongwe primary school did not due to its remoteness.

Statistics on the classroom-pupil ratio (CPR) reflected the same trend. While one classroom was supposed to accommodate not more than 45 pupils (1:45), national statistics revealed that a normal classroom in the country catered for 92 (2006), 109 (2009), 72 (2010), 66 (2011), 70 (2012), and 77(2016) (BEST 2016; URT 2012). The CPR in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa and Mongwe primary schools was 1:79, 1:49, 1:121 and 1:58, respectively (Table 1, No.5). The status of pit latrines drop holes (PLDH) indicated that the acceptable PLDH-pupil ratio was one to twenty five (1:25) for boys and one to twenty for girls (1:20). Nationally, the trend was 12.5 (2005), 89 (2009), 56 (2010), 53 (2011), 56 (2012) and 56 (2016) (Awinia 2019; BEST 2016; URT 2012). Statistics for the PLDH-boys ratio in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa, and Mongwe was 1:25, 1: 33, 1:47, and 1:29 (Table 1, No.1) and for girls it was 1:20, 1:35, 1:43, 1:25, and 1:29 (Table 1, No.2). Although these statistics are better than the national statistics, they still do not comply with the established threshold. The same applies to textbooks, that is, the book-pupil ratio (BPR). For instance, while each pupil should have his/her own textbook, national statistics showed that 2 shared a textbook in 2001, 3 in 2009, 5 in 2010, 5 in 2011 and 5 in 2012. The BPR in Mnazi, Njoro, Dakawa, and Mongwe was 1:2, 1: 2, 1:24, and 1: 31 (Table 1, No.4) as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Comparison of Characteristics of Selected Schools

N/s	School Features	N.S	Mnazi (MO)	Njoro (MO)	Dakawa (MV)	Mongwe (MV)
	Standard indicators	N.S	Actual	Actual	Actual	Actual
1	Boys PLH Pupils Ratio	1:25	1:33	1:47	1:49	1:29
2	Girls PLH Pupils Ratio	1:20	1:35	1:43	1:25	1:29
3	Teacher-Pupil Ratio (TPR)	1:45	1:39	1:30	1:38	1:70
4	Book-Pupil Ratio (BPR)	1:1	1:2	1:2	1:24	1:31
5	Classroom-Pupil Ratio (1:45)	1:45	1:76	1:49	1:121	1:58
6	Desk-Pupil Ratio (DPR 1:2)	1:2	1:3	1:2	1:3	1:3

Source: Kamugisha (2019:119)

Generally, the statistics in Table 1 reveal that Mvomero and Moshi Councils lack autonomy as regards having authority over resources (finances, staff, and equipment) and access to social services, focusing on primary education as explained below.

Authority

The information from Mvomero and Moshi Councils revealed that policy makers had narrow discretionary authority to make decisions at the local level before the reform era of the 1990s. Councilors opined that after the reforms they had discretionary power to sack any council official, including the directors, for violating rules or for squandering resources. They could also make their own by-laws, solicit resources, and allocate them to address jurisdictional matters. Heads of departments were accountable to LGAs executives whereas previously they were only accountable to the respective ministry, (MoESTVT) in this context. Although that seemed to be the case, the notion of autonomy appears to be contradictory because Act Nos. 7 and 8 of 1982 of LGAs give autonomy to the minister responsible for LGAs to create, abolish, and re-establish LGAs even without their consent. In line with that, the government officials and councilors interviewed indicated that executive directors had limited autonomy to solicit funds as a source of revenue and use them as they saw fit, which opposes Ayee's (2008) contention that money is the life blood of decentralization, without which nothing imperative can be done.

Financial resources

This statement by Aye (2008) implies that for decentralization to work, money is crucial. Although the interviewed government officials and councilors from the selected LGAs indicated that they had some financial autonomy, practice revealed that a decision regarding the allocation of financial resources was always overseen by central government as the acting Municipal Executive Director (MED) commented:

> Local governments' power to levy and allocate taxes is granted, although in some cases autonomy is limited. The council's own sources of revenue, like property tax and hotel levy have been shifted to the TRA. From the meagre revenue, the directives still require the council to allocate 60 % of own source revenue to development, transfer 20 % to lower level governments, allocate 5 percent to women's groups, 5 percent to youth groups, and render 5 percent as co-funding to donor-funded projects, excluding other unplanned activities. In line with this, LGAs still get conditional and unconditional grants (Kamugisha 2019: 113).

Theoretically, LGAs have substantial autonomy, but in practice the above quotation reveals that LGAs' problems are mainly associated with financial incapacity, which contradicts certain legislations and policies pointed out earlier which accord mandate to LGAs to solicit, plan and use own source revenue sagely on numerous issues, including school development. In addition to that, the capitation grant disbursed to primary schools did not go as budgeted. The following trend tells it all: 75 % of 32 billion (2016) was not disbursed; 67 % of 54 billion (2015); 47 % of 81 billion (2014); 27 % of 133 billion (2013) (Awinia 2019; MoFP 2017).

Human resources

Adequate and qualified human resource can enhance a robust service delivery. The adopted legislations at the lower level of government mandate LGAs to recruit their own personnel with relevant characteristics (URT1998, 1982). But staff recruitment function, particularly of primary school teachers, is overseen by central government through different ministries covering those related with education, finance, local governments, and management of public services. Local government officials and councilors have autonomy to only distribute and transfer staff within their jurisdiction.

However, this is not always the case because staff transfer and distribution is partly influenced by government officials, friends, business men and women, and prominent people through 'memos' and 'networks' (Kamugisha, 2019). Actually, the recruitment is done by the center through Public Service Recruitment Secretariat (PSRS) under Section No. 29 (1) as amended by Act, No. 18 of 2007. The PSRS functions contradict local government policies and legislations which mandate local government councils' power of exerting own freedom in making policies to address jurisdictional matters without government encroachment (URT, 1998: 3). Furthermore, resourcing procedures are governed by various Public service decrees including Act No.18 of 2007.

Infrastructure

Autonomy can be assessed based on how officials at LGAs have autonomy to acquire necessary resources and equipment, especially for schools in this context. Table 1 above shows what schools lack enough classrooms, desks, toilets and extra-curricular facilities. The Municipal Executive Director, Municipal Education Officer, and Ward Executive Officer indicated that although LGAs could exercise their discretion on jurisdictional matters, they had limited autonomy (financial resources or capitation grants, physical resources, human resource, including teachers) to address service delivery problems.

Accountability

Accountability can be presented in different ways. This section looks at citizens' ability to demand accountability, especially when they encounter delays and experience theft by SLBs in trying to get access to essential services. Although Sujarwoto (2012) commented that citizens could either voice or exit when service quality declined, it was imperative to find out what citizens did when they experienced 'delays' and 'theft'. Insights from the two councils given in Table 2 show that 19 % of citizens did not know what to do about delays and 16 % did not know what to do about suspected theft. This was more of a problem in Mvomero than Moshi. While 16 % lodged complaints through the proper channels in the case of delays, 38 % did the same when they suspected theft. Similarly, 41 % did nothing when they encountered delays because they believed that nothing could be done and 41 % did the same when suspecting someone of theft (see Table 2).

Table 2: Extent of Citizens' Demand for Accountability

Levels	What can you do when encountering delays while seeking public services?			What can you do when suspecting an education officer of stealing?		
	Mvomero	Moshi	Total (%)	Mvomero	Moshi	Total (%)
Do not know what to do	15	4	19	13	3	16
Lodge complaints through proper channels	4	12	16	8	30	38
Use connections with influential people	2	12	14	1	1	2
Offer tips or bribe	8	2	10	2	1	3
Do nothing because nothing can be done	21	20	41	26	15	41
Total (n-50)	50	50	100	50	50	100

Source: Kamugisha (2019)

Table 2 shows that Moshi (urban) citizens were able to demand accountability more than their counterparts, Mvomero-rural, which shows that the difference between rural and urban areas matters when it comes to demanding accountability due to information asymmetry and lack of confidence and connections.

The state of service delivery discussed above concerning school characteristics, authority, finances, decision making, staffing, infrastructure, accountability and access confirm what Lipsky (2010, 1980, 1969) states that when there is a high demand for crucial services, there are conditions that are likely to hinder effective service delivery. Some of them are inadequate resources, physical and/or psychological threats, and ambiguous job performance expectations (ibid.), which is also a case in Tanzania (Kamugisha, 2019). This signifies a lack of symbiotic interface between key service delivery actors and governmental and non-governmental actors. This is because the centre has enormous power over LGAs and so is unwilling to cascade substantial autonomy to LGAs for fear of surrendering its office (Gupta 2009). This culminates in a lack of mutual relationship, and thus, as Wild and colleagues (2015) point out, creating a mismatch between policy making in theory and its execution in practice, thereby restraining resources, authority and power transfer to LGAs. This situation denies citizens an opportunity to participate in development process by giving their opinion, labor and finance, for example, in school construction. Other factors that may hinder accountability include: corruption, lack of infrastructure, information asymmetry, unethical culture, low capacity and technocracy (Muro and Namusonge 2015). Regarding these deterrents, Lipsky (2010, 1980, and 1969) suggests that SLBs would devise mechanisms to cope with the status quo while Moore (1973) observes that coping strategies may tend to limit government's control over semi-autonomous social fields.

Coping with service delivery deterrents
The findings from selected cases show that SLBs can cope with service delivery deterrents discussed in previous sections using various strategies. This section covers a few of them in the context of Tanzania, like resource rationing, making routine procedures, and modification.

Rationing
The findings revealed that where there was high demand for services with limited resources, rationing was introduced to safeguard the distribution of resources and allocation of services without any waste. Rationing was in two ways. First, primary school teachers carried out their tasks by fixing the distribution of services. For example, time was rescheduled or minimized to facilitate teaching when facing staff shortage. Second, they provided services at a certain level to different classes; they prioritized national examination classes at the expense of non-examination classes.

Furthermore, teachers as street-level bureaucrats attempted to reorganize their work to meet their obligations, like saving time for their own benefit. Despite such challenges, rationing meant devising ways to ensure fairness, orderliness, regularity and answerability, and defending workers from beneficiaries' demands for a response. It was a way of legitimizing the reason for not dealing with recipients' concerns at a certain point. On the other hand, SLBs used their discretion to ration services by ceasing to perform certain tasks they were responsible for. Certain schools dealt with inadequacy in terms of both the number and qualification. For instance, although Njoro and Mnazi primary schools had the required teacher pupil ratio (TPR) of one teacher to 45 pupils, teachers of standards one and two were unqualified.

To deal with this scenario, the school administrators requested the Municipal Education Officer to enhance training of teachers without qualification to instill the 3Rs into pupils. Coping with staff shortage, Mongwe primary school arranged for private teaching in return for a small token by getting pupils to

review previous national examination questions, selecting the subjects to teach, and giving priority to examination classes, like standards four and seven. Because Mongwe primary school had a ratio of one teacher serving 70 pupils (1:70), the only way it could cut costs was to engage pupils to teach easy subjects focusing on classes preparing for the final examinations. It also rationed teaching time by reducing the number of days, contrary to education policy intentions because teachers stayed far from Mongwe village for fear of witchcraft practices reported there. Because traveling to and from the school and prepare for class, they arrived at a consensus to teach from Monday to Wednesday, leaving the remaining days for personal business, self-reliance, entrepreneurial and extra-curricular activities. Another way by which teachers dealt with the scarcity of manpower and resources was to bear some expenses. For instance, in the absence of funds allocated for examination or test papers, teachers used their initiative to print pupils' exercise papers in advance and distributed them later, thereby resolving service delivery deterrents.

Simplification and routinization

According to Lipsky (1980) treatise, SLBs face tough conditions in executing their tasks and so they may think of some strategies for dealing with service delivery deterrents in semi-autonomous social fields, simplification and routinization being some of them. The routine activities developed byprimary schools are viewed as local rule or formal order taking place in selected schools, regarded by Lipsky as 'social fields' as a result of existing norms enriched by routine and simplification. Generally, SLBs and semi-autonomous social fields' used here to elucidate primary school teachers' operations in selected LGAs. The findings indicated that primary school teachers tended to behave like SLBs, since they had established routines and made life simpler to cope with service delivery deterrents, including inadequate resources, like finances, primary school teachers, teachers' quarters, pit latrines, drop holes and other school infrastructures. As regards the mechanisms used to deal with the shortage of pit latrines and drop holes, with the resulting overcrowding and pupils relieving themselves in nearby bushes, Njoro and Mongwe teachers simplified this problem by encouraging children to take a break every half an hour to reduce queues to the pit latrines. At Mnazi primary school class teachers were routinely involved in managing the queues although it took up a lot of their time, for which they were not given any incentive. It was also noted that a lack of adequate intrinsic and extrinsic incentives compelled teachers to do businesses such as ladies' and gentlemen's salons, motorbike taxi service, and farming, livestock keeping during teaching hours although the Standing orders for the public service 2009 and other Public Service Acts do not entertain the practice. As regards to 'overcrowding', which was difficult to control because the number of pupils' enrolled kept on growing, schools such as Mongwe primary school divided big classes and examination classes into streams, which could be attended to by more than one teacher at different intervals. These findings indicate that implementation of the decentralization policy and its promises by reformers have not led to an improvement in essential services at LGAs, but instead frontline workers have always had to work to bridge the gaps by developing coping strategies to ensure continuity in the delivery of services.

Modification

As already mentioned, Lipsky (2010, 1980, and 1969) indicates that in doing their work SLBs, primary school teachers in this context; face the difficulty of limited resources. Therefore, SLBs try to make best use of them through modification of their work, while relinquishing some organizational and personal objectives that cannot be attained. The findings revealed that teachers had a lot of influence on the lives of

citizens because they could determine how their children could benefit from their service through their decisions, and the manner they dealt with service delivery predicaments and emerged work pressure. The ways or internal engagements, they used to curb such quandaries is what translated into local accepted policies or living norms in the social fields. In this regard, teachers chose to teach by reviewing the questions set in previous examinations due to the lack of human and material resources, rather than following the syllabus, or they trained older pupils to write notes and mark the work of lower classes and get pupils in higher classes to mark each other's multiple choice questions. These actions clearly indicate how at the end of the policy chain primary school teachers from selected areas formulated their own policies and executed them as a way of mitigating the problematic situation.

How coping strategies shape public policy intentions

Through a street-level bureaucracy perspective there is a notion that SLBs always develop strategies to address some challenges they face in doing their businesses. Nevertheless, there is another school of thought that such strategies may contradict public policy intentions or limit the effectiveness of the 'legal rule' or 'order'. Coping strategies at the local level dance to the tune of operating forces in the social fields. These study findings confirm that in certain scenarios SLBs' coping strategies and interventions either comply with public policy intent or not. Such strategies became social rules, norms and values. Compliance with legal order was reflected in the interface between SLBs and citizens through school committees where it was acceptable to ask parents to contribute money to purchase more desks, chalk, chairs, tables and textbooks. Although government circulars No. 5 of May, 2016 prohibits parental contributions practiced from 2002 through voluntary and compulsory contributions, in some situations parental contributions were still practiced at a great deal. Another example was the parents and teachers getting together to raise the national examinations' performance by contributing some food and money so that their children could be tutored after school hours. This practice indicate how socially constructed rules facilitate the delivery of education by enabling citizens to voluntarily participate in the activity.

The inability of social rules, norms and values to comply with laws, statutes, creeds and public policies in social fields means that government's interventions do not always achieve their goals. The findings indicate that some issues in the internal structure respond more to customary arrangements, some of which are governed by the lineage system involving the rights, trust and obligations of kin as well as neighbors. For instance, the fact that behavior such as absenteeism and dropping out affected the delivery of primary education without government officials taking legal actions, explicates how social norms or rules may limit the effectiveness of government in execution of formal rules. Although the inability to take action against absenteeism and dropping out contradict public policy and the public service legal framework of Tanzania, they are viewed as normal by citizens. For instance, it was observed that some parents and guardians in the selected cases encouraged girls to drop out and get married so that the parents could dowry. The parents also encouraged boys to drop out mainly to help with running their parents' businesses, which is prohibited by the 2002 Education Act. Moreover, lower level leaders, who should ensure that this law is implemented, were reluctant to take action because the majority of the community members behaved the same way. They probably feared being victimized by the large community if the government were to punish those reported for doing wrong. Secondly, teachers do not always abide by the law contrary to its requirement. Such kind of behavior contradicts the execution of Education and Training Policy (URT, 2014, 1995) and the Public Service Regulations (2003). For instance, as already mentioned, the modifications they made to overcome shortage of resources were a misuse of judgmental

discretion in favor of leniency, as noted by Locke (1948: 99) and Davis (1969: 3) that "where law ends, tyranny begins" and Davis' (1969) critique to Locke's argument that discretion begins at the end of policy chain which also covers tyranny.

Discussion

This article addresses the state of service delivery (primary education), coping strategies with deterrents of serviced delivery, and how coping mechanisms affect public policy implementation. The service delivery in selected LGAs is at the state of flux despite the milestone reached as the result of decentralization reforms. This is because the discretionary autonomy articulated by decentralization reforms (URT, 1998) has not been honored. The central government continues to extend its tentacles over LGAs' affairs. For instance, LGAs are used as a learning curve for the central government because when they discover new vibrant source of own revenues, the central government seizes it.

The central government directs LGAs how to use their own revenues over a number of things including serving the disadvantaged groups like the aged, womankind, youth and undermined. Therefore, anticipated LGAs authority declines or becomes like a rubber stamp because many of the activities done at this level is a response to higher authority's directives. Furthermore, in the delivery of primary education, staff recruitment is done by the centre through ministries of education, finance, public service, local government, and recruitment secretariat. Nevertheless, there are no any efforts seen so far rising to question the overriding powers from the central government suggesting that the central government interference over LGAs' discretionary power will not be reduced. As for now, it is the central government that decides what LGAs should do and not do. Consequently, the mutual interface anticipated by reformers to come true amidst the centre and LGAs has become a nightmare or illusive as highlighted by aforesaid factors. In this situation Lipsky (1980) explicates what policy implementers should do to rescue the possibility of closure. With limited resources, unconducive service delivery environment, and any threat that may be encountered in the due course of rendering services, frontline policy implementers (in this context primary school teachers), should develop mechanisms to deal with such difficulties. Due to the service delivery deterrents encountered in the selected LGAs, it was evidenced that street level bureaucracy largely applied. Primary school experts or teachers in study schools conducted themselves as SLBs. For example, where teachers were not enough, pupils in higher level classes were required by the schools to teach the young ones under the guidance of the respective subject teachers. Secondary, under limited motivation, teachers could decide to complement the existing fissure by engaging in 'entrepreneurial activities' like opening ladies and gentlemen hair cutting/dressing saloons, bodaboda transport, and retail kiosks. With these coping strategies, one may not find a problem but it is imperative to note that they increased absenteeism, which led to compromising of education quality. Despite the challenges from the coping strategies, some other strategies increased quality as in many selected schools teachers cooperated with parents to increase teaching hours apart from the formal schedule set by the government. This was specially done to national examination classes for the purpose of covering syllabus and reviewing previous exams whereby parents supported schools by contributing either in cash or in kind or both. The limitation of SLB' theory in relation with study areas is that, it is not always the case that whenever SLBs encounter difficulties they will find the way to deal with the situation. There are avenues for total exit, especially in difficult and complex environments.

Generally, coping strategies may lead to detrimental or negative repercussions depending on the nature of the policy in operation and the context. For instance, the National Education Policy (1995) encourages much private public mix in the delivery of primary education. Accordingly, engagement of citizens or parents' contributions was very much at zenith. Therefore, any contribution in cash or kind would mean compliance with it. However, the National Education Policy of 2014 was silent regarding parents' contributions to education delivery. The Government circular No. 5 of May, 2016 prohibits both voluntary and compulsory parent's contributions. However, although parents' contributions to compensate teachers' for their time informally scheduled for examination classes is good, it contradicts the government circular or the policy. Therefore, commenting on a policy as good or bad is contextual in certain situations. Furthermore, coping strategies may affect policy in several ways. Entertaining absenteeism in the name of engagement in entrepreneurial activities contradicts the standing orders for the Public Service of 2009 and other public service acts. This means that at the end of a policy chain, coping strategies may pose detrimental effects to the quality of education. As pointed out earlier, not always should coping mechanisms be entertained by street-level bureaucrats. The government has the responsibility to improve the working conditions in difficult environments. Otherwise collective services may not be accorded as required, and the spillover effect of not taking respective measures may be more injurious.

Conclusion

Based on what the selected cases reveal, SLBs as primary school teachers have the ability to develop a pattern of practices to cope with deterrents of service delivery, including primary education in this context, which tend to limit the central government's control over the respective semi-autonomous social field. This can be seen in how they translate discretion down to earth by putting public policy into action in a difficult environment for the sake of service beneficiaries. This is manifested in how SLBs manage heavy workloads, modify their work or ration material resources to meet this objective. SLBs also use their discretion as to whether or not to conform to public policy intentions. They may choose to ration teaching so that they can engage in entrepreneurial activities during class sessions, which is contrary to certain legislations, standing orders, employment guidelines, establishment circulars, teachers' ethics guidelines and other regulations governing operations of the public sector. They may also opt to abide by established guidelines, directives and legislations, and liaise with the citizens to amicably address educational problems. Because SLBs' behavior in a semi-autonomous social field is influenced more by wanting to deliver a service than meeting personal interests, the government should take this into account and find ways of raising their morale. Although SLBs are constrained by the lack of finances, staff and equipment, they can still render service and fulfill their duties when they put their mind to it altruistically. However, this depends on how they were raised religiously and socially and how teachers colleges' curriculum was designed to embrace teachers training and mentorship to shape teachers' behavior ethically in any situation. Since they are frontline policy implementers, they may have detrimental results as they interact with pupils they are not well trained.

Policy Implication

This paper aimed at explaining SLBs roles in developing strategies to deal with service delivery deterrents in selected councils in Tanzania. The strategies SLBs developed may either comply with public policy

intentions or not. To start with service delivery deterrents, it was noted that the interface between key stakeholders in the delivery of education did not culminate in mutual interaction because the center exhibited overriding powers over other stakeholders ending up deterring service delivery. The exercise of powers by the center was reflected in devolving capitation grants, teachers' recruitment, and distribution of school infrastructures. These problems can be addressed, firstly the central government deliberately deciding to cascade substantial autonomy to local governments so that they can address their jurisdictional matters using available resources. Secondly, the central government building people's capacity by availing them with relevant information as the basis for making informed decisions so that they can hold the government accountable indirectly through '*the ballot*' or directly through '*voice*' or '*exit*' when services quality declines due to unproductive decisions.

Based on Lipsky theory, there is a big room for the government not considering the aforesaid viewpoints. In this situation, frontline policy implementers, teachers in this context, may precede rendering services in a very difficult environment or decide to quit the work environment if its turbulence becomes high. For those who remain in semi-autonomous social fields can develop strategies to cope with the status quo (Lipsky, 1980). Some strategies affect policy, stipulated legislations, guidelines, procedures and standing orders pointed out in the previous sections. In the selected cases it was noted that some teachers engaged in small businesses, such as ladies and gentlemen saloons, motorcycle taxis or bodaboda and engaging in agricultural activities as a compliment to meagre salaries accorded to them. Therefore, it is imperative to accord teachers with extrinsic and intrinsic incentives, especially to those who are in difficult environments. Likewise, the government should enhance ethical education to ensure that teachers undertake responsibilities or civic duties thoroughly.

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